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ABSTRACT

TECHNO-RACISM: HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRITICAL
PHILOSOPHIES OF RACE

By
James Taylor
December 2016

Dissertation supervised by George Yancy
Racism continues to be a pressing problem in Western Society. In some ways it even
makes a great deal of sense to think about racism as a tool of political power. My dissertation
explores the way in which racism is informed by the underlying social structure of whiteness,
and the way that modern technology is informed by the underlying structure of the enframing. I
draw on the works of George Yancy, and Cornel West to demonstrate that the everyday
problems we face in racism are informed and guided by the systemic problem of whiteness. I
then use the work of Martin Heidegger to demonstrate that the everyday problems that exist in
modern technology are informed and guided by the systemic problem of enframing. By further
demonstrating that the language of sin, as it is used in the works of Augustine, can be applied to
both whiteness and enframing I show that these systems are manifestations of an underlying
cultural attitude, technoracism. The original work in my dissertation involves defining the
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concept of cultural attitude and demonstrating that cultural attitudes present a dominating force
in how western society has thought, lived, and worked throughout history. I then argue that our
current attitude is that of technoracism, and I locate technoracism at the advent of historical
modernity. Technoracism can be understood as a vice that is instantiated in the historical
moments of Christian Supremacy, the drive for precise scientific categories, and the emphasis on
individualism. These moments arise out of the pre-rational characteristics of violent exclusivity,
precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism. I ultimately conclude that an ethical resolution to
technoracism is necessary. To that end I work out a virtue ethics based on the ideal of humanity
as multiplicitous and lay out the virtues of religious diversity, aesthetic mystery, and community
to counter the vices of technoracism. Finally, I end my dissertation by explaining how these
virtues can be brought about through the practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and
dialogue.
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Introduction
Perhaps one of the most difficult parts of any project is the beginning. Indeed, one of the
problems facing this dissertation is precisely how to form the beginning of the project, especially
since this project appears to be such a massive undertaking. This dissertation will cover no less
than race and racism, technology and the dangers of technological advancement, and the
underlying attitude which links these two spheres.
Of course it cannot be taken as a given that race and technology are related or even that
they present any special problems. And while history and our contemporary moment speak to us
of the problems that both have wrought, as philosophers, we must show this to be so. Both topics
are clearly significant topics for philosophical analysis and discussion. Race has to do with one
of the most basic ways in which human beings have been categorized. To understand the concept
of race is to understand its logic, the ideas that justify race categories, and the social implications
that are entailed. Therefore, race is an issue that also deals with ontology, epistemology, and
ultimately ethics. Likewise, technology raises significant philosophical questions about how
human beings relate to their world, how they make use of that world and what this means for
their understanding of that world. Thus, technology raises issues that also deal with ontology,
epistemology and ultimately ethics.
It is not enough to see these spheres as mere issues for philosophical curiosity. The
questions that one poses, and the deeper issues that arise, when discussing race and technology
are profoundly important because both issues raise deep ethical concerns. To demonstrate the
ethical nature of race, one needs look no further than a brief study of the history of the past
several hundred years. Even in our contemporary moment, race, and questions of race, continues
to raise moral dilemmas and problems in society. On the other hand, technology is not always so
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clearly value laden. This might be because the ethical problems it does raise are dismissed as
secondary issues, or the result of ethical failures in some other sphere. Technology is supposed to
be morally neutral, since it is supposed to consist of nothing more than the manipulation or use
of human tools and the goals to which humans direct such tools. If technology raises any ethical
concerns, then those concerns should be related to the goals that humans have in using
technology or in the improper use of technology. Of course we could say the exact same thing
about the issue of race. It can be claimed that there is nothing intrinsically ethically problematic
about identifying or categorizing human beings according to racial types. Rather, the only
problem that arises is when such types are mishandled or else made to serve some nefarious
purposes. Indeed, the ethical concerns regarding technology and race seem all-too-reasonable.
For example, consider how racial classification works. If I identify someone correctly as
being of Asian descent and more specifically as originating from the island regions of Japan,
then I have simply made an obvious scientific observation. In short, if I claim that they are of the
Asian race then I have not yet done anything wrong or even problematic, so long as my claim
remains factual. Epistemological error, not ethical concerns, seems to arise only if I then draw
conclusions about this person based on their race, and then the error only exists if said
conclusions are the wrong ones. If I were to erroneously declare that an Asian person of Japanese
descent will be a skilled harmonica player, then the mistake is that I assume that one's race has to
do with one's musical talents. So long as I only draw the correct scientific conclusions from a
person's race, that is, conclusions about propensities for contracting certain diseases and simple
observations about "normal" height and weight ratios, then I seem to have done nothing wrong.
In the same way technology, at first, seems to pose no real ethical problems. A classic
example of this would be a case of an accidental death by use of a firearm. It would be clearly
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unethical to use a firearm to kill an innocent person. Yet it also seems obvious that there is
nothing ethically wrong if I properly discharge a firearm at a firing range when aiming at a
stationary target. The concerns raised in this second scenario are concerns of safety. A gun
presents certain risks and if a person is not properly trained in the correct use of a gun then they
are liable to accidentally hurt themselves or others. The same logic can be applied to driving a
car or working on machines in a factory. In each case it seems that there is nothing ethically
problematic in the basic use of the technological device, and that technology only becomes
problematic when it serves an immoral purpose. This may occur in one of two ways: first if I use
a firearm without receiving the proper training, and I know that I should receive that training,
then I am being unethical, which is to say willfully negligent. Second, if I use a firearm properly
but for purposes which are immoral such as the murder of a helpless person who has done me no
wrong, then I am also being unethical. In the first case I am immoral by a kind of willful
inactivity, in the second case I am immoral by a more common intentional evil. However, there
seems to be nothing in the making, designing, or basic use of a firearm that even raises any
ethical issues. In the same way race might be used to intentionally cause harm, and it may
through negligence come to harm someone. Thus, we are led to casually assume that technology
and race exist in a morally neutral state. Also, that any ethical inquiries are circumstantial, owing
to specific cases, rather than to the fundamental nature of the thing.
The ethical implications of both technology and race need to be brought forth and
uncovered. So, the first step in this dissertation is to demonstrate the extent of the ethical
problems inherent in these areas – race and technology.
Although racism is commonly accepted as a moral wrong, the notion of race itself seems
morally neutral, and this supposed neutrality must be investigated. We begin with racial
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stereotypes as a practical catalogue for racial categories. The advantage of starting here is that
racial stereotypes do not at all seem to be neutral. These stereotypes are loaded with value claims
and serve to reinforce certain social norms. So if there is something inherently value laden in
these types, then that might shed some light on how race itself is value laden. We begin by
delineating some of those stereotypes which our contemporary western, and especially
American, society makes readily available to us. One such type is "The Wigger - the white
person who acts like a black person."1 Crispin Sartwell expounds on the nature of this stereotype
in his article of the same name. He describes a television commercial in which the wigger is
portrayed by "three white guys speaking in black argot and dressed in parody Hip Hop wear sweat suits, head scarves, and sideways baseball caps...."2 Sartwell explains that the wigger is
often portrayed ironically or sarcastically as a figure in modern American comedy, "The comic
effect is achieved partly by the slight flavor of transgression that still attends the figure; the
wigger plays with and in a variety of stereotypes."3 The point for Sartwell is that the wigger
represents a notion about what it means to be black because the wigger is actually a white male.
Sartwell claims that the character is almost always a male, who is simply acting black. The
effect, then, is to draw forth and illuminate the stereotype of the black male as seen through the
comedic lens of the sardonic white male. This is of course not the only racial stereotype available
to us, and one might just as easily draw on the notion of the "day laboring immigrant" who is
typically Hispanic, or even the "upper class socialite" who is typically white.
These stereotypes abound in comedy, but we also encounter them in drama and in music.
Consider how the song "Lord Have Mercy on a Country Boy", presents a clear image of a poor,
ostensibly white, young American male and his daily experiences of life. At the same time the
song "Ridin" presents a very different figure of a poor, ostensibly black, young American male
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and his struggles with racial profiling. Despite the obvious differences between these two songs,
each presents very interesting profiles of race in American society.
"Country Boy" is a country song which focuses on the rural experiences of a man who
remembers using guns to hunt for game, and who experienced a free and unhindered access to
nature. Like other works of the genre, this song depicts the story of transition from a rural youth,
to a troubled and anxious adulthood in an urban environment. The song also raises a lament for a
simpler lifestyle, one which is ultimately overrun by encroaching urban advancement. 4
"Ridin", tells a very different story. It’s a rap song which focuses on the experiences of a
man who is being racially profiled by the police. While driving his car, with his tinted windows
and his loud music, the police pull him over to search his car for weapons and drugs. They pull
him over specifically because he is black and fits the profile of someone they think will be an
easy arrest. Although the police go away without finding anything, the singer also raps about
how he in fact secretly has both drugs and guns, but that he is too clever to be caught by the
police.5
Although it may be easy to say that these songs are not about racial stereotypes but rather
reflect different types of poverty from different community backgrounds, this rejoinder would be
naive. Each of the recording artists in their respective songs take up a first person perspective,
and the race of the recording artists becomes a major point of influence. "Country Boy" was
originally sung by Don Williams, a white country singer. "Ridin" was originally performed by
Chamillionaire and Krayzie Bone, both of whom are black recording artists. In neither case do
the artists try to take themselves out of the music but instead they step forward as the very
stereotypes about which they sing. The artist’s performance is meant, in some way, to give a
presentation of a type of being white and a type of being black.
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Chamillionaire’s song actually reflects an important social notion about racial
stereotyping, the idea that stereotypes are wrong in one sense, but also correct in another. 6 This
reveals the basic moral tension that exists when determining whether or not race actually
presents a moral issue in and of itself. We may claim that racial categories are morally neutral,
but we are only able to do so as long as we maintain that these categories are correct. Although
the police officers in "Ridin" are unjust in their racial profiling, even the singer admits, albeit
sarcastically, that the police are incidentally correct in their assumptions, at least in this one case.
But of course the singer is far too clever to ever get caught "ridin dirty",7 so the song becomes an
anthem of empowerment even as it stands as a critique of racism. Yet it is precisely this notion
that racial stereotypes are ultimately justified which opens the way to an understanding of the
ethical problem with race.
Those who wish to maintain that “racial types” make good empirical or logical sense, and
yet continue to criticize the use of these types as racist, will find themselves in a strange
quandary. They end up encountering a serious conflict between their ethics and their ontology.
This is a contradiction that they attempt to resolve by appealing to the primacy of facts over
moral feelings. They claim that ethics must give way to science and truth, and if someone has
ethical problems with racism then these problems simply show our ignorance. If I then racially
stereotype immorally this is ultimately reduced to a problem of whether or not the racial
categories are being properly or improperly applied. If racism can be reduced to a kind of
childish name-calling, then all racial tensions should merely result from ignorance. The way to
resolve racism is the same way we resolve any kind of ignorance, education. They who know
better must instruct those who do not know any better. So racism turns out to be little more than
a problem for science and logic, and not even an ethical problem at all. At least that is what we
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encounter when we think about race as an everyday sort of problem, and that is how we
encounter race on the lowest level of philosophical inquiry.
However, this view of racism does not even begin to explain the violence and
degradation that has accompanied this notion over the years. Beatings, lynching, castration, and
rape are a small sampling of the various types of violent acts that have been performed from
racist intentions. Some of the most powerful examples of racism, Trans-Atlantic Slavery and the
Holocaust, show us that racism involves so much more than a mere social faux pas. We may be
tempted to dismiss the more extreme examples as things of the past, as anomalous, or as extreme
cases of racial profiling. Yet none of these excuses quite measure up to the scope and extremity
of the threat that racism presents to us. So philosophical inquiry now turns to a deeper look
through the everyday problem of race, and, more specifically, down to the problem of whiteness.
We may initially say that the deeper problem of race is that racial categories identify
people as fitting into types and kinds within a hierarchy. In general, this hierarchy determines
that people are essentially different according to what race they are and that these differences
come with certain advantages and liabilities. On the everyday level, this seems non-problematic
if we assume that our racial categories are fair and balanced. The science that establishes the
racial categories presumably turns a disinterested eye to the adding up of racial traits which make
up the races. From a scientific standpoint, there is nothing inherently better or worse about
having a greater number of “twitch” muscle fibers in your legs. If we can determine that a person
should have a surplus or deficiency of these fibers, then we can better categorize their natural
aptitude for certain kinds of athletic achievements. Yet we should be uneasy about the results of
this kind of categorizing. This kind of racial profiling does not limit itself to what traits are useful
for athletics, and what traits are appropriate for intellectual pursuits. Rather, this profiling is
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absolute and it encompasses every feature of the person. The individual is swallowed up and
subsumed by their category and there are also certain categories which are valued as “better”
than others. Without engaging in pointless racial stereotyping ourselves it is not too difficult to
conjure up the ideas of certain races being “naturally gifted athletes,” or “naturally gifted in
mathematics,” or “naturally gifted in dance.” Alongside these stereotypes are the more insidious
assumptions, too. We are equally aware of the races which are typed as prone to “laziness,”
“naturally poor at driving,” “stingy with money,” or even “oversexed.”
The result of this profiling is that we tend to assign a social score to members of the races
as though they were in some kind of competition. Thus racism is obviously a system which
assigns value and significance to certain traits and practices, all the while devaluing others.
Furthermore, this racist attitude then reduces an individual to their racial traits, all the while
completely ignoring whatever accomplishments they have made as an individual. Whatever
work, sacrifices, education, dedication, and overall commitment a person has made to their
profession, they each must face the racist calculations of society. These calculations involve
evaluating people of different races as if they were better or worse than each other in virtue of
some “natural essence” which is determined by their race. It is this need to force people into the
appropriate categories which spark racist violence. The deeper problem of racism is that racism
categorizes people as better and worse, superior and inferior, and it punishes people severely for
deviating from their natural categories.
Yet in all this the one race that is conspicuously absent from the contests, and indeed the
one race which seems to have no particular traits at all, is the white race. When we chart the
history of racism we find that whiteness is originally associated with intellect, sophistication,
civilization, and having the “proper” religion. It is in the work of Hegel that we gain just such an
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account of the white race, or as Hegel puts it, the Caucasian. "It is in the Caucasian race that the
mind first attains to absolute unity with itself... (it) achieves self-determination, selfdevelopment, and in doing so creates world-history."8 Hegel is not satisfied to end the distinction
there, as he further divides the Caucasian race into the Western Asiatics, which he identifies by
their religion of Islam, and the Europeans which he identifies by their religion of Christianity. It
is clear from what Hegel writes that Christianity is to be preferred. Hegel claims that the
followers of Islam, who are unable to rationally organize the universe, are still given over to
irrational drives. "So it is that here, along with the noblest sentiments, there exists the greatest
vindictiveness and guile."9
Yet as the years pass it becomes increasingly difficult to identify a member of this
“Caucasian” race. We turn right and left and never encounter a white. Instead we encounter the
Irish, the Swedish, the British, the Italian, the German, etc. but never the White. The reason for
this evasiveness is that whiteness stands as the ultimate category, the standard against which all
other categories are judged. This does not mean that “whites” excel in all the contests, but rather
they excel in the contests that matter. Where members of the white race prove “inferior” to
members of the other races, the nature of the contest itself is deemed irrelevant as a criterion
upon which the distinction between “superior” and “inferior” is even necessary. Contests where a
white person prove “superior” become the sorts of contests which stand as the only significant
judge of what any person of any race should aspire to be. In short, whiteness exists as the social
and cultural standard in terms of which we think about how others are raced. George Yancy
characterizes whiteness as "the transcendental norm, the good, the innocent, and the pure, while
Blackness is the diametrical opposite." 10 Yancy claims further that whiteness is not to be found
as a substance, but rather as a "relationally lived phenomenon..."11
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When we turn a critical eye to understanding what whiteness is, we see it stand out as a
grotesque image of unfairness. Yet this sudden apparition is all-too-brief, for whiteness
disappears just as quickly as it shows up. We cannot anywhere find a white. It seems that when
we do run across that racist violence, which characterized racism for so long, that such violence
is considered to be rare. Yes, incidents of racist violence do occur, but these incidents are viewed
as outliers, since the culture on the whole is thought to have transitioned into one of tolerance
and color-blindness. Now although we would be naive to think that violence motivated by racism
is obsolete, whiteness on the whole tends to take a somewhat different shape in our current
society. According to Shannon Sullivan, after the success of the Civil Rights movement in the
1960's there was a shift from violent white-centered oppression to a subtler mode of life. "The
shift from de jure to de facto racism corresponds with a related shift from habits of white
supremacy to ones of white privilege...In the early twenty-first century, white domination
increasingly gains power precisely by operating as if non-existent."12 Whiteness still
characterizes people in society in terms of their “superiority” and “inferiority,” but it now does
so in subtle social ways. This is precisely why Yancy calls it the transcendental norm. Whiteness
does not show up as whiteness, but rather it appears as "normal". Actors are never asked about
how being "white" contributed to their landing the lead role in a film that is supposed to be about
the average working class male. Musicians do not need to explain how being white contributed
to their affection for the Beatles, or the Rolling Stones. A question that very few politicians ever
have to answer is how being "white" contributed to their understanding of politics and American
Society. Whiteness is set as the social default, and because it is the default then we are rarely
aware that it exists, or even how it continues to function and operate as a controlling factor in our
society.
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Yet it is this elusiveness which opens the path to the greatest danger that race holds for us
as human beings. Race threatens us to always see a world that is raced in terms of whiteness.
Whiteness hides itself as the normative standard for society, but then everywhere we encounter
people who are raced. This is true even for those who think of themselves as white. Certain
styles of clothing and art identify one as non-white. There is no restaurant that serves "white
food" but all serve the food of some ethnicity or geography. One can never be rich enough, or
smart enough, or physically gifted enough to truly be "white", and yet that normative standard
constantly presses us. Whiteness seems forever out of reach. It seems to remain always visible,
but somehow perpetually unattainable. One of the facts proclaimed of George Zimmerman, the
man acquitted of the murder of Trayvon Martin, was that he was "not white", but rather he was
Hispanic.13 This fact was often claimed as evidence that the killing was not in any way motivated
by race. Though one does wonder if George Zimmerman's grandparents had been Russian,
Italian, German, French, or Lebanese, would people have still claimed that he was "not white"?
We seemed doomed to live in a world that is defined by a default standard of whiteness, but a
standard which is so intractable that no one ever appears white, and yet to be white carries with it
very visible privileges. The meaning of this is profound. If our society is one that is dominated
by whiteness as the transcendental norm, and if no one appears to be white, then we are all
delivered over to an immovable standard. At its core, racism is the problem of identity and we
find that we are forcibly identified by what we are not, that we are not "white". The tension
exists between those who chase whiteness as this unattainable aspiration, and those who benefit
from whiteness and also insist that they do nothing of the sort. Although whiteness is perpetually
out of reach for some, for others it seems to be something they rarely, and then only with great
trepidation, admit to being. In a sense, no one is truly white because there are many who are not
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white enough, and those who are so white that they use their whiteness as a concealing cloak.
They then mask their whiteness behind layers of class, wealth, power, and the great illusion that
they have earned all that they possess.
Yet since none of us are truly white, and since our society is one ruled by whiteness, then
we are living in a world where one must gain their identity and their belonging in white society
by turning against themselves. In order to have an identity in a society ordered by whiteness you
must abandon non-white habits or traits whenever possible. The supreme danger of race as
whiteness is that we will live in a world where no one is white, but where everyone secretly
wishes that they were. That is not to say that having fair skin is believed to be more desirable
than having darker skin, but rather that even a person with fair skin, blonde hair, and blue eyes
can be considered "non-white" if they are poor or speak with a regional dialect. The trouble with
whiteness is that it becomes so all pervasive as to disappear entirely from view, because it
becomes the view. Whiteness becomes the gaze of normality, and so we do not encounter it
anywhere since it is right before our eyes filtering the world into white and non-white. Yet while
we can see nothing else, the supreme threat of whiteness is that we will forget that whiteness is a
“seeing”, and that it is a process of knowing the world. It threatens to swallow up all other modes
of knowing and transform even the most non-raced aspects of the world into racial ones.
But surely this is too much? After all, how can I claim that we only ever see the world in
terms of race when we also see the world in terms of sex, sexuality, religion, science, or any of
the other gazes that dictate our view? To answer this question, I must slightly modify my claim
and say that the supreme danger of whiteness is that it does indeed swallow up all of the ways we
have of seeing the world and substitute one overarching gaze in place of all others. Yet although
this gaze at first appears to be the gaze of whiteness, whiteness is really just a further layer of
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deception. Whiteness is a manifestation of a cultural attitude that is deeper than race, and also
more insidious. This attitude manifests itself through many different ways of seeing the world,
all the while attempting to reduce all of our gazes to one singular look. In order to further explain
this I must now turn my attention to a different mode of seeing the world, the technological gaze.
We may now return to the question of what ethical problems technology presents for us?
As previously mentioned, technology does not obviously present any real ethical dilemmas in
and of itself. Indeed, it may prove difficult to even establish that technology can be viewed as a
singular kind of entity. So our first step into the question of technology requires us to analyze the
devices and tools which we consider to be technological.
Our primary experience of technology is that it is a simple category denoting any number
of different tools, devices, and machines. All of these things appear to possess only an artificial
nature in common. In the first place, technology is little more than a human creation designed to
perform tasks or enable humans to carry out tasks. Technology is the computer that sits on the
desk, the phone ringing down the hall, and even the pen that is used to sign a check. Thus we
experience technology as an unproblematic collection of tools. Technology seems to be neutral;
after all, it sits inert without any intentionality of its own. The hammer can be used to build a
house, or it can be used to tear one down. A gun may be used for defense of an innocent person,
or else it may be used to murder an innocent person. An airplane is a marvelously efficient
means of transportation, but in the hands of hijackers it can be turned into a missile of deadly
destruction. The moral conclusion of such experiences seems obvious enough. There is nothing
really wrong with technology so long as it is being used “properly”, that is, so long as it is being
used in the way that human society has defined for it.
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Perhaps one of the best illustrations of this approach to technology can be found by
examining the work of Alfred Nobel. Nobel is well known today for establishing the Nobel
prizes, which award immense prestige to a few select individuals in fields such as Medicine,
Physics, and in the continuing pursuit of peace.14 Nobel was also a famous inventor and scientist
in his own right. Dynamite was his most famous invention, and Nobel initially intended his
invention to be used in mining. This is evidenced from the fact that Nobel fought for control and
patenting of his inventions and oversaw the use and distribution of his product to various mining
and blasting companies for primarily positive purposes.15 The sheer power and destructive force
of Nobel’s invention has often been viewed as part of the inspiration for his peace prize.
Whatever part it may have played, Nobel clearly wanted to encourage the development of
science for peaceful, rather than destructive, ends. He saw nothing inherently wrong with the
development of powerfully destructive explosives, so long as those explosives could be put to
good use. “It was the idealist in him that drove Nobel to bequeath his fortune to those who had
benefited humanity through science, literature and efforts to promote peace.”16 Nobel would
certainly have understood the potential for technology to be dangerous, but he also focused on
the potential that technology had to be beneficial. By looking at Nobel’s dedication to peace and
his dedication to industry we are pulled into agreeing that technology is only bad when misused
and only good when properly applied. Thus technology, at first, stands over and against us as
inert and morally neutral.
Despite its apparent neutrality there is a further problem which technology poses to us, as
discussed in the works of Martin Heidegger.17 According to Heidegger, technology is not simply
the threat of machines that can be misused, but rather there is something about technology itself
which is threatening. Heidegger claims that technology is an attitude, and thus primarily a way of
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thinking or understanding the world. “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a
way of revealing…i.e., of truth.”18 Heidegger claims that throughout history technology has
always been a way of seeing and revealing the world. At times it has even been poetic and
beautiful, but Heidegger detects something different in what he calls modern technology. 19
The danger and threat of modern technology is not that it will be misused but that, as a
fundamental way of thinking, it reveals a world of resources and nothing else. The technological
attitude is one that is always looking at a world full of people, plants, animals, and minerals as a
“nature” that is full of resources to be unlocked and stored in the most efficient way possible.
Thus a mountain is viewed as potentially coal, diamonds, gold, or whatever other materials that
can be mined from it. Heidegger’s term for these resources is “standing-reserve.”20 The threat of
technology here is that the entire world exists only as a resource waiting to be plundered.
Now Heidegger is clever enough to understand that this plundering cannot happen
without the driving force of human interaction. Technology also challenges human beings as
well as nature. While humanity is using technology to reveal the resources in the natural world,
technology is also revealing humanity. Heidegger explains this by introducing the notion of the
“enframing”.21 We find ourselves pushing technological advancement, precisely because we
have no way to stop it or are completely unaware of it. The danger of technology is that we will
continue to push technological activity till everything in the world has been mined, exploited,
and expedited all so that it can be stored up as energy for ever more technological activity. Even
humans may be stored up as energy to drive some further technological achievement.22
This danger in technology seems to have the same characteristics as the dangers of white
racism. The idea that human beings might be turned into commodities, viewed in terms of our
utility, and otherwise treated as resources to be exploited or culled, is precisely how racism has
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historically worked, especially white racism. Besides this there are numerous examples of how
this technological attitude has long been at work. The lumber industry, the oil industry, the
mining industry, and all such industries concerned with supplying energy are simply the latest
examples of this enframing.
Yet even in light of this threat, Heidegger claims that there is a greater danger, the
supreme danger. The supreme danger of modern technology is that this way of looking at the
world completely and utterly denies every other possible truth.23 The supreme danger is that we
forget that the technological attitude is just an attitude. We will be so busy turning the world and
ourselves into resources that we will be unable to realize that the technology we created and used
is just a creation. This also occurs with race, insofar as those who have invented and successfully
used the racial categories seem to forget their artificial nature. Thus the origins of race and
technology are concealed and covered over while both are presented as though they were part of
the natural order of the universe.
Originally technology, as a way of seeing the world, was a human and social
construction. It applied to some things and not others. Yet at a certain point in human history
technology became central to our existence and it began to dominate all other ways of seeing the
world. It is no coincidence that the birth of modern technology correlates with the birth of
colonialism and racism as whiteness. While the threat of the enframing is that it creeps in upon
everything, the supreme danger of technology is that it conceals its true nature from us. Thus we
are left only with the everyday understanding of technology as good or bad according to its use.
This also applies to race, and the everyday problem of race deludes us into thinking that we can
be nice non-racist people as long as we properly apply the racial categories. And yet the
thunderous moment of realization passes us by. We find ourselves in a racialized and
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technological world, unable to remember how we got here and unable to discover a way out,
even though we have done it ourselves.
So ultimately I argue that the problems of race and technology are two manifestations of
the same root problem. In this dissertation this root problem will be continually referred to as the
cultural attitude of technoracism. The everyday problem of technoracism is that we will misuse
our devices and tools, be they “universal categories” or electronic machines, for social and
political power. The deeper problem of technoracism is that technoracism springs from a
fundamental attitude of dominance and imperialism which grows out of western “white” culture,
and which always seeks to reinforce that cultural dominance. Although there have been many
societies that also sought to enforce the dominance of their cultures, still the culture of whiteness
is unique. It is unique in part because of its ambition, but also because the dominance of
whiteness, through exact science and modern technology, seeks mastery over all aspects of the
physical world. Technoracism is a cultural attitude that is forever pushing to see ourselves as
masters of a natural world full of resources waiting to be exploited. Thus it is also a supremely
ethical mindset, as it determines the value of all of our actions and behaviors in light of what it
denotes as good.
This ethics is generally worked out in a re-evaluation of agents as objects. Technoracism
sees that there is no difference between coal and those who mine it, as they are both natural
resources. The more that we push to reveal the world as a resource, the more we are pushed right
back to being resources ourselves. Our identity becomes completely subsumed under the process
of resource gathering as we all become gatherers, and our worth becomes determined by whether
or not we “make a contribution to society.” Yet just as Heidegger claims with technology, the
supreme danger of technoracism is that this attitude will conceal itself so that we forget that it is
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just an attitude and a way of looking at the world, while we are left to see nothing but a world of
natural resources waiting to be exploited. In practical terms the results of this concealment is that
the average person comes to regard the various races as “natural kinds”, and they further seek to
order their life according to a model of technological efficiency. While this model makes them a
productive member of society it also undermines the value of rest, art that is not entertainment,
and ultimately categorizes one’s existence in terms of the “practical” and the “useless”. The
exceptions to this mode are only found in those rare individuals who stand outside of, or else
above and beyond, the general reach of these social norms.
Now that technoracism has been revealed as the object of my investigation I will briefly
outline the course that this investigation will take in the next seven chapters. In chapter one of
my dissertation, I will begin by working out a genealogy of race. This will involve tracing the
roots of the concept back to its origins in seventeenth and eighteenth century European
Colonialism. From there I will pay special attention to the relationship of race and the emergence
of the American Nation. This chapter will also include a brief survey of the relationship of race
and science, which will involve looking at how science has attempted to prove, disprove, and
utilize the racial categories over the years.
This allows me to go beyond the everyday problem of racism to my second chapter and
the emergence of whiteness and the non-white. This dichotomy has been present in race all
along, even though it is a continually collapsing dichotomy. The white race is socially construed
as “normal” and all other races are construed as abnormal. This marks “whiteness” as the
invisible race. It does not show up as a race but rather as the gaze of normativity, which defines
itself simply by not being anything else. This leads me to a discussion of the ultimate danger
posed by racism as whiteness, that the racial category will become the only significant way of
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seeing ourselves in the world. Thus we become doomed to be seen as white or not-white. But of
course this is only one side of the issue of normativity, and in the next chapter I discuss how
normativity takes on a different form under the guise of technology.
In chapter three, I analyze the notion of whiteness as a tool by investigating the
technology of race. This will involve an examination of how Falguni Sheth argues that race can
be used as a political tool of power and oppression. This examination will also involve a
phenomenological approach to the subject by looking at how it is reflected in the arts. From this I
will analyze the ways in which the idea of race resists rational discourse as a function of a basic
cultural attitude. Since race is technological, then a full understanding of it is only possible by
investigating the idea of technology, and to that end I turn my project over to Martin Heidegger’s
philosophy of technology.
In chapter four, I introduce Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, beginning with
a brief exposition of the salient features of Heidegger’s genealogy of technology. Heidegger at
first explains that we encounter two kinds of technology in human history, the handiwork and the
Modern. Although handiwork technology has always been a part of humanity, “modern”
technology emerges only in the past few hundred years. Heidegger explains that technology
comes to exist first as a cultural attitude, which then allows for the coming forth of the exact
science necessary to make complex machines. That normativity is what, to use Heidegger’s term,
challenges us to reveal the world and all its objects as “standing reserve”, mere resources to be
exploited and put into storage.24 For Heidegger, this attitude is a destining of being itself,
revealed through the guise of modern machine technology. However, even while technology
threatens to turn human beings themselves into resources this is not yet its supreme danger.
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For Heidegger the greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a
normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. This is the gaze of the enframing, and it is
the reason that we are set up and forced into this way of seeing the world. The threat is that we
will only ever encounter technology as a means to our ends, and will never understand that
technology is in many ways out of our hands, and operating under its own autonomic forces.
Whenever we find humanity threatened in such a complete and overwhelming sense, especially
by their own actions, then that threat to humanity has become a sin
In chapter five, I turn from examining technology and race as normative, to
understanding them as sins. To that end, I will begin with an analysis of religious language. This
analysis will demonstrate how religious language can hint at the foundation of modern
technology and racism in the common cultural attitude of technoracism. This will involve
looking at Augustine’s views of the two different kinds of sin, the religious and social. To sin
against God would be to commit a sin that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of the
world more than the great good of God. To sin against society is to elevate one’s own importance
over the importance of maintaining social unity. Racism as whiteness can be understood as a sin
against society, as a sin against the people it seeks to define. Whiteness is also a religious sin, as
the sin of idolatry. It asserts itself as the supreme category by which all people are to be judged,
and in so doing causes a disordered state of values in our intentions. Modern technology as the
enframing can also be understood as a religious sin. It takes no care for the world and retains no
respect for it, and so it too operates as a kind of idolatry in asserting its supremacy over every
other consideration. It can also be understood as a social sin, especially since the supreme danger
in it consists in how it closes humans off to every other kind of knowing. By looking at
whiteness and enframing through the lens of sin we see that they operate in the same fashion.

xxvii

The problems of the enframing and whiteness are manifestations of an underlying cultural
attitude, the attitude of technoracism. This attitude is the fundamental cultural attitude which
holds sway in our contemporary society.
Chapter six formally introduces and explains the concept of technoracism. I will argue
that there exists a cultural attitude, technoracism, which exists logically prior to whiteness and
modern technology. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so
it is both rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I
will then argue that technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural
attitude which underlies both whiteness and the enframing. I will show that technoracism is the
cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of
the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Technoracism is instantiated discursively by
a shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal
categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. It is characterized by
the non-discursive aspects of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism.
Technoracism arises from the historical and emotional conditions of fear and paranoia and it is
an attempt to resolve those feelings. In my analysis of the discursive and non-discursive elements
of technoracism, I will determine that an ethical resolution to this attitude must also involve both
discourse and non-discourse. In order to resolve the tension of technoracism we must undo it in
all of the various ways that it has been done. This leads to my last chapter, the discussion on
virtue ethics.
The final chapter explores the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by
means of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. By translating the language of discourse into education
and non-discourse into habit, I will have the foundations of a virtue ethics for resolving
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technoracism. I will offer a brief analysis of virtue ethics from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I
will determine that the human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even
in the most rigorously constructed of human identities there arises a tendency to define ourselves
in terms of a vast diversity of concepts, entities, beliefs, practices, desires, and relationships. This
will enable me to define three virtues which oppose the three main characteristics of
technoracism. I will present the virtues of religious diversity, aesthetic mystery, and community
as the virtues which can counter the effects of technoracist conditioning. Since virtue is acquired
through practice, then I must also set out and describe those four different practices which will
help to bringing about the virtues of multiplicity. This will lead to a discussion of how the
practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue can begin to bring about the ideal of
multiplicity through the creation of its virtues.
Now that the beginning is complete we are ready for the first chapter, the genealogy of race.
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Chapter 1 – Genealogy of Race
If the concept of race truly seems to present a problem on so many levels then perhaps
the best solution would be to do away with it. If we just all agreed to stop using the concept and
classifying each other into races then perhaps we could resolve the ongoing historical legacy of
racism and the terrible violence associated with it. On the other hand if we try to eliminate the
concept of race we must not eliminate our knowledge of the history and the evolution of the
concept. That history must be investigated if we ever hope to have a workable ethical solution to
this problem. So for now, we should place in abeyance the idea of eliminating the concept of
race, even as we fight against how it continues to create so much misunderstanding, hatred, and
violence. We should also keep in mind that eliminating the concept of race by fiat will not be an
easy task.
In this first chapter, I begin by working out a genealogy of race.
1

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the method of genealogy as conceived by

Friedrich Nietzsche. In order to use the method we will begin by tracing the concept of race back
to its origins in seventeenth and eighteenth century European Colonialism. We will look at the
origins of the concept in the writings of Francois Bernier, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Herder.
Bernier is credited as the originator of the concept of race. Kant was the first to present a science
of race and resolve some of the initial intellectual difficulties that had already arisen with the
concept. Herder was the first real critic of the concept, although ultimately he still favored
similar notions. Yet rather than continuing on to the next historical figure in what would be a
long history, this chapter will instead go behind the origins of race to the social conditions which
made such a notion possible. Those social conditions are the advent of the scientific revolution
and the creation of the scientific method. The concept of race clearly arises in the eighteenth
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century and can be linked to the preceding seventeenth century Cartesian, scientific, and
Eurocentric view of the world. Since this view of the world is concerned with mastery, then the
idea of race begins within the context of race deployed as a tool of mastery, that is, racism and
especially white supremacy. In turning to investigate the rise of white supremacy, we then look
at the work of Cornel West. He argues that white supremacy first emerges through the area of
natural history with the invention of the category of race as a means of classifying human beings.
White supremacy then becomes further solidified with the introduction of pseudo-sciences like
phrenology and physiognomy. Yet those pseudo-sciences owed more to the sentiments of
Europeans who idealized a certain kind of classical Greek and Roman form of humanity in their
artwork. The rise of white supremacy made the concept of race possible both in terms of the
pragmatic value of race for colonizing, and in terms of the methodological value of race as a
scientific category for “understanding” humans. Quite beyond the origins of the concept of race,
and the idea of race as a simple category, the understanding of race leads on to the deeper
problem of whiteness.
We begin with the notion of genealogy as a method, and how this involves history and
philosophy in a unique sense. The origins of the genealogical method itself should be attributed
to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, and his work On the Genealogy of Morals. The defining
feature of this text involves Nietzsche’s attempt to trace the origin and development of the idea
of morality. Nietzsche wanted to show that the simple moral notions of good, bad, evil, etc., had
their origins in certain kinds of historical movements. His starting point is an etymological
survey of the word good and its origins in various languages.2 Nietzsche’s project presents a
critical understanding of morality as historically developed, without necessarily referring to the
influence of any specific historical events. History is to be understood, not as a timeline of
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various moments, but more as the fluid working out of various human ideas. Thus a genealogy
will do several things. First, a genealogy is critical and it aims to uncover the hidden assumptions
and structures of a concept, especially when that concept has become mired in cultural myths or
obscured by scientific methodology. Second, a genealogy charts the history and development of
a concept. It does this while paying special attention to the origins of the idea and how the
original meaning still pervades throughout its developmental stages. Finally the goal of a
genealogy is to reveal how the concept under consideration informs and creates the
contemporary societies in which we live, and attempts to show how a particular concept, say,
race, can obfuscate its origins.
Thus a genealogy of race will prove essential to understanding the problems of racism
which we face in our own society. In order to grasp how we can resolve race as an ethical
problem we must first explicate its hidden meanings, its tangled history, and its complex
agendas. To that end it is also helpful to consider that we are performing a genealogy of race in
much the same way that Cornel West explains it in his book Prophesy Deliverance. “I call this
inquiry a ‘genealogy’ because, following the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault,
I am interested in the emergence (Entstehung) or the ‘moment of arising’ of the idea of white
supremacy within the modern discourse in the West.”3 Following Cornel West, then, we too
must think about race through the lens of genealogy. As an everyday phenomenon, race
presumes to function as a scientific category used to define the apparent physical differences
between various groups. So an investigation and genealogy of race must involve a questioning of
the origins of the scientific discourse which defines race in the first place. West characterizes the
driving force behind race as deriving from a supreme notion of rational ordering. “To put it
crudely, my argument is that the authority of science, undergirded by a modern philosophical
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discourse guided by Greek ocular metaphors and Cartesian notions, promotes and encourages the
activities of observing, comparing, measuring, and ordering the physical characteristics of human
bodies.”4 This ordering force points both to the origin and the goal of race, and will ultimately
lead us to an understanding of the notion of race as whiteness, and how whiteness is the site of
the supreme gaze of normality.
Before we can trace the origins of the history of race, we must address a potential
objection. The objection is that such a history is either impossible or else it is a history that is
inclusive of the whole of humanity. The claim is that human beings have always been racist, and
that historical examples of this racism can be cited. One of the simplest examples of this line of
thinking can be found in an etymological survey of the word “barbarian.” In modern usage, the
word has a pejorative connotation and is used to refer to foreigners who are so different from
ourselves as to seem monstrous in their habits and cultural practices. Barbarism is synonymous
with brutality, and with strange acts of violence for which those “barbarians” seem to have no
moral qualms. The Oxford English Dictionary informs us that historically this word derives from
an ancient Greek word which was used to denote foreigners who did not speak Greek. This word
was then later used to denote anyone outside of the Roman Civilization, then the medieval
Christian Civilization, and so on throughout the ages.5 This, or so the argument would go, is
proof enough that the idea of race is an old one. It is presumed that the Greeks and Romans
thought of their neighbors and enemies as being members of other races. Yet we should not be so
quick as to include other forms of discrimination as racial in nature. The idea of race is
something unique in the history of the world, and it has a relatively recent origin.
The first person to use the term race to define “a major division of humanity displaying a
distinctive combination of physical traits transmitted through a line of descent...”6 was Francois
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Bernier. In 1684, Francois Bernier anonymously published A New Division of the Earth. Robert
Bernasconi and Tommy Lott comment that Bernier was a remarkable world traveler and that he
is the first person to use the term race to define the various peoples he encountered in his travels.
Although in the exterior form of their bodies, and especially in their faces, men are
almost all different one from the other, according to the different districts of the earth
which they inhabit, so that those who have been great travelers are often never mistaken
in distinguishing each nation in that way; still I have remarked that there are four or five
species or races of men in particular whose difference is so remarkable that it may be
properly made use of as the foundation for a new division of the earth.7
Bernier’s treatise is quite short and a thorough analysis of it is unnecessary, but a few points are
worth mentioning. It is important to note that Bernier’s expressed aim is geographical
categorization, not of human beings but of the earth itself. His breakthrough is that the various
“races” of humanity seem to be unique to certain geographic locations of the world. Thus a
clever new way to classify a landmass or country would be according to the race of people one
finds living there. To his credit Bernier did, by all accounts, visit many of the regions and
peoples he is describing so that his system seems to be driven only by his own curiosity, rather
than some political agenda.
The second point to be made about Bernier’s treatise is that the most obvious
categorization on which he hits is the primary difference between black and white.
For although the Egyptians, for instance, and the Indians are very black, or rather coppercoloured, that colour is only an accident in them, and comes because they are constantly
exposed to the sun…What induces me to make a different species of the Africans
are…the blackness which is peculiar to them, and which is not caused by the sun…for if
a black African pair be transported to a cold country, their children are just as black….8
Elsewhere Bernier describes the peoples who are native to areas like Japan and China as, “truly
white”.9 Bernier describes many physical traits, and it is clear from the beginning that the
defining aspect of race cannot be reduced to mere skin color. Rather it is natural skin color that
defines race. In analyzing Bernier’s work we need the historical context, and also the
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philosophical context of the natural kind. Bernier easily dismisses the blackness of the Egyptians
since they are not naturally black, but the blackness of the Africans is part of their nature since
when they are forcibly removed from their country their blackness does not fade, nor does the
blackness of their children.
The final point that needs to be made about Bernier’s account of race is that it involves
more than just the European gaze, it also involves the male gaze. Bernier also undertakes to
determine whether or not the women of the various races can be considered beautiful. Some
women Bernier finds to be beautiful, despite their race, since they seem to be exceptionally
unlike the rest of their people. Others are handsome precisely because they are exotic and
strange, and still others are beautiful because they resemble women from France or other parts of
Europe. It is also worth noting that many of the women that Bernier describes are being sold into
slavery, or else have already been slaves. “I have seen at Moka many quite naked for sale, and I
may say that I have never seen anything more beautiful; but they were very dear, for they wanted
to sell them three times dearer than the others.”10 Bernier’s observation is important; the
monetary value of these women is determined by their beauty and attractiveness to those men
who buy and sell them. Thus the implications for many of these beautiful slaves seems to be that
these women are to be sold into sexual slavery, hence their great value. It is important to point
out that the gaze that categorizes, stacks, measures, and gauges is also the gaze that determines
value. Bernier is deeply interested, not perhaps in acquiring any of these women for himself, but
certainly in assigning worth and significance to them based on how attractive he finds their
bodies. The gaze which determines race is necessarily an evaluative one, and it is no mere
scientific curiosity.
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Bernier makes a major mistake when he conflates the notion of species and race. Modern
science is easily able to distinguish the difference between an ape and a human being, and then
further between someone raced as white as opposed to someone raced as black. So a further
investigation of the origin of the scientific idea of race is required. Before we can begin to ask
ethical questions, and indeed Bernier’s work brings up several, we must arrive at that idea of race
which creates the everyday problem of it. So to that end we must look to the work of the
philosopher who began the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, Immanuel Kant.
In The Idea of Race, Bernasconi and Lott comment that, “One finds in Kant not only a
clear and consistent terminological distinction between race and species that was lacking in his
predecessors but also an insistence on the permanence of racial characteristics across
generations.”11 Kant resolves the puzzle of the relation of species and races. He is also able to
explain why race seems to be both environmental in origin, but nonetheless resistant to
assimilation into new environments.
“To many observers in the eighteenth century, it seemed that if environment accounted
for the races, then whites who moved to America or Africa would, after a number of
generations, take on the characteristics of Native Americans or Africans…By arguing
that the original human beings carried the seeds of all four races, that one of those seeds
was actualized as a result of environmental conditions, and that there could be neither a
reversion to the original stem nor a change to another race, Kant provided
an…explanation.”12
In 1775, Immanuel Kant published Of the Different Human Races, an essay which he revised and
expanded to be republished in 1777. We also have in Kant a scientific account of the origins of
the various races, as well as a simplified and streamlined vision of only four basic races.
Although Bernier lists at least five races, he really only displays confidence in the diversity of
the first three, using the last two to explain the existence of unique groups of people who he
could not easily class with the other groups.13 What we will investigate in Kant’s essay is his
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understanding of the difference between species and race, his characterization of the four races,
and the arguments he uses to attempt to prove the “natural superiority” of the white race.
Kant begins his essay by explaining that all humans are of the same species but are not all
from the same race.
…Buffon’s rule, that animals that produce fertile young with one another belong to one
and the same physical genus (no matter how dissimilar in form they may be), must
properly be regarded only as a definition of a natural genus of animals in general…all
human beings on earth belong to the same natural genus because they always produce
fertile children with one another…14
In fact Kant’s assessment here is so obvious to the contemporary mind that it seems remarkable
that such a claim would ever have needed to be proven. However, for Kant the human ability to
reproduce is perhaps the only universally human trait, and Kant now needs to make sense of the
vast differences which seem to occur between the various distinct groups of humans. “At long
last, then, the condition of the earth (dampness or dryness), along with the food that a people
commonly eat, eventually produces one hereditary distinction or stock among animals of a single
line of descent and race, especially with regard to their size, the proportion of their limbs (plump
or slim), and their natural disposition.”15 For Kant, as well as for Bernier, race is a matter of
nature, although Kant has a more detailed explanation of that nature.
This idea of one hereditary stock is precisely what is meant by the notion of race, so in
one sense race is initially explained by a combination of environmental influences and selective
breeding. “Those features that belong to varieties – which are, therefore, by themselves
hereditary…can, through marriages that always take place within the same families, even
produce, in time, something that I call the family stock.”16 Now Kant is not nearly as radical as
some of his contemporaries. According to Kant, Maupertuis argued that the family stock could
be used to control the selective breeding which supposedly creates races in the first place.
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Maupertuis wanted to selectively breed a superior stock of humans within any race which had
the features of intelligence, hard work, and good morals. Kant comments on this when he writes:
“His (Maupertuis) view rests on the possibility that an enduring family stock might eventually be
established through the careful selection of the degenerate from the normal births.”17 Yet
Maupertuis’ program of eugenics is not completely original. The basic idea of creating a superior
population through selective breeding certainly goes all the way back to Plato’s Republic, if not
further. Though what makes Maupertuis’ plan unique is that the science of race seems to make a
program of eugenics ever more feasible. Plato’s plan for a perfect society may have involved
selective breeding, but Plato is rather vague on how this is to be done. After all, the selective
breeding program in the Republic is to be carried out on one’s own population. Maupertuis’ plan
seems designed to be carried out on other populations so as to create that trifecta of European
civility: intelligence, hard work, and manners.
Kant does not share Maupertuis’ optimism, and instead he thinks that it is likely that the
natural process which brings races about might be far too complex to be co-opted by human
plans. Yet before one begins to praise Kant for his refusal to participate in genetic manipulation,
we should see why he thinks such a scheme will not work. “I think, however, that even though
such a scheme is, strictly speaking, certainly practicable, nature, in its wisdom, acts to hinder it
rather well. This is because major driving forces lie even within the mixing of evil with good that
set the sleeping powers of humanity into play. These forces require that human beings develop
all of their talents and approach the perfection of their calling.”18 Kant disagrees with
Maupertuis, not because genetic manipulation is morally wrong, but because it is inherently
difficult. Kant explains that nature is already working to produce distinct races, and so a person
would have to work rather hard against the natural world to make such a scheme work. So in
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principle Kant agrees with Maupertuis that such a feat is possible, but it seems impractical. In
short, nature has already conditioned certain races so that it would be quite difficult for members
of those races to become intelligent, hard-working, or well-mannered, at least not to the level of
those other races which are naturally suited for it.
Having established for Kant that nature determines the races, we should turn now to what
races it has established. Kant describes the four basic family stocks, and his four basic races. “I
believe that we only need to assume four races in order to be able to derive all of the enduring
distinctions immediately recognizable within the human genus. They are: (1) the white race; (2)
the Negro race; (3) the Hun race (Mongol or Kalmuck); and (4) the Hindu or Hindustani race.”19
Unlike our contemporary assumptions, the white race is much more inclusive for Kant. It
contains the Europeans, Moors, Arabs, Turkish-Tartars, Persians, and any other Asian peoples
who do not fit into one of the other races. Although a thorough accounting of Kant’s races is not
necessary, it is important to investigate Kant’s two basic races. Kant’s entire argument for this
consists of one sentence. “The reason for assuming that Negroes and whites are the base races is
self-evident.”20 When we seek his reasons or his method, all he has to say is that the reason is
“self-evident”. Yet we must have a clearer explanation. If indeed there are only two basic races,
then Kant will have to do slightly better than “self-evident”.
The answer may be found in Kant’s account of how the races come to develop. “The
causes lying in the nature of an organic body (plant or animal) that account for a specific
development are called seeds when this development concerns a particular part of the plant or
animal. When however such development only concerns the size or the relationship of the parts
to one another, I call them natural predispositions.”21 Kant’s terminology appears to form the
philosophical precursor to the science of genetics. Well before Darwin, the idea that different
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species could adapt themselves to different environmental conditions was already in the works.
The basic idea is that there are pure natural kinds of different animals and plants, but that owing
to the need to survive in climates which are foreign from one’s original habitation, one finds that
these pure kinds must adapt and evolve. Of course Kant stresses that such adaptation must in fact
be evidence of a special act of creation, rather than some chance mechanism. Yet this does more
than merely defend God’s involvement in nature. This idea places even more emphasis on the
notion of natural kinds, even going so far as necessary natural kinds. For Kant each adaptation
is not foreign to a creature but is in fact always beneficial, “Such development makes it possible
for things to turn out well for the creature and for it to preserve itself continually.”22 Now the
human races come about in the same way, so that there must have been some kind of pure basic
human being which has adapted to various environmental conditions so as to better survive.
These adaptations over the years resulted in the four basic races and all their variations.
Here we will take a moment and bring up a few details which Kant uses to prove his
theory on how the races develop. He remarks how Native Americans are not a fully formed race
and then uses this evaluation to explain why they make very poor slaves since they seem to lack
the physical endurance which Negroes naturally possess.23 He lauds the strength and agility of
Negroes while at the same time explaining that the excess iron in their blood is what gives them
their black color and is also the cause of their bodily odors, “which explains why all Negroes
stink”.24 Indeed, Kant even accounts for the common illnesses of Asian-Indians as resulting from
their inadequate racial adaptation, rather than any cultural practices or direct environmental
factors.25 Given that Kant explains race in the context of slavery and colonialism it is important
to remember that his conception of race is not simply a finding that results from an objective
curiosity, but is also politically situated.
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Having explained the origins of the races, Kant turns to define the pure kind of the
original human. “We must conclude that this lineal root genus is already extinct or that we can
find evidence of it among the existing stock, from which we can generally construct a
comparative account of the lineal root genus.”26 Kant dismisses the idea that the root genus still
survives, especially since all of those original humans had to adapt to varying environments and
extreme conditions. Yet there is a part of the world which Kant thinks still retains the ideal
weather conditions. In that special climate the humans who live there have needed to adapt very
little, and are thus very close to the root genus. In true scientific form Kant gives the
geographical coordinates for this region, rather than simply declaring where it is outright. “The
only part of the earth that we can justifiably think to have the most fortunate combination of
influences of both the cold and hot regions is the area between 31 and 52 degrees latitude in the
old world (which also seems to deserve the name old world because of the peoples that inhabit
it).”27 Incidentally, the area which Kant has marked out denotes the southern and northern limits
of the continent of Europe. His justification for this rationale includes not only the climate of
Europe, but also the European propensity to colonize. Europeans seem to be “already wellprepared to be transplanted into every other region of the earth.”28 Thus due to the ideal
European climate and the apparent success of European colonization, Kant concludes that the
lineal root genus was white with brown hair. He goes on to claim that the first deviation from
this is the white and blonde race, which Kant states is native to northern Germany. All of the
other races clearly descended from the lineal root genus. Kant even laments the fact that the
noble blonde race has been unable to develop entirely on its own due to “interbreeding with alien
stocks….”29 So the original humans were apparently white, and the first racial variation of this
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purity was an improvement. Since then subsequent racial variations served only to taint the
development of the blond race with their alien stock.
So it seems that the origin of race begins with whiteness. While Bernier was content to
describe the races Kant determines the scientific justification for race, and it seems to begin with
the pure European White. It is rather telling that Kant justifies the “purity” and “supremacy” of
the white race based on the success of colonization. How else would Kant be able to provide
solid evidence for the originality of whiteness unless he could say: “See? Whites can adapt
themselves to every other environment on earth and there they may thrive and continue to build
their great civilizations!” The same cannot be said of Native Americans. Kant found them far too
weak for field work, that is, forced field work, and he thought they were a people who were only
half-alive. Writing of the Black race, Kant praises them for their strength and at the same time
chastises them for their laziness. 30 He justifies this by claiming that Africa is a land that is sowell supplied in natural resources as to make the inhabitants lazy. If this is even remotely
accurate, then it would seem that Africa has a better climate than Europe. Kant might explain this
away by agreeing with Maupertuis and argue that “hard work” is an essential feature of a noble
and good people.31 Writing of the white race Kant claims that they alone possess the natural
features of intellect, work ethics, and an industrious morality. He claims that these features are so
natural to the white race that the attempt to cultivate them in other races must necessarily fail
since nature itself will not allow it.32 It would seem from this that Kant has no moral problem
with the eugenics which he earlier dismissed. Instead, he thinks that one cannot fight or reform
one’s true nature as raced. For Kant, race becomes destiny, and all that we are capable of
becoming is contained within the seeds and natural predispositions of our race.
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By examining Bernier and Kant we have seen the how the everyday problem of race
emerges as a search for a proper identification and categorization of the apparently different
humans in the world. Yet this search leads inexorably to the problem of race as whiteness. It is
easy enough to understand that European intellectuals of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries were trying to make sense of the vast diversity of peoples and civilizations beyond their
own. It is also worth mentioning that explorers and conquerors had been “dealing” with the
problem as far back as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Yet if we can trace the origin of the
idea of race to these European intellectuals then the everyday problem of race seems to emerge
with grand simplicity. The everyday problem of race is how best to categorize people, and so this
inspires the European to first ask “what are you?” of the other. This must be the case since once I
understand fully what you are, then I will be capable of knowing how I ought to treat you. This
categorical curiosity is the very basis for almost all scientific inquiry, especially since
observation and understanding of natural entities must lead to application. This quest for a
category turns from initial curiosity into a desire for control. Then that objectifying gaze which
first emerged in Europe and seeks to order the world, is the same objectifying gaze that is
complicit in the ordering of people according to the concept of race. Yet this gaze is never a
mere curiosity. Science is always looking for clear and practical solutions to its various
problems, solutions which will give way to technologies. So this applies to the everyday problem
of race, since the idea of race begins as a quest for identity. The concept of race begins as a
scientific pursuit of truth and knowledge, an epistemological quest for certainty about one’s
neighbors, as well as oneself. Indeed, the initial developments of the idea of race follow these
lines of scientific inquiry, and the idea takes on a different form of violence than the one
practiced by medieval conquerors and explorers.
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Race begins as a scientific category that is meant to denote the diversity and variety of
humanity into distinct, and altogether separate, groups. Thus the everyday problem of race, the
quest for proper human categories, begins right along with the birth of the concept of race itself.
From the start we struggle with how to properly identify and apply race in the various peoples of
the world. For example, Bernier struggles with how best to categorize the inhabitants of the
nations of Japan, China, and the Philippines since they are all “truly white; but they have broad
shoulders, a flat face, a small squab nose, little pig’s-eyes long and deep set, and three hairs of a
beard.”33 When Bernier encounters their whiteness what can he do, since he already knows they
may be truly white, but that doesn’t seem to make them really white in the same way as
Europeans. He decides to focus on other features in order to create a proper category for these
people who are not really white, despite their appearance. It is telling that he resorts to language
that describes animals in order to define and describe the peoples of this non-white race. We see
that what is at stake in categorizing those other types of humans is the necessary work of
dehumanizing them. Bernier no doubt reasons that if these others were truly human, as we
ourselves must be, then they would be exactly like us and not look like inhuman animals.
In trying to properly apply our understanding of the racial categories, the problem which
first appeared to be value-neutral now shows itself as ethical. There is a profound undercurrent of
paranoia and violence in the notion of race. Bernier and Kant both describe how the notion of
race seems to provide a logical justification for slavery. Bernier explains that the women of those
other races who are beautiful are understandably enslaved because of their beauty.34 Kant
explains why Native-Americans make poor slaves and why Negroes make superior slaves, at
least when it comes to fieldwork.35 Not only were the horrific practices which these two thinkers
described in themselves abhorrent, the casual manner in which they talk about such practices
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should make us pause. Still, perhaps the conceptual mistakes that Bernier and Kant committed
regarding their use of race could be corrected if someone had resolved their improper
identification of the races with identifications which were more accurate. Consider the work of
Johan Gottfried von Herder.
According to Bernasconi and Lott, if Kant was the first to truly invent the scientific
notion of race, then Johan Gottfried von Herder was the first to deny it.36 In1784, Herder
published Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Humankind in which he simply rejects the
notion of dividing people into races. Herder instead favors a division into what he calls peoples
and this is in some way quite different than the concept of race. Herder “maintained that every
nation contributed to humanity and thereby provided the framework from which to argue that
any action…that interfered with that people’s capacity to fulfill its historical mission is
destructive of humanity as a whole.”37 Herder takes great pains to communicate that there are
variations of Negroes that are not ugly, not stupid, with an olive rather than black complexion,
and whose hair is “but little wooly”.38 Of course this account also shows that he thinks there are
some Negroes who in fact have all of those traits. Despite succumbing to the racism he is trying
to critique, it is at least clear that Herder is doing his best to counter the already strong racial
stereotypes which persist about the inhabitants of Africa. He details the various scientific reasons
which can account for almost all of the superstitions and facts which apply to the notion of the
African race. Herder also attributes the key racial marker, skin color, to little more than
prolonged environmental exposure to wind and sun.39 In some ways at least Herder is a kind of
apologist for those people whom Kant deems inferior.
However, even Herder, through our contemporary lights, seems to have been blinded by
certain racist stereotypical assumptions. A key function of Herder’s understanding of Africans is
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his claim that they are somehow more sexualized than Europeans. Herder begins by explaining
the apparently more sensuous body parts of Africans. He writes, “According to various
physiological observations, the lips, breasts, and private parts, are proportionate to each other;
and as Nature…must have conferred on these people, to whom she was obliged to deny nobler
gifts, an ampler measure of sensual enjoyment, this could not but have appeared to the
physiologist.”40 The argument is deeply problematic, but Herder aims to show that the Negro has
been “naturally gifted” to enjoy sensuality simply because it is the experience of sexuality which
most makes the Negro happy. The argument is teleological, and seeks to prove that certain “body
types” (for example, the Negro body) are better equipped, naturally, to be sexual. To his credit,
instead of conceptualizing Negro sexuality in negative terms, Herder argues that these “facts”
indicate a kind of natural superiority, at least in the practice of sexual pleasure. Yet it must be
admitted that Herder is arguing that this natural sexuality is present in people who lack the
“nobler gifts”. It seems clear that Herder is convinced that natural sexuality is inferior to other
more advantageous natural abilities.
Part of the cost of this thinking is that the African loses intelligence, and this is due to
nature’s ability to counterbalance the environment with its inhabitants. Herder supposes that
since Africa is so rich in resources that a “finer intellect” would have been unnecessary, and
instead nature compensated by making stronger bodies which were naturally as fruitful as the
land they occupied.41 On this point, strangely, Herder and Kant are in agreement. We have to
pause here and try to remind ourselves that Herder is at least attempting to counter many Kantian
assumptions regarding the concept of race. Hence, he challenges some of the racist notions held
regarding people who inhabit Africa. Yet if this is his goal then why does his approach serve to
refute one stereotype while maintaining another? Herder seems to be no better for praising the
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supposedly “natural” sexuality of the Africans rather than condemning it. Herder also agrees
with Kant that Africa’s rich resources inspires a natural kind of laziness in its inhabitants. Still,
he does disagree with Kant on some aspects and this brings us to understand that the original
racial identities were never completely agreed upon in this early scientific speculation. Kant
disagrees with Bernier, Herder disagrees with Kant, and Kant also disagrees with Herder. There
is no simple consensus on the proper identification of the peoples of Africa or Europe.
Yet a look into the work of Herder reveals that the philosophical issues which surround
race seem to exist even before the concept has been formally discussed. It is easy enough to see
that the types and categories that Herder uses to try to identify and distinguish Europeans and
Africans are neither more nor less racist than the categories of Kant or Bernier. Herder may be
more sympathetic to the peoples of Africa but he directs the same quantifying gaze over them. In
Herder’s attempt to explain how the African might understand the European he applies the same
structures and categories. He assumes quite simply that the African must understand the
European in precisely the same way that the European understands the African.
The characteristics of this bias are easy enough to analyze when reading Herder’s thought
experiment on how the African might view the European. “Since whiteness is a mark of
degeneracy in many animals near the pole, the negro has as much right to term his savage
robbers albinos and white devils, degenerated through the weakness of nature, as we have to
deem him the emblem of evil, and a descendant of Ham, branded by his father’s curse. I, he
might say, I, the black, am the original man.”42 Although in one sense Herder seeks merely to
humble Kant by proposing that Africans might have a similarly bad opinion of Europeans from
their perspective as Africans, this argument goes further. It reveals, in one sense, how Herder
understands the steps of the normative gaze. First, in order to identify the other it is necessary to
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assume of ourselves a kind of primary importance. I am the measure by which I may judge all
others. Second, my primary source of ideas and information are the “natural observations” I
make of those who inhabit my world. Thus, when I observe the natural world from the position
of assuming myself as the primary and first kind, I easily deem all others to be inferior, if not
threatening, to my own original “purity.” Herder, while only inviting us to engage in a thought
experiment, seems to indicate that such a discursive strategy is in fact universal. Yet why on
earth should I assume that a discourse which identifies myself as “normal”, and through
observation identifies all the rest of the world as other, is to be expected from other peoples?
Perhaps because I have already assumed that this stance is normal since I operate within a
normative framework for understanding the world, the framework of whiteness. This problem of
whiteness then is the deeper problem of race, and it hides behind the everyday problem of race as
identification, since even in Herder we are already looking at others from the perspective of a
normalizing gaze, the white gaze.
At this juncture, having gotten a sense of the emergence of the concept of race, it is
important that we explore the normalizing gaze of European whiteness and how it is directed
towards a world of “objects” whose natures are then measured against the European notion of the
“self” as primary. So we must step back behind the notion of race as identification in order to
determine how the deeper problem of race as whiteness first emerges.
The easiest place to begin is with the concept of the European “self,” which seems to be
linked with the advent of the scientific revolution. Cornel West writes, “The scientific revolution
is noteworthy… primarily because it signified the authority of science. This authority justified
new modes of knowledge and new conceptions of truth and reality; it arose at the end of the era
of pagan Christianity and set the framework for the advent of Modernity.”43 West identifies the
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scientific revolution as beginning in the seventeenth century with thinkers like Galileo,
Copernicus, and Rene Descartes. It is not surprising then that near the end of the seventeenth
century Bernier publishes his book on how the world might be geographically ordered by race.
Bernier sees race as the latest scientific breakthrough in how one might go about structuring the
geography of the world.44 West goes on to argue that this scientific revolution is significant in
determining a genealogy of race because of its two most fundamental methodologies, that is,
“observation and evidence.”45 The scientific method depends on the presumed validity of
determining truth by making observations about the world and determining that such
observations stand as facts which are reliable.
This new scientific method formed a further basis for a revolution in philosophy, and this
is especially demonstrated in the works of Rene Descartes. West claims that, “Descartes is highly
significant because his thought provided the controlling notions of modern discourse: the
primacy of the subject and preeminence of representation.”46 Here we may have found the
origination of the all-important concept of the modern self. Descartes’ method, as practiced in his
Meditations and in his Discourse, demonstrates that the goal of philosophy is absolute certainty.
That certainty is only achievable by beginning with that which is most certain and clear to us, our
idea of ourselves. Yet what is this Cartesian self? It is a mind without a body, and a mind that has
all of the powers of knowing, choosing, and thinking unhindered by the physical uncertainties of
sentiment or interrelatedness.47 The Cartesian self is alone and depends on nothing except,
perhaps, on God. According to West, Descartes placed great emphasis on the ability of the
philosopher to represent the world perfectly via the mind. “In this view the fruits of scientific
research do not merely provide more useful ways for human beings to cope with reality; such
research also yields a true copy of reality.”48 On the scientific side of his ideas Descartes was

20

most determined that the end goal of research, of observation seeking evidence, would be the
formation of a practical philosophy. This would become the means by which one could know
the laws of nature as well as the technique of any given craft, “and thus render ourselves the
masters and possessors of nature.”49 Descartes was highly influential in the philosophical
revolution of the seventeenth century, and we find in his work the precursors of modern science
which prepared the way for the concept of race.
West summarizes the historical forces which bring about the rise of the idea of race
thusly: “In short, modern discourse rests upon a conception of truth and knowledge governed by
an ideal value-free subject engaged in observing, comparing, ordering, and measuring in order to
arrive at evidence sufficient to make valid inferences…and verify true representations of
reality.”50 This discourse implies that the European self is in possession of a normative gaze,
which is based on the recovered and reconstituted notion of the classical world, which gets
reinterpreted through the institution of science. According to West, it is science which gives the
original authority to the idea of white supremacy, without which whiteness might remain merely
a cultural bias.
The initial basis for the idea of white supremacy is to be found in the classificatory
categories and the descriptive, representational, order-imposing aims of natural history.
The captivity of natural history to…the ‘normative gaze’ signifies the first stage of the
emergence of the idea of white supremacy as an object of modern discourse.51
The evidence for this claim is clear in the works of all the thinkers we have thus far investigated.
Bernier may be the first to use the term race, Kant may be the first to defend a science of
race, and Herder may even be the first to counter the science of race with a “better science.”
However, all of these thinkers proceed from a Cartesian, scientific, and Eurocentric view of the
world. They use the methods of observation and identification, they all invoke the notion of
natural kinds and types, and they all tend to agree that the world is a kind of problem which
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needs to be understood in order to be controlled. This is the same world which is made up of
strange and unknown entities, entities which the methods and systems of science must bring
within its scope. If Descartes is to be believed then the aim of science is mastery of the natural
world. According to Francis Bacon, another great pioneer of the scientific method, the aim of
philosophy and science is “to give humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific
discoveries and inventions.”52 Descartes also discusses the idea that the major advantage of
science lies, not in its correctness or exactness, but in its applicability through technology. 53
Descartes envisions a world of the future where, thanks to technological advancements,
humanity has cured almost all diseases, divested the earth of most of its resources, and enabled
itself to live a trouble-free life, even one that might not end in death.54 This ultimate goal of
absolute mastery necessarily includes mastery over humanity. On the one hand this mastery is
personal, one must use the mind to master the body, but it is also cultural and the notion of a
master race is not far behind. Now while Descartes does not argue that this mastery is available
only to the Europeans, Kant assumes that the white is the original form as well as the superior
stock. Bernier also insists on the mastery by the European. Even Herder claims that the white is
superior in intellect, the mark which indicates the race best suited to carry out the work of
science. If the aim of science is really mastery over the world then only those who are gifted with
intellect are capable of carrying this out. This notion even gives way to ideas like “manifest
destiny” and the “white man’s burden”. It is on the shoulders of that race whose burden it is to
carry out the work of this mastery. Yet all the while the problem with this notion of whiteness is
that those carrying it out seem unaware that they were its inventors.
The everyday concept of race emerges out of the scientific drive to master and order the
world through proper categorization. Yet this science seems to be already driven by an
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underlying set of assumptions and structures which order the world from a white European
perspective. The assumed supremacy of the white race is not discovered by the science of race
but instead forms the foundations of it. So in moving behind the everyday problem of racial
categorization we come upon the structures which underlie and make possible that science of
race. The idea here is that the idea of whiteness exists, in an unrefined fashion, already in
European culture prior to the invention of the science of race. It first exists in the form of white
supremacy, even though the rational discourse which justifies this is not initially explained.
Cornel West investigates the rise of white supremacy by delineating the historical forces linked
to the assumptions embedded within the sciences and also in the arts.
In West’s genealogy of race, the idea of white supremacy first emerges through the
claims of natural history with the invention of the category of race as a means of classifying
human beings.55 So West begins with a discussion of the role that Bernier and Carolus Linnaeus
have in the development of this idea. Linnaeus refrains from explicitly ordering the races
according to some kind of natural ranking, though his language does reflect a preference for the
European over the African. He describes the European as ruled by laws, exhibiting gentleness,
and as inventive. He then describes the African using terms that indicate he thinks of them as
lazy, capricious, and that the woman are oversexed. “Linnaeus’ use of evaluative terms revealed,
at the least, an implicit hierarchy by means of personal preference. It is also important to note
that he included some remarks about the African Woman, but that he said nothing about the
European woman (nor the American and Asiatic woman).”56 So in Linnaeus we also find the
seeds of racism alongside the idea of race.
Cornel West notes that white supremacy is also made possible through the rise of, now
outmoded, sciences like phrenology and physiognomy and the ways in which those systems are
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based in art. Phrenology involved determining aptitudes and traits based on the shape and
disposition of skulls, while physiognomy involved determining those same traits based on the
reading of faces.57According to West, the breakthrough in this stage is not to be found in the
methods of science so much as it is to be found in the influence of Greek aesthetic ideals vis-àvis the idea of race. West tirelessly lists the major thinkers and influential figures of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who propagated the idea of race based on this marriage of
art and science. For example, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, a founder of modern anthropology,
held that the symmetrical face was the most beautiful since it most closely approximated the
Greek ideal as portrayed in classical sculpture. “Applying the classical ideal of moderation, he
claimed that the more moderate the climate, the more beautiful the face. The net result was that
since black people were farthest from the Greek ideal and located in extremely hot climates, they
were, by implication, inferior in beauty to Europeans.”58 Many great philosophers from this era
and even well into the nineteenth century, all seem to back up these emerging ideas about race.
Hume, Hegel, and Kant all seem spellbound by the notion of white “supremacy” and black
“inferiority” despite their own insistence on a critical and rational approach to philosophical
thinking. West concludes that the emergence of white supremacy was inevitable for two reasons.
First, the idea of whiteness as superior is practical in that it justifies colonization and white
domination of non-whites. Second, the only way to combat the emergence of white supremacy
would have involved a method of “detailed observation, measurement, comparison, and ordering
of the natural and human kingdom by autonomous subjects in the light of aesthetic and cultural
ideals of classical antiquity.”59 That is, if there ever was some original critique of white
supremacy, then that critique would have relied upon the same rational foundations as white
supremacy in order to make its arguments. Thus such a critique would have been possible but it
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ultimately would have also been abandoned for being self-defeating. Not only is the emergence
of white supremacy pragmatic, it does so based on the only method available. We can now
understand that even thinkers like Herder, who mean to debunk race of the Kantian sort, must
fall back on the methods which establish white correctness and superiority. Before Herder can
even combat Kant’s concept of race he finds himself caught up within it. He may adamantly
deny it, and modify it, but he does so within the context of a normative gaze that in fact preexists Bernier’s attempt to trouble the concept of race itself. The normative gaze of whiteness is
already working even before the European explorer has encountered the rest of the non-white
world.
By now the problem of race as identity has faded from view, as we have moved deeper
into the problem of race as whiteness. It is clear enough from the writings of Cornel West that
the proper identification of races into their appropriate categories proceeds already from a
categorical mindset which pre-exists the racial categories. This mindset is aptly called whiteness
and it is forms the deeper problem of race.
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Chapter 2 – Whiteness
Of course the problem of race as whiteness is not the problem of there being people who
phenotypically have light skin, any more than that there is some intrinsic problem of there being
people who phenotypically have dark skin. That thinking is still firmly entrenched within the
everyday problem of race as racial identification. The deeper problem of whiteness is precisely
the normative gaze which Cornel West discusses. Whiteness is the originary stance which
invents, adapts, and maintains racial identities in an evaluative hierarchy. As Kalpana SeshadriCrooks notes, and she is worth quoting in full: “The structure of racial difference is founded on a
master signifier – Whiteness – that produces a logic of differential relations. Each term in the
structure establishes its reference by referring back to the original signifier. The system of race as
differences among black, brown, red, yellow, and white makes sense only in its unconscious
reference to Whiteness, which subtends the binary opposition between ‘people of color’ and
‘white.’”
1

Whiteness is not dead, despite our social advances, precisely because whiteness

continues to stand behind those advances. In his book, Black Bodies White Gazes, George Yancy
writes on the continued survival of whiteness. “To engage the issue of whiteness as a process of
racialization is not to fall into a problematic and unwanted essentialism. The fact is that
whiteness continues to exist within the socially and existentially lived sphere of our
experiences.”2 The deeper problem of race as whiteness is precisely that this ethical problem of
racism not only persists, it thrives. Whiteness exists and continues to function in our society as it
perpetuates racial hegemony, privilege, and power over black people and people of color. “Even
if science provided an exhaustive list of reasons why we should abandon race-talk and how race
is a fiction, the everyday performance of that fiction would not necessarily change.”3 It is worth
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mentioning that science has yet to furnish us with that list. So in practice the problem of race as
identification continues, though in different forms than it did for Kant or Herder. Yet engaging in
or evading this ongoing identification is not the way to resolve the deeper problems which cause
it to surface in the first place. The deeper problem of whiteness precedes this everyday encounter
with race as identity, and so it is into this deeper problem that we must go.
In this chapter, I investigate the notion of whiteness as the deeper problem of race, and
the numerous ways that racial categories are offshoots of an original white standard. The
normative gaze of whiteness is explored through a discussion of white privilege and the process
of how whiteness creates other “races.” This will involve an investigation into the key factors
and defining features that make up whiteness, as well as the reason that whiteness is difficult to
define. Although whiteness is constitutive of all the other racial categories, as Seshadri-Crooks
argues above, it constructs itself in such a way as to evade detection or identification. Thus
whiteness exists not only as normative, but also as invisible. Whiteness is socially constructed
and must constantly reconstruct and reinforce itself. This reinforcement involves the process
whereby some people become white and, by extension, where other people become non-white.
Finally, in this chapter, I explore those arguments that contend that whiteness is not a problem.
These arguments are steeped in a naïve assumption that racism has somehow already been
resolved. Despite the rhetoric of a post-race America, I will show that racism has merely shifted
from overt to subtle. Racism as whiteness remains threatening since whiteness retains the ability
to invisibly continue as the supreme normative category. Since this chapter deals so closely with
the question of raced identity, I will engage my own raced identity as white. I conclude this
chapter with the argument that whiteness precedes the categories of race and exists as a tool for
constructing race.
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We begin the investigation into the deeper problem of whiteness by discussing George
Yancy’s evaluation of whiteness as the transcendental norm in his work Black Bodies, White
Gazes. Yancy explains that whiteness exists as a “transcendental norm – where whiteness takes
itself to be that which remains the same across a field of difference – in relationship to the social
ontological implications of racial embodiment.”4 Whiteness can be described as the look, glance,
perspective, gaze, standpoint, or vantage point qua ordinary. In drawing out this distinction
Yancy emphasizes personal narrative as a means of analyzing racial issues. “Narrative has a
powerful capacity to communicate lived and imaginative dimensions of reality.”5 So in that spirit
I now present a part of my own narrative on race in an effort to elucidate the concept of
whiteness as Yancy describes it.
As a young undergraduate, I once engaged several friends in a discussion on what it
meant for us to be white. One of my more confident friends boldly stated that whites had no
culture and no artifacts which identify them as interesting or exciting. He explained that this is
why they often feel the need to appropriate “black culture” and listen to rap music or adopt
“black” styles of dress. Their own culture was dull, flat, and without any mark of interest or
appeal to recommend it. He argued that in response to the dullness of being white, young whites
had to seek out the culture of the “other,” in this case the culture of black people. A less
confident friend thought that this idea was preposterous, and he insisted that there was a white
culture. Although when he was pressed for details and examples by my confident friend, my less
confident friend could not produce them. Each attempt he made to carve out a unique example of
white culture inevitably led back to black innovators who were the originators of music, art, and
“slang.” Feeling desperate, my less confident friend declared that European civilization and
classic forms of art and music were white culture. The confident friend easily dismissed this by
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saying that those cultures were not white but rather they were German, or Italian, or else British.
The effect of this conversation on me was that I was left quite uncertain as to what had become
of whiteness. On the one hand I thought of myself, and all of the friends involved in the
conversation, as white. Yet, apparently, on the other hand, to be white meant to be nothing at all,
since whiteness had no mark. In that discussion whiteness presented itself as the un-presentable,
the invisible, the imaginary, or else the thief, the assimilator, the flattener, and the colonizer of
culture.
Yancy is able to account for that experience I had of my own whiteness by explaining
that whiteness constructs and reconstructs itself time and time again all while evading notice.
“The presumption is that whiteness is lived as pure mind, while Blackness is lived as pure body.
As Robert Birt argues, ‘Whiteness is the privilege of exclusive transcendence.’ Hence whiteness
is not only a form of bad faith because it assumes the position of exclusive transcendence but
also by implication it is a form of bad faith because it denies transcendence to blacks’.”6 Those
who identify as white, and who identify with whiteness, are somehow able to avoid having a
race, and, according to Birt, evade questions of embodiment. Thus it is only non-whites who are
raced and who have a raced and racialized body, while whites exist as the site of exclusive
transcendence.
Through an elaborate ideology that sustains the appearance of truth (that whites are pure
transcendence) whites are not only able to conceal the truth about themselves (that they
are located, invested in their lived embodied situation as white) but they also attempt to
convince Blacks of the appearance of this truth…indeed the lie of whiteness is
dialectically embedded in the lie about “Blackness”.7
Returning to my personal experience above, what was so telling, though I did not understand it at
the time, is that I did in fact have a culture as white. One of the facts about that culture was that I
was in the position of observer, able to pass judgment and scrutinize the cultures of the other
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races. I functioned as the site of a racially neutral background against which raced others were
foregrounded in terms of their “exotic” raced identities, art, music, and idiomatic expressions,
that is, “their language.” Yet I, being white, had no fashion, art, or music since I, as white, had
unfiltered access to all fashions, arts, music, and languages. All of these cultural artifacts were
available to me and all remained available from my vantage point as the invisible neutral, nonraced observer.
The deeper problem here is that whiteness eludes being identified as raced. The white
knows all and sees all as raced, as other, and as not itself. Whiteness claims to have no identity,
thus escaping the power of its own gaze, but it maintains an invisible identity as superior,
intellectual, disembodied, political, and above all ethical. The gaze of whiteness is ethical in the
sense that it is a normative gaze since, from the perspective of whiteness, the world is seen in
terms of black (or nonwhite) and white. The world and all its objects are available to the pure
and disinterested white gaze. However, this is an illusion, and one which John D. Caputo
precisely explains when he claims that,
White is not “neutral.” “Pure” reason is lily white, as if white is not a color or is closest to
the purity of the sun, and everything else is “colored.” Purification is a name for terror
and deportation, and “white” is a thick, dense, potent cultural signifier that is closely
linked to rationalism and colonialism. What is not white is not rational. So white is
philosophically relevant and needs to be philosophically critiqued — it affects what we
mean by “reason” — and “we” white philosophers cannot ignore it.8
If whiteness presents itself as invisible then this seems to have profoundly negative implications
for people who identify as white. When whiteness fails to see itself as embodied it escapes the
accountabilities created by its own created systems. This reinforces a kind of ethical failure or
refusal of white people to see themselves as involved in racism. Yet the white apologist must
protest this apparent reverse racism which would demonize all white people. They might claim
that not all whites are culpable in whiteness since it was white people who played such important
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roles in the abolition of slavery, and who championed the cause of peace and an end to hostilities
shown toward Native Americans. The apologist maintains that there must be some good whites
and that also the position of power and influence afforded to whites gives them the opportunity
to enact great social reforms. Yancy responds by pointing out that this apology is an example of
the distinction between good and bad whites, or between the non-racist and the ultra-racist.
Evoking the power of narrative again, Yancy details an incident where he attempted to
confront his fellow students about the issue of whiteness while discussing some texts in an
African-American Literature class. As they discussed the Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Douglas, an American Slave, Written by Himself and Harriet Jacobs Incidents in the Life of a
Slave Girl, Yancy recalls that his own reaction to these texts was one of anger. He explained to
his fellow students, who were almost exclusively white, that he was angered as a black male
when he read these texts and he wondered if they felt anything via their own whiteness. When
the class remained silent, Yancy reflected on the meaning of this silence. He later determined
that the students felt uneasy at the associations with the white racist individuals in these
narratives. “The white students distanced themselves from these figures through a process of
juxtaposing the ‘good white’ with the ‘bad white.’ They saw themselves as ‘good whites’
incapable of such acts of racial brutality.”9 In their minds they were not racist or at least they
weren’t guilty of that vicious racism practiced by white supremacists.
Now we come to it, and the moment threatens to slip away, as we begin to wrap
ourselves up in the cool distinction between ethical and unethical whiteness. For example, the
temptation for me to slide back in and congratulate myself on overcoming the evils of racism,
and the evils of racism committed by my white ancestors, is absolutely intoxicating. I now have
the wherewithal to respond to the racism of Kant, Bernier, Hegel, Hume, Herder, Linnaeus, and
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all the other thinkers mentioned thus far. I am tempted to declare that I, as are all whites in
contemporary society, am no-longer-racist. The evidence for this hasty claim need be nothing
more than my lack of brutality against blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and (for the sake of appeasing
Bernier) the Sami people (whom he referred to as the Lapps). So, modern white people stand
vindicated and the problem of racism has apparently been resolved by the inevitable progress of
our “advanced” thinking.
This celebration is both premature and also extremely dangerous. Here there is a growing
danger and a rising threat as whiteness threatens to slip away and disappear again. If I am not a
racist, a bad white, then I am able to slip away and avoid being white altogether. I may then say,
as my confident friend claimed of white culture, that I am not white but I am instead European or
else American. Yancy points out the trouble with this escape as he continues to break down the
distinction between good and bad whites, and by extension good and bad whiteness.
Through this process of subterfuge, however, they failed to locate their own center of
power, a center that enabled them to make such a distinction without any recognition of
their own whiteness as a species of white racism. When whites take it upon themselves to
define what is and is not a racist act, is this not tied into the very power of whiteness?
After all this is another way that whites exercise their power to nullify the epistemic and
affective certainty in terms of which a Black person, for example, knows that he/she has
just been subject to white racism.10
Part of the basic power of whiteness lies in its ability to create and construct the world while
hiding from or evading the fact that whiteness is also a creation and construction. It was white
European thinkers who invented the concept of race in order to define all the others of the world
against themselves. This creation not only defines the other as non-white, it also calls forth the
invention and the creation of the self as white. In a movement reminiscent of Descartes, the
white-self first creates the world of non-white raced identities in all the variations that appear
before its disinterested gaze. Only after this creation could it begin to discover itself operating at
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the center of the universe as the identity behind the gaze; an identity that is defined by an
idealistic image of the disembodied mind. It is worth establishing, at this point, that of course
Europeans are not alone in their attempts to declare themselves supreme. Yet whiteness
accomplishes more than claims of political, national, or even ethnic supremacy. That is,
supremacy is certainly a part of the claim of whiteness, but while other forms of supremacy are
boastful and arrogant, whiteness extends a kind of mock humility. It extends itself everywhere
and applies to a multitude of people, and yet these people seem almost afraid to claim their own
whiteness.
Then why do white people hide from their whiteness and what does this evasion
accomplish? Yancy claims that one possible reason for this evasion is that it enables whites to
maintain their identity as atomic individuals while also giving them the freedom to “distance
themselves from whiteness as a governing racial ideology…”11 Thus, actually being white comes
to mean that one cannot be racist, it means that one is not the perpetrator of a racist society or an
ideology that maintains some kind of power structure based on whiteness. The rationale used to
avoid one’s whiteness and the racial privilege that this whiteness involves is often quite simple.
A person will boldly proclaim, “I can’t be white, since my ancestors were Norwegian, or British,
or German, or French, or….” Now I don’t mean to denigrate the cultural diversity that
accompanies all of these ethnic backgrounds, nor imply that the historical treatment for all such
peoples has been identical. Rather in the attempt to confront someone who is white regarding
their whiteness, one finds that the whiteness is absent, and that as an individual a person’s
identity is deemed much more complex. Perhaps this may be true of attempting to confront
anyone on their race, but in the case of whiteness this defense seems to be more effective.
Whiteness vis-à-vis white people is not like the artist’s canvas, but rather it is more like the clear
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glass of the picture frame. It defines the entirety of the space and delimits all of the expressions
contained by the individuality of the artists’ brush strokes. This glass is invisible, and we are not
even aware of it unless it becomes smudged, printed, marked, or stained. Yet whether we are
aware of it or not it is what defines the painting and even makes it available to the experience of
an audience.
Yancy further explains that declaring whiteness as raced is problematic insofar as it often
shows up as merely another race among other races. It shows up in precisely the way its
European architects intended, as simply another category to define and organize the human
being. Yet if we accept this understanding then we lose out on the realization that before Bernier
discovered the other races, he was already white. Bernier was already operating from the
“transcendental norm, or that site from which racial differences are established and identified.”12
Still, the process of declaring whiteness as raced can be a turning point, and Yancy explains that
racializing whiteness also imperils it. Once whiteness is named as a race then it shows up as a
category which is deeply invested in reinforcing its supremacy and survival. As a racialized
marking, whiteness loses its invisibility and shows up as the historical perpetrator and architect
of some of the worst racialized violence ever committed in the world. It cannot be denied that the
Trans-Atlantic slave trade of the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries was a form of
systematic brutality where those who were raced as white benefitted from the desolation of those
who were raced as black. Yancy writes that when whiteness is named and marked, its “presumed
fixed metaphysical essence, [is reduced] to a sociohistorical status whose power is not
ahistorically given, but selfishly and brutally maintained through human practices.”13 Once
whiteness is no longer invisible, it loses its claim to being natural, pure, virtuous, and even its
simple claim to being normal. Having lost that power phenotypically white people are forced to
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confront their identity as recipients of white privilege that has been purchased at a horrendous
cost to Black people and people of color. A white person might try to maintain that he is
innocent of racism because he himself never owned slaves. Yet if we confront the reality that
whiteness continues to operate as a site of racial hegemony then one’s individual innocence is
swallowed up by a history that is not merely past but also present.
Yet if we do encounter whiteness as raced, as white supremacy, then we encounter the
socially constructed nature of whiteness and how it has historically come to be what it is. Yet this
might be a path toward our “salvation,” since if whiteness is a historical construct then we might
engage in forms of historical deconstruction and resistance against it. We could speculate that it
was done away with when slavery was abolished, or at least when the civil rights laws were
passed, or at the very latest when an African American male was elected president. Can we not
finally hold our heads up and say we are done with racism, and also with the idea of white or
black? Such a celebration is likely to be very premature in light of any number of recent
historical events. Part of the problem of listing these events lies in their appearance as
anomalous. The white apologist is quick to point out how the perpetrators of hate crimes are
ignorant, or else few in number, or at least not like the apologists themselves. However, this
attempt to rationalize away whiteness is precisely part of the ongoing practice of whiteness. This
rationale reinforces categories of normality and racial neutrality. Such forms of rationale, which
are forms of evasion, remind us and others that the police only arrest people who are dangerous
or criminal. We are reminded that those people who get hired for a job are those who most
deserve it because of their neutral (read non-raced) qualifications. Reiterated is the narrative that
there are no white people, just a mixture of many different ethnicities. Indeed, the process of
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rationalizing away whiteness often involves substituting ancestry and ethnicity as a way of trying
to define one’s identity as complex, diverse, or anything other than white.
In order to illustrate the way that whiteness is rationalized away, let me once again
interject my own narrative to discuss my own search for a complex, and non-white, identity. As a
young boy growing up in the Southwest United States I was told a family story about how my
ancestors had been Cherokee Indians. I remember being fascinated by this at the time since it
gave my origins some interesting diversity. As a boy, being white meant being boring, ordinary,
and normal, and I was quite disinterested in an identity that was so common. Of course, the
origins of my European ancestry had always been better known to me. As my ancestors had been
so I also was English, German, French and Norwegian, and at the same time I suffered no ill
effects from any of these associations. As a child I imagined that being Indian meant being
dangerous, interesting, exciting, and, quite strangely, privileged. To be some fraction Indian
meant that I had a claim to what I thought was the privilege of victimization. Whenever
conversations about racism came up I could simultaneously be the victim, and thus the offended
party, and also still be the white speaker whose voice would and should be heard. Furthermore, I
looked into the extent of my racial roots, as I neared college age, in hopes that this might give me
the special treatment of affirmative action, or at least access to some scholarships which were put
aside for those who had been historically disadvantaged. As a teenager, “being Cherokee” meant
that I could not be racist since I identified with the victims of racism. I saw it only as an
advantage, a tool to be used for my own personal advancement in life. It provided a source of
righteous indignation towards violence against Native Americans, and at the same time I was
able to pick up and put down this tangential identity as it suited me. However, as I got older I
found no genealogical evidence of that diverse ancestry for which I longed. I ultimately had to
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resign myself to being European, or American, and yet somewhere along the way I had become
white. I was the recipient of a set of privileges tied to my race, even though these were privileges
of which I was not always aware. I may have failed to rationalize away my whiteness, but in that
failure I had managed to gain access to the very thing which all of my European ancestors had
struggled to gain, white privilege.
Before I engage the implications of white privilege, I will explore the processes whereby
a person becomes white. If whiteness is a historical and social construct then perhaps some clue
to its continued power can be found in its initiation rites. Yancy explains that becoming white
involves not only phenotypical whiteness of one’s skin color but also certain deliberate activities
and practices designed to erect barriers between whites and non-whites.
Becoming white involves acquiring, in some sense, the appearance of whiteness in terms
of one’s physiology. One way to do this would be to be born white, to two white parents. Besides
the obvious there may be other ways to gain access to the appearance of whiteness. Through the
intermarriage of whites and non-whites, and due to the inconsistencies of genetic expression, the
children of these marriages may exhibit more phenotypically white traits than their non-white
parents. This contributes to the phenomenon known as racial passing, where one is described as
being able to pass for white even though, and this is important, the assumption is that one is not
really white. The idea behind passing is that a person can appear to be phenotypically white in all
of the ways in which we stereotypically think of whites. Thus such a person is able to be
mistaken for a white, while the racist category of whiteness maintains that the person is not
“truly white.” Allyson Hobbs investigates the history of racial passing in her book A Chosen
Exile: A History of Racial Passing. In an interview with Nate Sloan, Hobbs explains that passing
is not simply a way of getting ahead or blending in. “I'm not as interested in what people gained
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by being white, but rather in what they lost by not being black,’ Hobbs said. ‘To understand
passing we can't just look at the story of the person who passed, we have to look at their whole
social world, because everyone is going to be impacted."14 Yet even this first step reveals the
impossibility of whiteness, for who could honestly say that their heritage is pure and unmixed
back to the very origin of the species? Nonetheless, whiteness survives as the image of purity,
and its essence, as it were, houses the illusion of the unspoiled and untainted.
By far the most important aspect of becoming white, however, is to be found in the
practices and institutions which define whiteness. This is a much clearer system since within a
white society the suspicion of merely passing as white is ever present. Yancy writes that “one
grasps the oppressive nature of the discursive and nondiscursive modalities through which
whiteness (or whiteliness) becomes a deeply political, existentially lived, social category that
shapes the subjectivities and future racialist/racist practices of whites.”15 Yancy gives three
anecdotes told by Thandeka, a Unitarian Universalist theologian and minister, which give
examples of how various phenotypically white children engage in the process of becoming
white. What the stories all have in common is that they detail events whereby young children
discover race, and, by extension, their own whiteness as something which is under threat.
Through their experiences, the children in these stories learn what socially acceptable behavior is
and what it is not. Primarily, they learn how the normative gaze of race informs many previously
unknown aspects of their lives.16 My own experience of becoming white was likewise
determined by the social imposition of a certain form of racialized propriety around the
observations of the differences of other people.
I distinctly remember the first time in my own life when I was instructed on the meaning
of white and black skin. My father was a minister in a Baptist Church, and as a young boy of not
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more than five years old I was often at our church for various functions, services, and ministry
programs. One such event saw us welcoming a missionary from Africa. I remember this event
distinctly because he was the first black person I had ever seen in the flesh. I am not sure what
categories very young children have which seem to take into account the differences between
themselves and others, yet I must have had those categories at that age. Upon seeing this dark
skinned man up close I was quite interested in his appearance. I was curious in my discovery that
the palms of his hands were of a different color than the backs of his hands. I was so interested in
this that I had the unmitigated audacity, as often children have, to ask him if there was something
wrong with his hands. I recall that he laughed and said something in a good-natured way, no
doubt as this was not the first time some wide-eyed white child had asked him questions about
why he seemed to be so different. Scarcely a moment seemed to pass between his response and
my initiation into whiteness as an adult quickly took me aside and chastised me for asking that
question. They even went so far as to educate me and say that I was not allowed to ask such
questions of people “like him,” as it was considered rude. I do not know if the adult meant well,
and I do not remember if this adult was a teacher, a parent, or a stranger, only that the adult was
white. In their whiteness they were teaching me what it meant for me to be white also. In this
case being white meant you were not allowed to ask questions about why people were not white,
as this was simply a cruel reminder to those non-whites that they were not like us.
The phenomenon I encountered is explained by Yancy when he writes that whiteness
involves creating distinctions and barriers between whites and non-whites. For me it meant
becoming aware that people with dark skin were also sensitive about it and that it was apparently
rude to remind them of it. “The process of becoming white in this sense has nothing to do with a
so-called genetic racial substratum, but everything to do with what happens at the level of social
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constitutionality, how the human being comes to be the white self that is both constituted by and
constitutes white racism.”17 Yancy reminds us that race is in some ways already operating even
before a young child begins to develop a sense of themselves as white against the non-white.
Thus the white identity is created through a process of negation and abstraction, since the white
shows up through a contrast vis-à-vis the non-white. I came to know myself as white through
negation: I was not-African. Yet even as whiteness revels in the other as “dangerous,” “dark,”
and “base,” whiteness itself is under the real danger of dissolution. Like the term “Cracker,”
whiteness has a certain fragility. Whiteness must constantly recreate and reform the black body
as the site of terror in the white imagination. “Rather, the dark body as the phantasmic object of
the white imaginary regulates production of the white self. Before long, the authority and power
of whiteness, through white ideological sleight of hand, appears devoid of a beginning or an end.
White reactionary values become the universal measure of the human.”18 The result is that we
live in a world where whiteness becomes established as the norm through an arduous and
continuous process of negation and degradation. All the while it remains invisible and undetected
as the norm. Yet perhaps whiteness is no longer invisible given the recent “social progress” we
have made in eradicating racism from the world. I turn now to the question of how visible
whiteness has perhaps become and whether or not this means that the problem of whiteness is
now in the past.
Perhaps one simple response to this ongoing critique that race is a problem and that
racism and therefore whiteness is a problem could be that we have resolved these problems. One
might claim that there is some racism left in the form of white supremacist hate groups but that
these groups exist only on the fringes of society. We could point towards Barack Obama as a
shining example that racism is obsolete if a black man can become the President of the United
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States. Furthermore, we could point to the Civil Rights act and affirmative action laws that by
now must have leveled the playing field and eradicated the problem of whiteness and racism
once and for all. One might even go so far as to claim that whites too can be victims of racism.
Since black people are now in positions of power in society, the reasoning would go, then surely
they could discriminate against whites. In short we are everywhere confronted by the loud and
fervent cry that racism is no more. We congratulate ourselves on this victory and then treat
incidents of racial violence, aggression, rape, and murder as anomalies. We explain these
incidents by claiming that evil people will continue to commit evil acts, but that these acts no
longer have anything to do with race. If the majority of society insists that it is time to move on
from the topic of race and racism, then perhaps racism is truly dead. However, the announcement
of the death of racism should be delayed while we consider whether or not white privilege is
keeping it alive.
Shannon Sullivan explains that although racism has undergone some changes, it is not
finished so much as it has been transformed. From the inception of race in the seventeenth
century all the way up through the rise, decline, and dismantling of slavery in the latter part of
the nineteenth century, racism has gone through its historical paces. In her book Revealing
Whiteness Shannon Sullivan writes that in the twentieth century white domination was very
visible. Slavery may no longer have been legal, but the idea of white supremacy still informed
culture and law. Sullivan recounts how public lynchings of black men, which had all of the legal
sanction of mob murders, were well attended by hundreds and sometimes thousands of white
spectators19. Yet there was a decided shift away from this attitude in response to the gains of the
civil rights movement. Sullivan writes that “After the civil rights movements of the 1960’s the
move from de jure to de facto racism meant not the end of white domination, but a significant
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shift in its predominant mode of operation.”20 Racism fell out of public favor, or at least the
active social practice of racial aggression, violence, and degradation fell out of public favor. Yet
whiteness did not fall out; indeed, it proved too deeply embedded in social and cultural identities
to disappear so easily. Instead, there was a quiet social shift from habits of white supremacy to
white privilege. While Sullivan acknowledges that violent white supremacy continues to exist,
she also claims that it becomes increasingly marginalized. Because whiteness as a site of
hegemony continues to exist and unconscious white habits and privileges continue to shape our
lives, then a form of white supremacy continues to exist. However, white privilege, and its
source whiteness, continues to function in increasingly invisible but simultaneously pervasive
ways. “As unconscious, habits of white privilege do not merely go unnoticed. They actively
thwart the process of conscious reflection on them, which allows them to seem nonexistent as
they continue to function.”21
Sullivan gives an example of how, at a conference of intellectuals discussing racism and
the Roma people, one interlocutor kept referring to the Roma by using the term Jews. Even upon
being corrected and admitting his or her mistake the speaker continued to make the mistake and
insert the term Jews when discussing the Roma. For Sullivan this was a troubling reminder of the
invisibility of white privilege and the unconscious nature of the racism it supports and
perpetuates. “The association instead is the product of a constitutive relationship between
psyche, soma, and world in which historical events have shaped the way the Roma and the Jews
are negatively perceived; reciprocally, deprecatory stereotypes of the Roma and the Jews have
been used to facilitate and justify their oppression.”22 The speaker was too deeply entrenched in
the unconscious habits of racism for any conscious thinking, public correction, or even logical
difference to penetrate and correct the mistake.
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Still the tendency to see this kind of thinking as isolated to those few “racist” individuals
is an assumption that is difficult for many people, especially white people, to shake. White
people, and people more generally, tend to become defensive about the implication that they
somehow benefit from an invisible system of privilege, especially when they think that their
moral sense of themselves is being challenged. Those who are most defensive about white
privilege are invariably categorized by the broader society as white, even though such people
have trouble admitting to that classification and would rather see themselves as simply human.
There are broad implications for this kind of ignorance, vis-á-vis the invisibility of whiteness.
This kind of ignorance is itself one of the symptoms of white privilege. Critical whiteness
scholar Peggy McIntosh wrote an influential article on white privilege, and its intersections with
male privilege and heterosexual privilege. In her article, McIntosh, a self-described white
woman, provides a list of forty-six different examples of white privilege in contemporary
American society. What follows are a few of those examples which are especially pertinent to
this discussion.







When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I am shown that
people of my color made it what it is.
I can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to my race.
I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.
I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who constitute the
world’s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such oblivion.
If I declare that there is a racial issue at hand, or there isn’t a racial issue at hand, my race
will lend me more credibility for either position than a person of color will have.
My culture gives me little fear about ignoring the perspectives and powers of people of
other races.23

George Yancy expounds on this list by claiming that in order to understand the lack of privilege
faced by non-whites, one need only negate one of those statements. The simple way to do this
would be to add the phrase, “It is not the case that” to any item on that list. 24 Yancy is quick to

43

point out that this system of privileges does not extend equally to all whites and in all areas. This
is clear enough when one considers that white privilege is tempered by gender and class
privilege. McIntosh also includes a brief list of heterosexual privileges in her article. Depending
on one’s sexual identity, for example, certain white privileges may be curtailed because one may
have the “wrong” sexual partner.25 My own personal experiences provide support to the ways in
which, as a white male, being white comes with various benefits in the form of white privileges.
In thinking about the nature of white privilege I realized that I could compile my own
personal list. The value of compiling such a list strikes me as pointedly ethical. The sheer act of
confronting situations where I have been the recipient of white privilege forms a basis for
beginning to also confront the existence of whiteness and racism as an unconscious part of my
own psyche. If the issue at hand with racism and white privilege, and ultimately technoracism, is
ethical, then the practices of anti-racism must begin now. In my own research into whiteness, it
is important that I name white privilege and that I refuse to approach whiteness under the
assumption that it is best to do so from a disinterested, objectivist viewpoint. My list is obviously
not exhaustive, but it does lay out several of the ways in which whiteness and racism have
shaped not only my mode of thinking and living, but also my education and even my
understanding of philosophy.
1. I have never been the recipient of hostility or suspicion over whether or not I am
the father of my young son.
2. Almost all of the racist statements I have made in my life have been publicly
excused, by people who took offense to them, based on the assumption that I
came from an ignorant background where I was not better educated about such
matters. In short, my white ignorance saved me.
3. If I am even slightly well-dressed in a public place it will be assumed that I am an
authority figure.
4. Although a girl I was dating was once reprimanded by a member of her family for
dating a man outside of her religion, she was immediately afterwards
congratulated on dating a man from her own race, a fact which could only have
been apparent from my name and photograph.
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In making such a list I attempt to confront the most difficult and insidious fact about whiteness,
its invisibility. As a recipient of white privilege I am often blind to the ways in which that
privilege is extended to me or to those like me. Yet even though white privilege functions as
crucial and more than effective evidence for showing the continued existence of racism as
whiteness, there are untold numbers of white people in our culture who continue to deny that
white privilege exists. The primary counterargument is that white privilege really amounts to
little more than class privilege. The result is that any system of privileges in the western world is
primarily based upon one’s wealth and social status. It is further argued that poor whites suffer
from lack of privilege in the same way as poor blacks, and that rich blacks benefit in the same
way as rich whites.
Yancy provides an example of how this denial works where he shares a discussion that he
had with a white philosopher.
I recall a white philosopher recently denying the legitimacy of many Black people’s
claims that they still experience inordinate discrimination and have not substantially
benefitted from the civil rights movement…To make his point, he argued that since the
antiracist movements of the 1960’s, Blacks have done extraordinarily well…(he) both
assumed the authority to speak for the majority of Black people and conveyed the
message that Blacks ought to stop complaining and start doing for themselves…26
There are many mistakes made by Yancy’s white philosopher, not the least of which is the
obvious racist move to speak for an entire group of people. It is worth noting that any attempt to
speak on behalf of an entire race, whether solicited, unsolicited, and regardless of one’s own
experiences, is deeply problematic. In fact, McIntosh actually argues that she has the privilege of
never being asked to speak for all the people of her racial group.27 One possible reason for this
particular privilege is that white people don’t often see themselves as operating in a group, they
are almost always able to function as individuals. Not only do white people presume to speak on
behalf of all Black people, Black people lack the privilege of not being asked to speak for their
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entire group. Caputo addresses this problem when he criticizes whites who attempt to appropriate
blackness and claim to speak of the lived experience of being black.
You can’t be an “intentional” victim, adopt it freely, because that means you are always
free to walk away from it if the going gets rough, take a few weeks off for a holiday, or
just you change your mind. So it ends up making a mockery of the oppressed — the
biting edge of oppression is that is not of your own choosing! People who try to walk a
mile in the shoes of the other, to live among and dedicate their lives to working with the
oppressed, are also sensitive to the fact of their own privilege. They know they can never
truly identify with them.28
Additionally, Yancy points out that the claims made by the white philosopher are simply not
true, they are not borne out by the facts. Particularly telling are how the facts about the situation
of poor whites and poor blacks are not at all equivalent. “In 2001, for example, 11.7 percent of
the total population lived in poverty. Significant here is that in the white population, only 9.9
percent lived in poverty…whereas 22.7 percent of Blacks lived in poverty…”29 Yet if the facts
speak so loudly then how is it possible that the myth of the death of race and white privilege
continue to proliferate?
Shannon Sullivan explains that the persistence of whiteness and the difficulty of
revealing it lie in how it operates as an unconscious habit. “…habit is an organism’s
subconscious predisposition to transact with its physical, social, political, and natural worlds in
particular ways…Habits…are [those features of the self that] which [constitute] the
self…because habit is transactional, in a raced and racist world, the psychosomatic self
necessarily will be racially and racistly constituted.”30 Sullivan argues that whiteness persists
precisely because we continue to transact in a world that is constituted by whiteness. Our identity
as individual white selves within such a society is only possible through our understanding of
race, and how race positions us into the broader culture. Race continues to operate as whiteness
precisely because it is the fact of being white or non-white which creates and recreates a certain
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fixed form of the self-understanding. White privilege, then, is a logical social extension of one’s
identity as white. Who and what we are is the “justification” for our set of privileges, especially
privileges which proceed from an assumption about our “natural, superior selves.” The origins of
race and the continued work of whiteness attempt to establish race as a natural category. That is
at least part of the reason for the continued existence of race; it tied to personal identity, an
identity that is held onto at all costs. I might well be willing to lose my social status as raced, but
I might not even be in a position, psychologically speaking, to give up my personal identity as
raced. Sullivan explains that race easily and often functions on this subconscious level.
For example, to be a white person means that one tends to assume that all cultural and
social spaces are potentially available for one to inhabit…(this) also severely limits
(one’s) ability to treat others in respectful ways. Instead of acknowledging other’s
particular interests, needs, and projects, white people who are ontologically expansive
tend to recognize only their own, and their expansiveness is at the same time a
limitation.31
This ontological expansiveness is the perfect example of white privilege. Indeed, this privilege
precludes the kind of vulnerability necessary to admit that one doesn’t know the extent of the
impact of whiteness on one’s identity. As expansionist, whiteness occupies the always already
occupied. So, there is nothing new to know; it is already known. So, not only is whiteness
ontologically expansionist geographically or socially, but also epistemologically.
One way of explaining white privilege is that white people come to see their privileges as
expectations to which they are entitled in virtue of being white. It is not always the case that
those of pale skin are unaware of their privilege, but rather that they are unaware of their
privilege as being born out of their race, their whiteness as such. If you return to the list of white
privileges, you can understand this very easily by adding in an explanation for each privilege. If I
am being taught that people of my race made my nation’s history what it is then I defend this by
claiming that these are simply the historical facts. If I try to make sense of people assuming that I
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am an authority figure, I will explain it as reflecting my natural confidence or knowledge base.
There is a ready-made list of alternative explanations (really, rationalizations) for situations in
which one is a recipient of white privilege. This list evokes almost every possible explanation,
including sex and religion. One of the quick justifications for hatred of dark-skinned men and
women from the Middle East is that they must be adherents of the religion of Islam. The
supposed justification for hating followers of Islam falls under the assumption that it is a violent
religion. This bias is reinforced by references to the actions taken by extremist political groups
who claim to be strict adherents to the religion of Islam. Falguni Sheth writes in her book,
Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, that Muslims themselves are becoming a racialized
group of people, a race which is subject to increasing hostility and scrutiny.32 The danger and
risk posed by this emerging “race” resembles the danger and risk which has been attributed to
blacks, Africans, Hispanics, Asians, the Japanese, Russians, Palestinians, Mexicans, and
American Indians. The telling thing about the list in the prior sentence is that we are quick to
realize that some of those groups are not traditionally defined as races but as ethnicities or
nationalities. Yet the hostility and disparaging gaze of whiteness falls on these groups with much
the same result. One example of this effect, given by Joe Feagin in an interview with George
Yancy, illustrates the way that racist images are used within whiteness to reinforce negative
emotions towards the various non-white races. Feagin discusses the imagery of apes being used
to stereotype and degrade Black people. He also describes the ways that whiteness casts the
images of these other races in racist and sexist fashion. “One good example of this emotionally
laden framing that has some research is the extraordinarily racist sexualization that white men
often direct at Asian women, Asian-American women, and U.S. and other Latinas, such as on the
Internet websites exoticizing these women for white male sexual and related purposes.”33 The
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effect is that all of these groups become non-white and therefore also the centers of violence and
dehumanization.
In the face of the work of racializing other bodies and thereby subjecting them to
violence, whiteness does the strangest thing, it disappears. Rather than boldly identifying itself as
master and supreme, whiteness makes a calculated move to always hide itself behind the gaze of
normality. This is as true now as it was in the age of Bernier and Kant. Whiteness disappears,
and the greatest threat and the supreme danger of whiteness comes to the fore when whiteness no
longer shows itself. The greatest ethical problem posed by race is that we will be unable to see a
world as anything other than raced, and racialized through the lens of whiteness. If whiteness
remains hidden then we become victims of a white and racialized worldview which nonetheless
continues to elude our attempts to discover it and make it known. To be sure, unconscious habits
are difficult, and sometimes impossible to discover. Yet we might expect people who lack the
habits of whiteness, that is, non-white people, to be the loud voices of opposition to whiteness.
Now it certainly remains true that non-white voices have made their opposition to whiteness
known. Despite this, the telling power of whiteness can also emerge when its rhetoric is being
espoused by persons who would ordinarily be considered non-white. How is it that the
institutions, identities, and habits which oppress, belittle, and denigrate non-whites also inculcate
in them a strong sense of reverence for whiteness? This line of questioning itself seems to
emerge from deep within the power and structure of the white gaze which turns its eye on all it
surveys and boldly declares that all before it is non-white and thereby inferior. Yet the looker
attempts to remains unlooked at, continuously obfuscating its presence despite all of our efforts
to bring it into the light. So we begin to wonder what power is at work in creating the world of
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race, and dooming us to systems of whiteness, while at the same time remaining invisible to our
sight.
Although the operations of whiteness may be undeniable, people still work to deny it.
Even though whiteness seems to exist most strongly as white privilege, there is still a way in
which it pre-exists that privilege. The very idea of race itself seems to pop up spontaneously as
Europeans began to wander the world and meet new people. There might be a case to be made
for the idea that race is not an immoral concept, any more than any other outdated scientific
theory. It seems that thinkers like Bernier and Descartes already understand themselves within a
social and cultural context before the idea of race can even begin to emerge. The origin of race is
not to be found solely in the works and travels of seventeenth century academics, nor is the
survival of race to be understood solely through the continued persistence of white privilege.
Sheth insists that race can be redeployed to create a new race of people, based on ideas of shared
culture and religion, and her chief example of this is the recent re-invention of the Muslim.34
There is something mysterious to this claim, and the idea that race is capable of being used by a
larger social and political structure makes race out to be a kind of tool. Yet if race is the
construction of whiteness, insofar as the races were conceived to explain the glorified position of
white Europeans in the natural world, then it seems obvious to say that whiteness must pre-exist
race.
Yet in order to understand this idea, that whiteness somehow comes before the very idea
of race within which whiteness is a category, we must understand the connection between race as
an idea and race as a tool. To that end this project will now turn towards an investigation into the
nature of tools and the problem of deploying technology to bring about social change and create
a social class of people.
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Chapter 3 – The Technology of Race
Race may be understood as a kind of technology, a technique, and a tool. Falguni Sheth
develops this idea in important ways in her book Toward a Political Philosophy of Race. This in
turn raises the issue of how technology is to be understood, and what kinds of philosophy serve
to unpack it? Sheth provides the connection between our initial critique of race and its
connection to a critique of technology. She uses Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology to
directly explicate her own philosophy of race as a tool of political power. Still there is much in
Heidegger’s thinking that needs to be explored in order to understand the full range of his ideas
on technology and the essence of technology. To that end, I take a closer look at how Heidegger
explains the distinction between technology as a tool and the essence of technology as the
Enframing.1 My aim here is to explore delineating a preliminary genealogy of technology, even
though a full genealogy may be impossible, especially insofar as a division needs to be made
between ancient and modern technological devices.
In this chapter, I will investigate the notion of whiteness as a tool by uncovering the
technology of race. This will be the initial point of contact between the genealogy of race and a
phenomenology of technology. We begin with the work of Falguni Sheth and her idea that race
is a political tool. Sheth argues that the technology of race is a tool of political discourse, that
race is able to conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and that race
conceals our actual relationship with the government behind a supposedly objective morality. In
order to construct a rich phenomenological approach to the subject, I will also explore Sheth’s
analysis by looking at how it is reflected in the arts. In simple terms phenomenology here should
be understood as a complete investigation, a “looking at” from all available sides. Husserl
defines this process as imaginative variation, and if these problems are to be completely
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elucidated then we must consider how they appear in various contexts and from various
perspectives in order to get to the core principle under consideration. Understanding how race is
a tool of political discourse which is concealed behind an official purpose can be shown in the
writings of Joseph Conrad and Rudyard Kipling. I will also demonstrate that race conceals itself
behind morality by examining Robert K. Fullinwider’s defense of affirmative action against the
moral language of colorblindness. This phenomenology reveals that whiteness and racism resist
rational discourse as functions of a basic cultural attitude. In order to initially explain the idea of
the cultural attitude, I will turn to the critical project of Immanuel Kant. This investigation will
be aimed now at uncovering the conditions which make race possible in the first place. Since
race is technological, then a fuller understanding of it is only possible by investigating the idea of
technology, and to that end I will turn my project to a full investigation of Martin Heidegger’s
philosophy of technology.
We must begin to think about technology by first thinking about its relation to race.
Falguni Sheth explains that one way of looking at the problem of race is by trying to determine
its function. She likens this to the function of technology.
Technology, commonly considered as equipment, facilitates the production of certain
‘goods’. It requires the input of certain raw material, which, mediated through a device, is
transformed into a ‘new’ product. In turn this product is thought to meet certain needs
that we might have. Similarly, within a juridico-political context, race becomes an
instrument that produces certain political and social outcomes that are needed to cohere
society.2
As a point of contact between a genealogy of race and a phenomenology of technology, Sheth
raises a very valuable insight. She argues that race is not so much a descriptive category as it is
an actively constructive one. The invisibility and persistence of race as whiteness reveals it as a
framework of thought which both creates and reinforces social norms. She claims further that
race is not a politically benign social construction but an active political one. “Legal and political
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institutions as representations of state power – produce race, understood as the vehicle by which
populations are distinguished, divided, and pitted against each other.”3 Sheth argues that the
political forces in contemporary societies are still actively involved in creating raced and
racialized identities, and that race continues to be deployed as a technique of power. Sheth
argues that the “Muslim race” was invented in the recent history of western, and specifically
American thought.4 In the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, the Muslim race was invented to serve as an enemy of the state. In order to ensure their
natural white citizens of their continuing safety, the government of the United States needed to
deploy a new category of fear and alienation, that of the Islamic terrorist. The effect of this
category all but criminalizes the religion of Islam, and by extension, all members of that religion
who find themselves within the borders of the United States. This criminalizing also mirrors the
military mindset of declaring Muslims, Islamic Nations, and nations with a predominantly large
Muslim population, as enemies of the United States.5
In this political context, the category of race serves to identify those who are good with
those who are natural Americans, that is to say white Americans. It also serves to automatically
identify all non-whites as non-American. Being non-white here means so much more than
merely being a member of a certain religion. The racializing of Muslims also reinstitutes and
reinforces the racializing of all non-whites as centers of violence and danger. It is especially
telling when you consider that Barack Obama, the forty-fourth president of the United States of
America, was accused of being Muslim while running for office in 2008.6 This particular story
seems to have been started by a simple misunderstanding about his education, and whether he
ever attended a madrassa, a Fundamentalist Islamic School.7 In the editorial from the Chicago
Tribune, Kim Barker explains the sheer futility of trying to debunk this account.
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Attention on U.S. Sen. Barack Obama's childhood in Indonesia has so far focused on
whether he was a Muslim and whether one of his schools was a fundamentalist Islamic
madrassa. Although his campaign has denied that Obama was a practicing Muslim, the
"Islam" issue is not likely to go away soon for the presidential candidate. Some
Americans link the religion with terrorism and see Indonesia, the world's most populous
Muslim nation, as being an alien place, a world away from the White House.8
Islam is seen as an anti-American religion, and in politics the perception of the public is a key
measure of whether or not a candidate has a fighting chance. Now if Sheth is right then Islam is
being used as a race and the issue of Obama’s faith is deployed as a racialized weapon against
him. It is telling that at least some of the people who were questioning the president’s integrity
and commitment were themselves important and powerful political personalities, rather than
merely fringe social figures. Yet what is the underlying reason for all of this suspicion? The
reason is clear, the president is non-white, and as such falls under the greatest suspicion. The
political issue of Obama’s religion does not actually come from questions regarding his personal
beliefs, but instead it follows from the suspicion regarding his race. This must necessarily
include accusations of secret affiliations with the very enemies which the United States has
sworn to eliminate. Thus, in the context of political power and social status, race continues to be
deployed and used as a tool of oppression and marginalization, even on the most powerful and
influential of people.
Having looked at the practice of producing race, it is important to understand how Sheth
sets up the theoretical framework behind this production. Sheth takes her lead from Heidegger in
explaining how race can function as a tool, or a technology. As suggested above, she argues that
the technology of race is a tool of political discourse, that the technology of race is able to
conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and that the technology of race
conceals our actual relationship with government behind a supposedly objective morality.
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Sheth’s first point is that race is a tool of political discourse. “…first, it is a vehicle
deployed by law to channel certain elements in order to produce a set of classifications that
constrain us to think about human beings as belonging to races.”9 Sheth further classifies these
elements, which the law channels, by using the term unruly. The idea here is that in the first
place there are legal institutions and organizations of power in societies which make use of race
in the political sphere. In this first sense, race is the tool which those in power invent and
continue to use in public discourse and law-making activities in order to define that part of the
population which is dangerous. On this score, the race of Black people is invented and used by
European and American governments in order to initially justify the slave trade. If Black people
are deemed “dangerous,” “childlike,” “warlike,” “uncivilized,” “ignorant,” and “dumb brutes,”
then enslaving them is not only justified, it might even be the most moral action one can take. 10
However, even after the abolition of slavery, the political tool of race was far too valuable for
governments to dispense with. They continue to find new and valuable uses for it, all of which
serve to justify the continually racialized power structure in society. Race becomes ever more
important to political powers since race now serves to justify that power structure itself. Perhaps
a better way to illustrate this point is with an example from literature. In carrying out a
phenomenology of both race and technology it is telling that one should address the issue from as
many vantage points as possible, hence why a detour into literature is no detour at all. 11 I turn
now to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, which was first published in 1899. This novella
illustrates the governmental power present in creating and justifying racial discourse.
Whatever else may be said of Conrad’s short novel, it certainly does contain a deep look
at the ways in which race is deployed as a tool for political power. Even in the opening chapter,
Conrad’s chief character and narrator, Marlow, reminisces on the conquest of Britain by the
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Romans. Marlow attempts to imagine what it would have been like for a Roman Legionary and
his soldiers when they first set foot upon the farthest point in their empire, the British Isles. He
uses language that is meant to foreshadow the tale of his own journey, which he will recall later
in the book, and then attempts to justify the difference between Romans and British Imperialists.
Mind, none of us would feel exactly like this. What saves us is efficiency—the devotion
to efficiency. But these chaps were not much account, really. They were no colonists;
their administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect. They were
conquerors, and for that you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have
it, since your strength is just an accident arising from the weakness of others. They
grabbed what they could get for the sake of what was to be got. It was just robbery with
violence, aggravated murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very
proper for those who tackle a darkness. The conquest of the earth, which mostly means
the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses
than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is
the idea only. An idea at the back of it; not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an
unselfish belief in the idea—something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a
sacrifice to. . . .12
Now the risk in analyzing a work of literature is that one may conflate the views and actions of
characters with the idea that the author condones or approves of such views. Despite this possible
slippage, a phenomenological survey of Conrad’s text reveals a profound critique of the spirit of
both imperialism and racism. The Romans were not exactly racist in the simple sense that the
idea of race did not exist for them. Though it must be readily admitted that they were
nationalists. Yet for Marlow and the nineteenth century British there seems to be almost no other
way to understand or justify the violence inherent in colonizing. It is telling that Marlow invokes
racial identifiers to try to explain the Roman mindset, while at the same time distancing himself
from the Romans behind the idea of efficiency. It is that notion of efficiency which so greatly
unpacks the technological aspect of racism in this sense. The only difference between the
brutality of the Romans and the attitude of the British is that the British are models of
technological efficiency in their colonization efforts. Marlow even pushes the idea of efficiency
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to religious heights, and very tellingly invokes the language of sacrifice. That is to say, the
barbarism of colonization is self-justifying to those involved in it, on the grounds that it is being
carried out in the most technically proficient manner possible.
One other rather illuminating incident from Conrad’s novel details the exchange between
Marlow and his Aunt. Marlow’s Aunt had used what social influence she had to get Marlow a
job as the captain of a river steamboat on the Congo River, in what was then the Belgian Congo
in Africa. Marlow’s interest in the job was pragmatic. He wanted work and the job fit his skill
set. His Aunt’s interest in the job was more complex, and reflected her own racial bias.

It appeared, however, I was also one of the Workers, with a capital—you know.
Something like an emissary of light, something like a lower sort of apostle. There had
been a lot of such rot let loose in print and talk just about that time, and the excellent
woman, living right in the rush of all that humbug, got carried off her feet. She talked
about 'weaning those ignorant millions from their horrid ways,' till, upon my word, she
made me quite uncomfortable. I ventured to hint that the Company was run for profit. 13
Marlow’s Aunt got him the job by representing Marlow as a man of deep moral convictions. The
most important of these convictions had to do with the desire to “civilize” the people of Africa.
Marlow is unsettled by this account since, as a practical man, he understands that the Company is
interested only in making money. Marlow’s aunt is laboring under the assumption that her
racism is justified since it places a special moral burden on her and others. To those who are
civilized, educated, and white, there is a great moral obligation to reform, salvage, and otherwise
improve the lot of those who are not-white. Rudyard Kipling immortalized this notion of the
moral obligation of whites in his famous poem, The White Man’s Burden. This poem was also
released the same year as Conrad’s novel, and Kipling’s prose touches on the very same themes.
“Take up the White Man’s burden—Send forth the best ye breed—Go send your sons to exile,
To serve your captives' need…”14 On this account, the white man is in the position of power and
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privilege due to his high moral status. In contrast, the non-whites have no moral sense of their
duty to enrich the lives of white men; indeed, as “savages,” it is said that they are devoid of a
moral sense. It is the whites who understand that their superiority comes with the moral
conscience of needing to support, save, and civilize the non-whites. It is this very notion that
whiteness has some grand design which forms the basis for Sheth’s second point about the
theoretical framework behind a technology of race.
Sheth establishes that the technology of race is able to conceal its political nature. “The
second dimension by which race can be considered technologically is through the juridical
capacity to conceal the first function, behind a more “official” or “procedural” one.”15 That first
function was to produce a set of classifications to constrain us in thinking of others as raced.
This concealment goes unnoticed since the newly deployed categories of the races hide the actual
legal processes which instantiate race behind the visage of natural science. There are social
institutions, like religion and science, which justify and prove that racial categories are a natural
part of the world and as such are essential to the running of our society. These social institutions
cooperate, sometimes in an organized way but also through a culture which deploys and
reinforces specific stereotypes, with the political power structures of society. This in turn creates
and reiterates the racial categories as “lofty and ambiguous”16, so that we stand indebted to them
in a way that is not accessible to most kinds of thinking. Thus the average person will understand
race very well, insofar as they can identify and properly categorize people into their various
races. This is the everyday problem of race which was introduced earlier. Yet those same people
will be largely ignorant of how race functions on the deeper level of whiteness and certainly
ignorant of the social structures which created the races in the first place. This is exactly what is
happening with regards to why Marlow’s Aunt seems unaware of her own racism. From her
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perspective, the civilization and ennobling of the Africans is exactly why Europeans even have
colonies in Africa. She does not see what Marlow sees, that this is simply a capitalistic endeavor
to gain wealth, power, and prestige for Belgium at the expense of African bodies. Marlow
himself is not entirely aware of all of the political motivations and forces behind the colony, and
indeed he shows little interest in these racialized forces. Instead, Marlow dismisses his Aunt’s
naiveté by claiming that she is simply an ignorant woman, and therefore insulated from the
practical realities of the world.17 Marlow himself understands that there are certain “confounded
facts” which men live with every day, of which women know nothing. The idea here is that in
the broader cultural context Marlow is aware of the racism inherent in his new job and the larger
society. However, he has no real interest in changing it; his only interest is in working with it.
Marlow’s disinterest strikes us as very revealing, especially since it must be thoroughly willed in
the face of all the moral dilemmas he encounters in Africa. Marlow may begin his journey as
morally disinterested but it is exactly the problem of race as ethical which ultimately confounds
him. This raises Sheth’s third and final point regarding the ways that technology of race conceals
our political situation.
The final way in which Sheth argues that race is technological is to be found in the direct
relationship between citizens and governments. “The third way in which race functions as a
technology is that it conceals our relationship to law and sovereign power behind seemingly
objective moral and political judgments.”18 Sheth explains further that in a liberal society racism
is masked behind what appear to be fair, equal, and unbiased agreements between the governors
and the governed.
A most brilliant example of this concealing of racism is discussed by Robert K.
Fullinwider in his article, “Affirmative Action and Fairness.” Fullinwider attempts to make sense
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of why various Americans in positions of political power in the 1980s and 1990s were so
dismissive of the idea of quotas in reducing racial discrimination. Fullinwider comments that
William Bradford Reynolds, the head of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Justice
during the Reagan administration, was a particularly strong opponent of quotas.
The debate about preferential treatment he said, is between those [like himself] who
believe in equality of opportunity and those who believe in equality of results. Those who
oppose preferential treatment believe in individual rights and a colorblind, genderblind
society. Those who support quotas believe in group rights and dividing up social benefits
by race and gender.19
Reynolds opposed Affirmative Action quotas, which would force businesses to hire women and
non-whites, on the basis that such quotas were racist and sexist. To give preferential treatment to
members of groups, who have been historically discriminated against, is the worst kind of
discrimination according to Reynolds. Instead Reynolds opposes these programs in order “to
prevent discrimination and secure equality of opportunity. Reynolds says that using racial and
sexual preferences to end discrimination is nonsense; the way to end discrimination is not to
discriminate in reverse but simply to stop discriminating.”20 Fullinwider’s critique of such
thinking is that the problem lies precisely with the supposed optimism Reynolds has in his
society’s ability to stop discriminating. Fullinwider gives several historical examples of
American businesses that, even in the wake of the Civil Rights Act, continued to discriminate
against hiring women or non-whites.21 It is impossible to stop discriminating when we have
constructed our society, our laws, and our government around this very discrimination. In fact, to
prevent and stop programs that demand quotas, whose goal is to increase the number of women
and non-whites in the workforce, essentially means that one wants the workforce to remain as it
is. One might try to justify this by claiming that those who have already made various
achievements have done so based upon their own social status using hard work and
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determination, and that the same principles should be applied to everyone. Of course, in so
doing, those in positions of power and wealth cover over and conceal the system of race
(whiteness) and gender privileges (maleness) that have enabled them to be successful.
Fullinwider creates an analogy for our unfair society and explains what it would be like
living in the Land of Giants. In this analogy, human beings have been suddenly transported to a
world made by and for Giant sized creatures. The giants might look at us as charming but we
would be judged inept and helpless since we could not do even the simplest tasks. “But we
would know that the problem does not lie in us, it lies in the fact that everything in Giant Land is
built to the scale of Giants…Giants see their world as the world. They just naturally measure us
against it, so they see the problem to be in us.”22 We can now say that the racism and sexism
inherent in Reynolds’ position is concealed under the guise of being colorblind and genderblind.
Race is only effectively deployed as a tool for political power if it is concealed under the
incredibly hypocritical image of being non-racist. It is not enough to hide one’s racism, but
rather the political institutions which survive on racism, in a world created by and for them, even
go so far as to claim that their racism is no racism at all. Their racism is, at least in their rhetoric,
a fair and just application of racial categories to human problems. In effect, they claim that they
have done all that they can to make the world fair and balanced and now it is up to us to do the
real work for ourselves and achieve success in their society. Of course, that success will come
easier to some than it will to others. Yet rather than admitting that this is the result of an uneven
field, where some have privileges and advantages that others lack, the official story will be that
the successful people are simply more hard working. This in turn will come to reflect the
narrative of the “hard-working” white and the “lazy” black. Race returns ultimately as a
justification for a racist system of government and power, but it returns in the guise of the
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everyday problem of race. It returns as the illusion of an improper application of the real
scientific categories of race.
As the problem of race goes deeper than the everyday problem of race as miscategorization, so also the problem of technology is more than its misuse. A rather obvious
interpretation of technology at this point would be that some tools, like race, threaten human
society. Sheth’s three divisions show us that at least certain technologies can be misused and
cause harm to a society by reinforcing corrupt and immoral political powers. The problem of
race is more than its misuse, and it also seems that the problem of race as a tool must be likewise
more than mere misuse. The problem of race is also the deeper problem of whiteness and the
supreme danger that whiteness will cover over every other way of seeing the world, and reveal
only that we always will be raced. This same kind of problematic can be applied to the
philosophy of technology. There is an everyday kind of problem with technology, its misuse, but
this also gives way to deeper problems and systematic ways of thinking and seeing the world.
Whereas whiteness tends to constantly re-evaluate human bodies under the terms of race, the
deeper problems of technology go beyond human bodies to strike at our most basic
understanding of the natural and social world. In order to understand the dangers posed by
technology, there is the need to delve into an understanding of the nature of technology, its
causes and effects, and ultimately the kinds of thinking which underlie it.
Since Sheth has introduced us to how the problems of technology connect to the
problems of race, it is fitting that Sheth takes the initial inspiration for her project from the
philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Sheth actually begins the first chapter of her book by
paraphrasing a quote from Martin Heidegger’s essay on technology, the “Question Concerning
Technology”. Sheth explains that in her paraphrasing of Heidegger’s quote that she has
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substituted the term racial for technological, and the term race for technology. The effect of this
is that Sheth understands that for Heidegger technology operates as a kind of system of thought,
rather than as a system of objects. “Heidegger’s 1950’s lectures on technology are notable for
distinguishing between technology and the essence of technology. Our attempts to find the
‘essence’ of a thing by looking at it directly often lead to its obfuscation; instead by looking to
the ‘Gestell’ or the enframing of an epoch, the truth of a particular thing might be more readily
revealed to us.”23 This understanding of Heidegger is what leads Sheth to search for the function
of race in society, as she seeks for the essence of race. This is better than merely searching for
the scientific or objective grounds for race, especially since race often functions in a way that is
utterly independent of any scientific evidence for it.
Part of the problem of the continuation of racism lies in the way that it resists active
scholarly work which is meant to resolve it. One of the great academic blind-spots is the
supposition that the way in which scientists, scholars, and academics have discussed an issue is
the way in which that issue really exists. There is often an emphasis placed on the notion that
scholarly work establishes truth, and that whatever most people in society naively think can be
dismissed as mere ignorance. Part of the mistake of such thinking is to ignore the way in which
society at large influences academic research. The most egregious aspect of this mistake,
however, is to be found in the troubling way in which certain ideas in the broader social context
actively resist scholarly insight. Even when scholars in a particular field reach a strong consensus
on an issue, the culture at large may still be quite resistant to pick up and accept those scholarly
findings. While there may be numerous reasons for this, the point I wish to make here is that this
is not the result of a lack of information or lack of education. Instead there are cultural attitudes
at work in a society which determine, prior to any scholarly work being done, whether or not
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something is going to count in the practical working out of social life. This is precisely the
problem that Heidegger raises by working out the essence of technology, and that Sheth raises by
working out the essence of race and technology. There is a truth about these notions (race and
technology) which is more basic than any objective attempt to properly define them in the
scholarship. This basic truth is worked out in a cultural attitude which defines the conditions
under which these ideas are able to emerge as meaningful.
Within the philosophical tradition, the idea of the underlying truth certainly goes back as
far as Immanuel Kant and his search for the possible conditions for the synthetic a priori.
Though we have already addressed Kant’s contribution to the genealogy of race, it is also
important to look at how Kant has contributed to a history of philosophical ideas in other aspects
of philosophy. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason investigates whether or not synthetic a priori
judgments are possible.24 These are the kinds of judgments which would be based in pure a
priori forms of sensible intuition, and thus involve ideas which can be known to be true
independently of any particular sense impressions. This would also involve synthetic judgments,
which are all judgments that expand our knowledge about a subject and whose truth value cannot
be determined by the rules of logic alone. So before I can know anything in the physical sciences
I must have certain synthetic a priori judgments which make science possible. These judgments
must be more basic than anything in the sciences, and in one sense the synthetic a priori is
simply an example of the conditions for knowledge. This idea of the conditions is what Kant
terms Transcendental Logic.25 This approach seeks out the conditions which make the
knowledge we gain through experience even possible in the first place. So those conditions are
essential for the knowledge we gain through our experiences of the world, and at the same time
those conditions are more basic than any of that knowledge. Although Kant does not use
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Heidegger’s terminology, since he predates Heidegger by several centuries, nonetheless Kant
might be quite comfortable with saying that in looking for the conditions of knowledge we are,
in a sense, finding the true essence of it.
In a similar fashion the true essence of race is not the scientific categories of race, but
indeed it is the conditions, found in the broader cultural understanding of a European self and the
selves of others, which make the scientific categories of race even possible. Yet since we have
seen how, in the work of Sheth, race is technological, then it seems we must gain a fuller
understanding of the problem of race by investigating the problem of technology. As Heidegger
introduces Sheth to this kind of thinking, then our project must involve an investigation into the
philosophy of technology of Martin Heidegger.
However, before we begin to investigate Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, I must
address a serious issue which confronts any scholar who attempts to use Heideggerian analysis
on the problem of race, namely Heidegger’s own racism.26 Historical evidence unequivocally
point to the fact that Martin Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party in Germany prior to and
during World War II. Jeffrey Van Davis explored Heidegger’s Nazism in his documentary film
Only a God Can Save Us.27 The degree to which Heidegger’s philosophy was influenced by his
Nazism has also been extensively explored by Tom Rockmore in his book On Heidegger's
Nazism and Philosophy.28
Perhaps one of the more troubling problems with Heidegger’s racism, which is not
always raised about Kant’s racism vis-à-vis the African slave trade, is its connection to the
violent movement of National Socialism in Germany. It may be said of Kant or Hegel that they
were racist but theirs was racism at a distance. They themselves were not involved directly in the
slave trade or in actual instances of violence against blacks and other non-whites. Yet without
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excusing Heidegger, it is worth mentioning that this kind of defense is incredibly weak. Certainly
these philosophers all had profound social and cultural impact thanks to their writing and their
lecturing. Their rationalizing of racism and slavery on the whole may have done more collective
evil in justifying and allowing racism to continue in all of its violent forms, than any singular
slave-owner or slave trader ever did. Of course, since Heidegger was also an intellectual caught
up in justifying and defending Nazi ideology, including Anti-Semitism, then Heidegger too bears
as much guilt as his intellectual predecessors. Perhaps the answer to all of this is to claim that
Heidegger, like every other philosopher before him, was merely a product of his own unique
place and time. Heidegger himself would emphasize how much we are the recipients of a world
and a way of thinking into which we are thrown. Yet this kind of defense rings rather hollow in
the face of the ongoing racial degradation of human beings. That Heidegger or Kant may not
have been fully aware of the extent to which racial violence was occurring in their own societies
does not excuse their active participation in the perpetuation of racism. Besides, unlike Kant who
had very little direct interaction with those harmed by German colonialism, Heidegger knew
Jewish colleagues and had Jewish students. So, again, the question must be raised: how can I
justify using the philosophies of such extreme racists in a dissertation which attempts to, at least
in part, critique racism?
My answer to this question is twofold; first, I find a certain justice in re-appropriating the
ideas and rhetoric of racists to critique racism, and, secondly, all intellectual exercise always
involves an act of transcendence. Firstly I am in a sense re-appropriating the writings of Martin
Heidegger and applying them to my own project. This dissertation is no mere exposition or indepth analysis of the work of Martin Heidegger. If it were to involve that then I should certainly
look at how the entire catalogue of his works addresses the issue of his philosophy of
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technology. Yet rather than attempting to provide a complex apology for Heidegger’s body of
work I will be honest and admit that I, like Sheth, take Heidegger as a starting point. Heidegger’s
work is deeply inspirational and influential for the project of this dissertation, but this
dissertation is going to take Heidegger’s ideas and attempt to reconstitute them within a new
argumentative framework. The issue at hand in this dissertation is that of how technoracism is a
cultural attitude which manifests itself in the issues of racism and the enframing. So to that end I
am not using Heidegger’s work to justify, excuse, or defend racism. Indeed, I find in Heidegger a
very compelling critique of blind ideologies, and even if Heidegger was himself a believer in
such ideologies, nevertheless his critique offers important insights.
Secondly, it must be affirmed that any intellectual effort involves transcendence and
universalizing. To be sure, my own project places a great deal of importance on lived experience
and writing that entails personal and ethical involvement. Yet even the most basic attempts to use
language makes an appeal to the notion that words transcend our own personal and private
endeavors. Thinking out loud, which must form the poetic soul of writing, requires me to use
ideas and words in ways which their creators and inventors may not have designed them.
Heidegger may prove unable to escape his Nazi ideology, even in his writings on the philosophy
of technology. Yet we can and must use his language and his ideas to go beyond the path he has
laid out for them. We can communicate something new, and something more than Heidegger’s
own poisoned politics. In the words, in the works of a Nazi we may yet find a compelling
critique of racism and modern technology, despite the limitations of their author.
This chapter began by discussing the work of Falguni Sheth and demonstrating how race
can be applied as a tool of political power. To further elaborate on this we also investigated how
a critique of race could show up in the works of Conrad and Kipling. This lead us to a discussion
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of how race contributes to socio-economic inequality as we looked at the arguments against and
for affirmative action. Finally, we determined that since race can be presented as technological,
and since Sheth was influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, then an investigation
of the essence of technology is needed in order to delve further into these problems.
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Chapter 4 – Heidegger and the Danger of Technology
In this chapter I introduce Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. I begin with a
brief exposition of the salient features of Heidegger’s genealogy of technology. According to
Heidegger we first encounter two kinds of technology in human history, the handwork and the
modern. To illustrate the handwork I show how Heidegger describes the making of a silver
chalice as the working of Aristotle’s four causes. This lead to a preliminary definition of
technology as an instrument and a tool for human work. In the activity of ancient, or handwork,
technology the work of the crafter reveals something hidden and natural in the silver. This
revelation is called poiesis and this poiesis is the true essence of ancient technology. Yet the
activity of modern technology is not merely an instrument nor a true poiesis, but rather it
challenges and forces the natural world to yield up its resources. These resources, in turn,
become the whole reason that motivates modern technological advances and changes. When
workers of modern technology are driven to yield up the resources of the world, then we see that
there is a different revelation that occurs in modern technology. The revelation of the world as
merely full of useful materials and resources is driven by a cultural attitude called the enframing.
It is in the enframing that we find the great danger posed by modern technology.
For Heidegger, the greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a
normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. He sees this supreme danger threatening
human beings insofar as they are set up and forced into one way of seeing the world. That while
they are the agents which cause the enframing to reveal the world as mere resource, they are at
the same time losing their agency. They are losing the very thing which most makes them agents,
their ability to choose. The threat is that they, and perhaps also ourselves, will only ever
encounter technology as a means to ends, and will never understand that technology is in many
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ways out of our hands, and operating under its own autonomic forces. What may be even worse
is the danger of forgetting that technology is merely one way of seeing the world, as our options
become absorbed by the normative gaze. The entire world, including ourselves, is endangered by
the normative gaze of technology.
To understand Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology,” we must begin with the
idea of questioning itself. Heidegger begins his essay by claiming that he is asking questions
when it comes to the idea of technology. This move is Socratic-like, since such questioning
seems to imply that we begin with a kind of ignorance of the truth we wish to learn. However,
the interrogative nature of Heidegger’s essay should not be read as proceeding from ignorance,
but rather from a point of philosophical caution. It is tempting to rush into things, define the
categories, label the terms, and delineate the subject matter of technology. Yet this temptation to
rush, label, and categorize is precisely the thing we must resist. That urge to push the world of
ideas and intellect to spill their secrets and yield up the knowledge contained within them is
already a kind of technological thinking. So Heidegger urges us to begin by questioning, since
questioning sets out the way that we will approach the issue, that is, a way of thinking. “All ways
of thinking lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning
concerning technology, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The
relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology.”1 We want
a free mode of thinking, which rightly implies that our natural impulse to think in certain ways is
not already free. We are caught up in ways of thinking and living which make us blind and
ignorant to the nature of what lies behind and informs our thinking. In the tradition of Kant,
Heidegger is interested in the conditions which allow the possibility of knowledge. We are
concerned with the conditions which allow the possibility of thinking freely about an idea, the
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essence of technology, an idea which threatens to determine all of our ways of thinking.
Heidegger knows that the reader of his text is coming to the issue of technology already within a
mindset and a way of living which supposes that he/she understands the true nature of
technology. So the first step is to attempt to free our thinking, as much as possible, from the
temptation to apply the categories we already have to the issues which Heidegger wants to
critically engage and lay bare. This temptation is felt most keenly in our efforts to use language,
especially a language whose definitions contain an unavoidable bias. It is important to note that
Heidegger does not advise us to do away with bias itself, as a move to escape one bias would
inevitably lead to submission to a different bias. Instead he cautions patience, and deliberate
thought applied to an understanding of the essence of technology.
According to Heidegger, the essence of technology is not in itself some kind of device, or
some kind of technological apparatus. Nor are we to find the essence of technology, that which
technology most truly and basically is, by looking at machines. “According to ancient doctrine
the essence of a thing is considered to be what the thing is. We ask the question concerning
technology when we ask what it is.”2 The immediate answer we might bring to the question, that
is, the answer which we have ready formulated before we have begun to heed Heidegger’s
caution to think, is that the essence of technology is that of the tool. Anthropologists often study
ancient human societies by considering the archaeological evidence of the tools that those early
humans used. We look at the behavior of chimpanzees using rocks to break open nuts or sticks to
get termites out of their mounds and we say that the essence of technology must be its “toolness.” “Technology itself is a contrivance, or, in Latin, an instrumentum.”3 This encapsulates the
ideas that technology is both a means to an end, and also a uniquely human activity.

71

Yet what do we make of the chimp using tools, if technology is a human activity? The
answer is so simple that we at first do not even remark on such genius. That chimps use tools is
to us evidence of their sentience, and their evolutionary nearness to our own species. Never mind
that other creatures use tools, the point of saying that a chimp does is not to diminish the human
activity of tool making and using, but to emphasize how human nature spreads even further than
our species. Humanity is to be found not only in our genetic similarity, but in a set of practices
and activities which we define as the human. We elevate the chimp and privilege its using of
sticks and stones as evidence that our theories about such creatures, and their similarity to us, are
correct theories.
To return to the instrumental definition of technology, Heidegger explains further that it
holds just as well for both handwork and modern technology. This distinction is pivotal in
Heidegger’s understanding of technology since it allows him to show how technology has been
set into human history. The distinction also opens us up to the possibility of discussing a
genealogy of technology in a similar fashion to how we previously introduced a genealogy of
race. Yet if we proceed from an understanding of technology as mere instrument then no such
genealogy is possible. The reasons for this are clear once we investigate the ancient tools of our
primitive ancestors. It seems that technology is one of those rare things which, to borrow the
phrase, actually goes back as far as the dawn of time. More realistically it goes back at least as
far as the dawn of our species in time. We have defined ourselves as the toolmakers and users
and so if technology is a mere instrument then we, who have always been using such
instruments, cannot mark the origins or the development of them. If we have always used
technology then there is no point in our recorded history or collective memory when we can
recall the time before its use. Thus technology seems to be always present, simultaneously with
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our experience of being human. The only exception here would be to chart a level of increasing
complexity throughout history, and to note how our devices become more advanced. This is
normally how we proceed when we compare the stone tools of the past to the electronic and
mechanical machines of the present. We remark on how our ancient predecessors used the spade
and the trowel to dig in the earth. We then turn to our contemporary age and point to how we use
the backhoe or the excavator to dig. In so pointing we naively claim that the spade is no different
than the backhoe, except in magnitude and efficiency. Yet Heidegger makes a division between
handwork, or ancient, technology, and machine, or modern, technology. If a genealogy of
technology will be successful then this historical division must be explored.
Since handwork technology is the oldest then that makes it the logical place to begin.
Heidegger introduces us to the distinction between ancient and modern technology when he
writes, “The instrumental definition of technology is indeed so uncannily correct that it even
holds for modern technology, of which in other respects, we maintain with some justification that
it is, in contrast to the older handwork technology, something completely different and therefore
new.”4 Heidegger also gives several examples of modern and ancient technology in juxtaposition
to each other throughout his essay. Examples of ancient technology include the weather vane, as
opposed to the modern invention of the radar station, and sawmill, as opposed to the
hydroelectric plant.5 He also gives the example of a windmill and farming by hand as ancient
technologies, which he contrasts to modern agriculture as the “mechanized food industry.”6
Additionally there is a brief mention of a wooden bridge over the Rhine River as the ancient
technological counterpart to the complex interlocking parts of the Hydroelectric Dam on that
same river.7 Although Heidegger gives us these examples, the origins of ancient technology
remain obscure. Heidegger does, however, place the origins of machine power technology in the
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second half of the eighteenth century.8 David Krell elaborates further: “Historians and social
scientists define ‘modern technology’ as the application of power machinery to production. They
locate its beginnings in eighteenth-century England, where large coal deposits provide a source
of energy for the production of steam, which in turn propels machinery in textile and other
mills.”9 Krell admits that the exact reasons for this sudden explosion in technological
advancement are complicated by numerous social and scientific factors. So he is unsure as to
why it happened there and then. In contrast, handwork technology has presumably been around
as long as human beings have been around. Now if there is to be a technoracism of any kind,
then it must be demonstrated that the attitude and idea of technoracism precedes both the historic
arrival of race and the historic arrival of machine technology. Thus the distinction between
handwork and machine technology is crucial to an understanding of Heidegger and also for the
continuation of this dissertation.
Heidegger explains the nature of the distinction between handwork and modern machine
technology most thoroughly in his discussion of Aristotelian causality. Heidegger explains that
the instrumental definition of technology is perhaps correct, but not quite true. In order to engage
what that distinction means, Heidegger proposes an analysis of instrumentality itself via the work
of Aristotle’s Physics. In his commentary on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, The Gods
and Technology, Richard Rojcewicz explains that the distinction between ancient and modern
technology hinges on the understanding of Aristotle’s four causes. “Ancient technology, in
essence, is the theory of the four causes; ancient technology is the disclosure of things in general
as subject to the four causes. Heidegger’s path to an understanding of ancient technology thus
proceeds by way of the sense of causality of the four causes.”10 In his investigation into an
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ancient understanding of causality and instrumentality, Heidegger also lays out the essential and
unique features of handwork technology.
Heidegger discusses the four causes by giving an example of how a silver chalice comes
to be made in the ancient world. There is the causa materialis, the matter and stuff out of which
the chalice is made, this is often referred to as the material cause. The material cause includes the
silver, but it also includes the physical tools which the crafter will make use of in the crafting
process. The next cause is the causa formalis, the formal cause, and this is best understood as the
shape that the chalice takes, its chalice-ness, that is the shape of a cup. The next cause that
Heidegger describes is the causa finalis, which we translate as the final cause. This is best
understood as the purpose for which the chalice is made, and also as the primary motivation for
the crafter to make the chalice. The final cause is in fact the cause which most importantly
determines the material and formal causes. If the silver chalice is made for display then different
materials will be used to make it and it will be put into a more ornamental form. If the chalice is
made for practical everyday use then it must be built from sturdy materials and shaped so that it
can withstand the rigors of frequent drinking. The last cause Heidegger turns to is the efficient
cause, “the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in
this instance, the silversmith.”11 Once he has finished listing the causes, Heidegger points out
that the peculiar thing about causality is that we only think of causality in terms of the efficient
cause. “Our contemporary understanding of causality is what, by its own agency, produces an
effect. Hence for us the cause of the chalice is not the silver but the artisan who imposes on the
silver the form of the chalice.”12 Rojcewicz here explains that the problem of how we understand
causality in our current society, a society where modern technology predominates, is that we
think that only an agent, a catalyst, or a precipitating event can truly be considered a cause. The
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other factors which Aristotle dreamed up, and which Heidegger mentions, may be important in
some peripheral sense, but they are not considered to be true causes. Yet Heidegger intends to
teach us the error of our ways by revisiting the example of the silver chalice in order to
demonstrate that only the four causes together can rightly be considered causality. In so doing he
demonstrates the true nature of ancient, or handwork, technology.
Heidegger explains that what each of the four causes has in common is that the silver
chalice owes its existence to each of them equally and communally. Lovitt translates Heidegger’s
term here as indebtedness, and he displays this first in how the silver chalice is indebted to its
materials. “Silver is that out of which the chalice is made. As this matter (hyle), it is coresponsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e., owes thanks to, the silver for that out
of which it consists.”13 Heidegger explains that this indebtedness exists between the chalice and
the formal and final causes, and here Heidegger redefines the formal cause as the eidos or idea of
the chalice. The final cause he redefines as the telos, that which truly begins and completes the
chalice. Lastly, Heidegger argues that the silversmith is the fourth cause, but not as an efficient
cause of any sort. Rojcewicz explains that another way to interpret Heidegger’s language here
may shed additional light on the ideas at play. Rather than using the word indebted, Rojcewicz
explains that it may be better to say that the chalice is obliged to its causes.
We are obliged to another not for creation or for taking away our accomplishment by
accomplishing it himself or herself, but for abetting us in our own accomplishment. That
is the nuance that Heidegger is trying to express: the four causes are ways of
abetting…the causes provide the conditions, the nurture, out of which the thing can come
forth.14
Heidegger is all too aware that the ordinary language used to describe causality is biased. The
foundations of our communication are themselves caught up within a modern and technical way
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of understanding the world. So our impulse is to understand causality as being relative to the
force which effects change, and through sheer effort of will brings something into existence.
Heidegger wants to resist this and so he insists on basing his terms in German on some
terms in ancient Greek, terms which are closer to a handwork definition of technology.
…let us clarify the four ways of being responsible in terms of that for which they are
responsible. According to our example, they are responsible for the silver chalice’s lying
ready before us as a sacrificial vessel. Lying before and lying ready (hypokeisthai)
characterize the presencing of something that presences…The principal characteristic of
being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival. It is in the sense of
such a starting something on its way into arrival that that being responsible is an
occasioning or an inducing to go forward [Ver-an-lassen].15
Although it may seem that Heidegger’s language is obscure, in actuality he has chosen his words
with the greatest logical urgency, so as to avoid vagueness and ambiguity. Lovitt understands
this and so he provides the original terms, along with his translations, whenever he thinks that an
idea of particular value is conveyed by Heidegger’s language. Now a full analysis of the meaning
and interpretation of Heidegger’s language would involve another project. So, we must limit
ourselves to a more direct approach to the meaning behind Heidegger’s terms. Rojcewicz
explains that hypokeisthai can also be translated as a lying underneath. Then we may understand
that the four causes create the grounding, and act like the soil in which what they bring forth may
be allowed to grow.16 With regards to the term Ver-an-lassen, Rojcewicz explains that the
principal meaning of the word can be found in the root lassen which is “the word for ‘let’ in
German…”17 According to Rojcewicz the use of hyphens by Heidegger is critical since such a
use distinguishes the term from the more ordinary German word Veranlassen, which is well
translated by the word occasioning. Yet, for Rojcewicz, when Heidegger hyphenates the word he
places special emphasis on the letting involved in the word. “As applied to the four causes the
sense of the terms is as follows. Los-lassen: the four causes let something loose or release it. An-
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lassen: they then let it go on to its path of development. Ver-an-lassen: their letting escorts the
thing all the way to the end of its development.”18 All of this answers the question of what the
four causes are engaged in, this act of releasing, but it raises the further question of exactly what
they effect. Heidegger’s answer to that further question is that they are releasing and effecting a
poiesis.
The notion of poiesis is exactly what forms handwork technology in the first place, and
ultimately the lack of poiesis is what makes modern machine technology different. For
Heidegger, a reading of Plato actually sheds more light on Aristotle’s understanding of the four
causes, since it is in Plato that Heidegger encounters the term poiesis, translated here as bringingforth. “It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth in its full scope and at the same
time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only
artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery…Physis also, the arising of
something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth poiesis.”19 This bringing forth is not unique to
handcraft technology, though it is essential to it. Poiesis rules over artistic production too, for the
work of art can also be seen to issue forth from the four causes just as well as the craft or the
practical production. Yet for Heidegger it is the bringing forth of Physis, of nature, which is
actually “the paradigm case of Poiesis.”20 The way that Heidegger explains it is that in nature the
bringing forth is a bursting forth, such as we see when the flower blooms. This bursting out of
the bloom, the emergence of the butterfly from the chrysalis, and the breaking out of the baby
bird from its egg is the emergence of what a thing itself really is. “In contrast what is brought
forth by the artisan or artist…has the bursting open belonging to bringing forth not in itself, but
in another (en alloi), in the craftsman or the artist.”21
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So the work and production of ancient technology ultimately is a bringing-forth but of an
indirect kind. It is the kind of emergence we find in abetting and aiding a thing to come out. The
work of the windmill is an excellent example of this. Heidegger writes that, “Its sails do indeed
turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock
energy from the air currents in order to store it.”22 The windmill produces, but it would be more
accurate to say that it aids and abets, the grinding of wheat into meal and flour. This is an aiding
precisely because the windmill cannot force the grinding without the aid of natural forces, on
which the windmill is dependent. The windmill brings out what is already there in the wind,
wheat, and mill stone. It brings out the possibility of flour and of food. Yet this is indirect, and is
not exactly the same thing as the tree bringing forth of fruit in its season. When a flower blooms
in nature, the bloom is the result of the work of the flower. When fruit grows naturally on a tree
it is the production or work of the tree which brings out the fruit. Yet when a farmer grows wheat
in a field and then grinds it at the windmill, it is fair to say that the flour is not the natural
production of anything. Instead it is the working of the farmer which brings out the flour. Yet
this working and bringing out can only bring out what is in some sense, available. The farmer
cannot bring atomic energy out of his farming and milling. Rather this bringing forth of the
farmer is limited by the process and technique, and technology, which the farmer uses to work on
the wheat. She can only bring out what is near and available in the thing on which she works.
The key feature of ancient technology is its dependence on natural, as opposed to artificial,
forces for its effectiveness. In that sense ancient or handwork technology is always inefficient
since it lies at the mercy of forces beyond its control. The work of ancient technology involves a
bringing forth of what is in some ways already present, but simply waiting to come out. For

79

Heidegger what, is brought out by the work of ancient technology, and what forms the essence of
technology itself, is truth.
If instrumentality is the nature of technology then Heidegger explains that an instrument
is a way of revealing truth.23 “Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to
presence…in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth,
happens.”24 Heidegger claims that technology as revealing the truth of the world is what forms
the essence of ancient or handwork technology. This is the truth of the grain in the windmill as
flour, and the truth of the dirt under the shovel as a shallow ditch. In his book, Martin Heidegger,
George Steiner explains that Heidegger’s notion of technology as truth comes from the ancient
Greek understanding of the relationship between art and technique. “…all shaping, all
construction of artifacts, is a focused knowing. A technique is a mode of knowledge which
generates this or that object, it is a re-cognition toward truthful ends.”25 Yet as much as ancient
technology involves this revealing, Heidegger is not so sure that modern technology can be said
to reveal anything at all about nature.
So far the understanding of ancient, or handwork, technology has turned on the idea of
revealing something natural and hidden about the world. Yet this revelation is indirect and needs
the aid of a worker, and a crafter to bring it about. Thus ancient technology reveals certain
indirect or hidden truths about the natural world through the aiding and abetting of a skilled
crafter or artist. Heidegger does make a distinction, however, between ancient and modern
technology. So this project must now turn to the idea of modern technology in order to discern
whether or not the definition of technology as revealing will also apply to complex machines.
Heidegger will give us numerous examples of modern machine technology. We have
already seen this in his mention of the radar station, the hydroelectric plant, and modern
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agriculture as the “mechanized food industry.”26 All of these are given in contrast to the simpler
handwork versions of technology which seem to accomplish the same tasks. Heidegger also
gives examples of machine-power technology which do not readily admit of simpler handwork
counterparts. He gives examples of the jet aircraft and coal mining as evidence of how modern
technology is something quite different.27 The hydroelectric plant may be a more complicated
version of the old sawmill, and the lumber industry may simply be a more complex form of
woodcutting. Efficiency, speed, and magnitude are certainly characteristics of modern-machine
technology, but only by degree. Perhaps one of the greatest problems with trying to establish a
distinction between modern and ancient machines is that they seem to be based on the same
principles. Even the jet aircraft may be understood as a more complex, faster, and more efficient
means of travel. The airplane is simply a complicated kind of shoe, as the shoe is one of the
simplest and most ancient aids to transport. Yet the shoe, in so far as it is ancient handwork
technology, is an excellent example of how that kind of technology exists as an aid to a natural
process. The human species is naturally gifted for walking and the shoe abets and aids us in
revealing our ability to walk or run over great distances. The endurance of the human runner is
naturally in our bodies, and with the aid of the shoe we find this endurance bursting forth into
bloom. Yet the airplane is something different, and it seems to do more than merely aid us in
travel, it seems to go beyond aiding and abetting into a new realm, the realm of creation. Steiner
locates this new dimension by explaining that the value of techne and technology has been
reconstituted thanks to, “…the Aristotelian-Cartesian mastery over knowledge, or more
precisely, use of knowledge in order to exercise mastery…”28
Despite their apparent differences, Heidegger still maintains that the essence of modern
technology is as much a revealing as the essence of ancient technology. Yet the work of
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revelation in modern technology is not the work of poiesis. “The revealing that rules in modern
technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that
it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”29 This challenging, which is also
translated as a challenging-forth, is no poetic revelation. It employs a force, a violence, and a
dominating attitude to the world and the objects within it. In handwork technology, the language
is passive, reflective, and encouraging. In modern technology, the language is active, directive,
and restricting. Rojcewicz explains that “Power-machine technology is precisely powerful; it
enforces its will upon matter, imposes a form onto matter, rather than merely nurturing a form
from latency to visibility.”30 What is so telling about the distinction between ancient and modern
technology is that Heidegger has given up the language of the four causes in describing machinepower. There is no inviting matter, pregnant form, and encouraging end to draw in the crafter to
aid and abet. There now exists only the crafter enforcing his form onto the matter for whatever
purposes to which he wishes to put his product. This is technology as production, and this is the
kind of technology with which we are familiar. To read Heidegger’s account of ancient
technology one would think that he was describing art. His language is the typical example of the
whimsical artist who claims that she must wait for the canvas to speak to her before she can
begin to paint. Yet this is not the attitude of the civil engineer who has been tasked with
designing an ever more efficient power plant for the city. The engineer does not wait, he has
deadlines. The engineer is not reflecting on what form the power plant wants to take, rather he is
following the proper method for building power plants to meet the power demands of an
expanding city. The language of demand, and even the language of power, tells us everything
about modern technology. It tells us that there is no cooperation of four causes, there is only the
enforcement of a will.

82

To better explain this challenging nature of modern technology, Heidegger must also
explain how technology challenges. Heidegger explains that the challenge to nature is an
expediting. “It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is always itself
directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the
maximum yield at the minimum expense.”31 Rojcewicz explains that the term which is translated
as expedite (Fördern) can have various meanings. In one sense it can simply mean that which
moves something along. “But fördern can also suggest the use of brute force. In this sense, it
doesn’t simply mean to transport but to drag out (against resistance), to hoist up (as dead
weight), to extract (with effort).”32 Fördern is also related to the term Heidegger uses to convey
the challenging (herausfördern). The essence here is clear, modern technology employs violence
and force as it unlocks and strips the world bare. Steiner explains how Heidegger’s example of
the hydro-electric dam accomplishes this kind of violence. “The dam across the living stream, on
the contrary, is an enslavement and a deconstruction. The energies and natural lineaments of the
river are coerced through artificial apertures into the servitude of turbines. Flora and fauna go to
ruin in the inert reservoir behind the dam.”33 The language of force and enslavement may seem
strong when referring to machines, but for Heidegger this language is essential to explaining the
real purpose behind modern technology. The violence that these machines perform fulfills a kind
of economic end. The more brutally the machine exposes and strips bare the natural world, the
more efficiently it fulfills its function, to store up energy. Although it may be tempting to
theorize that these machines are only at fault when their operators drive them to barbarous ends,
nonetheless the machine is already purposed towards that destruction. It may be inert and
inactive, but if it is being used then it must be used to rip out the things of the world and
transform them into resources.
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However, Heidegger has not abandoned the idea of technology, even in the modern
sense, as revealing. The driving force behind machine-power is a rational one, at least in the
sense of working towards a definite plan. “That challenging happens in that the energy concealed
in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is
stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew.”34 Ancient
technology uncovers and reveals some natural truth and beauty that bursts forth onto the world. It
is a midwife, helping the mother and infant to bring forth the event of the birth in their due time.
Modern technology is an obstetrician performing a cesarean section, working out a forced cutting
and expeditious separation of the infant from the mother. It is a harvesting of the valuable
resource of the future patriarch, and the technical apparatus of the knife, the anesthetic, and the
sterilized operating table all serves this final cause. Modern technology reveals the world, and
the things in it as resources waiting to be mass-produced. Heidegger’s term for this production is
Bestand, translated by Lovitt as standing-reserve. Modern technology is a way of knowing the
world. What modern technology knows is that every single thing everywhere in the world is
waiting to be stored up and turned into efficient energy in order to even more effectively power
the storing up of ever greater energy. There is a definite sense of economic gain and motivation
here, especially under an economic system where wealth is defined as capital. If wealth is simply
the power to earn more wealth, then the purpose of amassing capital must be always to amass
even more capital, with no end in sight. Rojcewicz comes to our translational aid again and gives
us a term in English which very closely approximates what Heidegger has in mind
philosophically. “What Heidegger is suggesting in the term Bestand is not only that nature as a
whole is approached today with a consumer mentality but that this is even the most disrespectful
consumer mentality. The things of nature are not only consumables, they are disposables.”35 The
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world and all of its inhabitants stand over and against the gaze of modern technology not as mere
resources but as resources whose sole purpose is to be used up and discarded. When one
considers the rising landfills, the idea of treating nature and all the things we encounter as so
much trash makes more sense. These landfills exist because we consume and dispose of valuable
resources as though they were mere trash, as though they had always only ever been mere trash.
“Not only are natural things resources, supplies of which we can avail ourselves, but they are not
even deserving of respect as supplies; they are negligible, since they can be discarded at will.”36
Because Heidegger has the term Bestand, he is able to distinguish between the idea of these
disposables, and, more generally, other objects in the world. Although modern technology takes
part in challenging everything to stand by as a disposable item, there is still something which
seems to escape this claim to disposability. There is at least one thing left in the world which is
not disposable, and which seems to have great significance, if only because without it, there is no
modern technology. That thing is us.
Heidegger emphasizes the idea that humanity itself, and human beings as individuals,
never quite become disposables, they never quite become standing-reserve. The work of modern
technology which churns the earth up and stores it as a resource is ultimately and always driven
by human beings. Yet it seems simple enough that human beings could become resources, and
this seems already obvious in the context of modern slavery. The fact that Heidegger does not
address this is rather telling, and it may reveal his own racist bias at work. Surely, isn’t enslaving
people the precise effort and work of how modern technology turns people into resources? It
seems that a slave is valued only because he is regarded as a resource, a being that is waiting to
be disposed of in the service of some economic gain. However, Heidegger explains that human
beings are challenged by the essence of modern technology, they are challenged to order the
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world and all the things in it as mere resources. “Yet precisely because man is challenged, more
originally than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is
transformed into mere standing reserve.”37 There is something mysterious at work here, but a
careful analysis will reveal the truth. It is all-too-easy, and all-too-misleading, to think of the
relationship of slave owners and slaves as one of simple mastery and servitude.
Slave owners are themselves being challenged by the system of slavery, a system which
they by and large inherit rather than create. This is even true for that first generation of
Europeans who began the trans-atlantic slave trade, the apparatus of slavery was already
historically available, like some ancient technology. Yet the new race based slavery came from a
different place, and put slavery, an already horrible system, into to use in the service of racism.
We need not excuse their behavior, or make the argument that slave owners suffer as much as
slaves. Instead, what I am arguing is that slave owners are not absolute masters, they themselves
are being mastered by the system and the society of slavery. The slave, and the slave owner
likewise, find themselves mastered within a complex social structure of rules, expectations,
demands, obligations, and consequences which to a large degree are beyond either of their
controls. Though it must be added that the slave masters believe themselves to be in control of
this system, and that even though they are subject to this discourse they still think it is within
their power. The difference is that the slave is mastered to produce the cotton from the field, they
are mastered to pick, clean, and bring up the cash crop. The slave owner, on the other hand, is
mastered to produce the slave. The owner goes out and brings up the human as a tool for
economic advancement. Indeed this reminds us of the meanings of the word fördern, discussed
by Rojcewicz above. “But fördern can also suggest the use of brute force. In this sense, it doesn’t
simply mean to transport but to drag out (against resistance), to hoist up (as dead weight), to
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extract (with effort).”38 The slave trade itself involves just this sort of violence which drags out
of Africa, hoists up in the murderous practice of lynching, and extracts economic value from a
living person. Yet that person, the slave, is never completely mastered into being a tool or a
resource precisely because they themselves must master the crop. The actual fact of slavery in
the Western Hemisphere is that the slaves were essentially very highly skilled laborers. They
were expected, and indeed driven, to produce pounds upon pounds of various resources every
day that they labored. They were called upon to yield these in the most expedient manner
possible, and this entire system could not have prevailed if the slaves had been “lazy” or
“incompetent,” which is the racist discourse that we are fed. The sheer economic efficiency of
slavery depended on a large group of highly skilled laborers.39 No amount of force, coercion, or
terror can turn a person into an efficient and skilled worker unless they already have the ability
and the propensity to develop the necessary skills. Insofar as the slave remained a skilled worker
they resisted completely being subordinated to the category of tool. Though of course this skill
was driven by a need to survive rather than some pure Marxist impulse to creative energy. They
did what could not be done by others, and they did it better than anyone else. However, this
system was not just some advanced labor program, it also used up and disposed of its members.
It treated those who lacked proficiency with extreme measures like beating and starvation. Yet
even those who were skilled and proficient were treated the same way, since the system thrived
on the brutality of always instilling fear and desperation in those people it mastered. Now the
mastery which was enforced upon the slaves seems to be very similar to the mastery which is
enforced upon all human beings within a society dominated by modern technology. The slave
masters might have a different relationship to this mastery, but they are still mastered by it in
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some ways. This mastery has a special name, and it is the word for which Heidegger’s
philosophy of technology is best known, the enframing.
The enframing is the essence of modern machine technology, and it reveals that
technology is out of our hands. The actual question concerning technology, “what is the essence
of modern technology?” is not answered by the instrumental definition. The idea that technology
appears before us as a tool for our use must be abandoned when technology begins to order us
into doing its work. Modern technology pushes us and makes a claim to mastery against human
beings. For instance, the old handwork technology functions at our speed according to our intent,
and according to the natural capacity of the objects on which we work. So if I am using a
hammer to pound a nail into a piece of wood, then the speed with which I do this depends on the
wood, the nail, the hammer, and myself. While the invention of the nail gun may depend on me
to plug it in, maintain it, and load it up with the proper nails, the gun itself fires the nail into the
wood in one swift stroke. Because the nail gun is so much faster, and so much more efficient
than the hammer, then the carpenter who still uses the hammer becomes outpaced by his business
rivals who use the nail gun. There is a kind of pressure being applied on him and the carpenter is
being challenged into using the nail gun. Now he may claim that he is only responding to the
pressure applied by his business rivals, but what then is their reason for adopting the nail gun?
They may in turn claim that they are responding to other business rivals, but ultimately there is a
broader social force being applied. Once the new technology is available, the possibility of using
the old technology becomes overridden. Some people still use the old handwork technology for
various tasks, but just as soon as there is a more efficient, faster, and stronger tool available, the
society on the whole will almost inevitably adopt it. The mistake here would be to think that
people adopt the tools simply because they are better instruments. Yet machine-power
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technology is not merely a better instrument, it is of a different kind because there is a different
cultural attitude behind it. We must adopt the newest phones, the most destructive weapons, and
the latest drugs to cure our various diseases. In fact we lose our freedom to choose against these
things. It is the essence of modern technology which locks us into a categorical way of seeing the
world as resource, as disposable. Again, the essence of modern technology is what Heidegger
calls the enframing.
The term that Heidegger uses to denote the essence of modern technology is Ge-stell,
famously translated by Lovitt as enframing. “We now name that challenging claim which gathers
man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve: ‘Ge-stell’ [Enframing]. We dare to
use this word in a sense that has been thoroughly unfamiliar up to now.”40 Heidegger explains
that the ordinary use of the word can denote anything from a skeleton to a bookshelf. It basically
means a frame or structure on which to hang something. Steiner explains that Heidegger’s use of
this term is meant to conjure up darkly negative images. “In it (enframing) he concentrates the
sterile, mendacious connotations of ‘scaffold,’ ‘gimmick,’ and ‘armature.”41 Rojcewicz explains
how the notion of the frame gives way to the notion of the en-framed.
…in the age of modern technology beings are given to us configured in a certain way (as
use-objects) and we are ourselves imperiously called to take them under that
configuration. The ‘enframing’ amounts to this, that just as the frame of ribs gives an
umbrella its shape, and our frame of bones gives us our shape, so things today appear in a
certain shape because they are enframed in a certain way, namely as there merely for our
use.42
The work of modern technology is the work of revealing a world of disposables, a world of
resources. Yet, before this work can be carried out there must be a way of thinking about the
world and the things in it which reveal themselves as disposables. The machines and technical
apparatus of modern technology are the expression of an attitude, and a way of thinking about
the world. The term for this way of thinking is enframing, and it carries the notion of a
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framework for our ideas. The enframing is the way in the sense of being the only way that the
world shows up for us. Long before we ever had atomic bombs, smartphones, or steel mills the
worldview of enframing was already at work in our society and culture. We have actually been
living with this technological way of seeing the world for some time now. Heidegger explains
that before we can have the machines, we need the exact science which makes such machines
possible, and before we can have that exact science we need the enframing which makes it
possible.
The first glimpse we have of the enframing challenging us to reveal the world is in the
birth of modern science.
Modern science’s way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable
coherence of forces…Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to
exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its
experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself
when set up in this way.43
In working out a genealogy of technology what we find is that handwork technology and ancient
technology even now continue to be in use, and they have not altogether disappeared. We also
find that their use is subordinate to and overwhelmed by the use of machine-power technology.
Still, these machines could not come about before the exact science which makes them possible.
The machine of the airplane requires quite a bit of exact science to justify and explain how
powered lift is even possible. The medical marvel of the vaccine is not possible without an exact
science of medicine to calculate just how much exposure to a disease is enough to develop
immunity to that disease. The scientific revolution begins about two hundred years prior to the
industrial revolution, and the explosion of machine technology owes its origins to the
calculations of the scientists. It was the scientists who first began to see the world as orderable,
calculable, decipherable, and categorical. We have already discussed the goal of modern science

90

as mastery over the world and its entities. Recall that for Descartes the goal of science was a
world where scientists have used technological advances to cure almost all diseases, convert the
objects in the world into a useable stock of resources, and do all this to enable human beings to
live a long and trouble free life.
For these notions made me see that it is possible to arrive at knowledge that would be
very useful in life and that, in place of that speculative philosophy taught in the schools, it
is possible to find a practical philosophy, by means of which, knowing the force and
actions of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies that surround us
just as distinctly as we know the various skills of our craftsmen, we might be able, in the
same way, to use them for all the purposes for which they are appropriate, and thus
render ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature.44
The emphasis on the last phrase is my own, but for Descartes that is the goal of a practical
philosophy, and what we eventually call a natural science. Speculative philosophy is not
productive, and only a practical philosophy can enable the philosopher to master and possess the
natural world, and to use its entities for all of their “appropriate” purposes. Yet this is propriety
in the modern, rather than the ancient, sense; this is a propriety dictated by the attitude of the
enframing. Recall also that Francis Bacon holds that the goal of science and philosophy is “to
give humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.”45
Mastery, mastery, and mastery is the goal of science. It is no wonder that in this context the
development of race and the Trans-Atlantic slave trade comes into being. If the essence of
modern technology is truly the attitude of the enframing, then the threat of technology as mastery
exists long before the machines which begin to affect this mastery. “The modern physical theory
of nature prepares the way first not simply for technology but for the essence of modern
technology. For already in physics the challenging gathering-together into ordering revealing
holds sway.”46 Yet despite this obvious appearance of this will-to-mastery, Heidegger maintains
that the true origins of the enframing remain hidden. This strikes at one of the most essential
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problems of the enframing, and the issue which gives way to the supreme danger of modern
technology.
The enframing is both revealed, under careful philosophical scrutiny, but also concealed
in the everyday use of technological machines. We are so inundated by technology that we come
to think that it is a mere tool and instrument for getting around in the world. Yet as Heidegger’s
analysis of language and the differences between ancient and modern technology reveal, there is
much more to technology than its use as a tool. There is a way in which this is a tool that uses us.
Enframing involves the idea that technological tools master us into mastering them, and
mastering them for the purposes of ordering the world and its objects into various disposable
categories. Despite this, the enframing itself is not reducible to any particular piece of
technology. “… (The enframing is) nothing on the order of a machine. It is the way in which the
real reveals itself as standing-reserve.”47 In fact, the enframing of modern technology seems to
accomplish the same basic task as does the poiesis of ancient technology. Both are simply
destinings of being, although the enframing seems to present greater problems.
We must turn now to investigate Heidegger’s notion of destining in order to understand
the true threat posed by technology. “Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a
way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over man…But when
we consider the essence of technology then we experience enframing as a destining of
revealing.”48 The destining of revealing is the idea of the attitude and way of seeing and dealing
with the world which holds for humanity during our particular age of history. Rojcewicz
comments that for Heidegger the notion of destiny is historical but it also shows that humanity
exists at the mercy of forces beyond ourselves. “What is primarily responsible for technology as
an understanding of what it means to be in general is the self-showing of the gods, the self-
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offering of being. That is, our current disclosive looking upon things as disposables is
encompassed by a more general imposition which disposes of us.”49 Heidegger hints at a
mysterious power behind the various ways in which we as human beings come to see the world.
This power gives to us the various ways, or modes of revealing, that we use to see and interact
with the things in the world.
Although Heidegger’s language is deeply mystical, the concept of Being is well steeped
in the history of philosophy. Consider Plato’s discussion of the forms in the Republic. “And what
is the main thing, we speak of beauty itself and good itself and so in the case of all the things that
we set down as many, we turn about set down in accord with a single form of each, believing
that there is but one, and call it ‘the being’ of each.”50 Plato emphasizes the notion that there is
something behind the entities we encounter in the world. This power is what causes all of those
entities to exist and possess the particular features that they possess. He called this something a
form, and the idea was that any beautiful thing in the world could only exist, could only “be”, if
there also existed the form of beauty in order to give the being of beauty to beautiful things.
Plato further claimed that there was an ultimate form, the form of the good, which was
responsible for all beings. “…for you’ve often heard it said that the form of the good is the most
important thing to learn about and that it’s by their relation to it that just things and the others
become useful and beneficial.”51 Problematically enough, Plato claims that no one possesses an
adequate knowledge of the form of the good. Yet he theorizes that if anyone did, they would
know everything, for they would know how it is that things in the world become useful, that is
how they become available to be known by ourselves as human knowers. So in that sense the
form of the good is what makes the entities in the world and the entities of our knowledge, both
existing and knowable. Plato compares the form of the good to the sun, and explains that just as
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the sun enables our sight to work, so also the form of the good enables our mind to work. “So
what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the
good.”52 Now Plato’s form of the good is not identical to Heidegger’s concept of being, but they
do function in similar ways in their respective philosophical worldviews. As the form of the good
makes the world and its objects knowable, so also for Heidegger “Being” gives us our ways of
thinking and knowing the world.
Heidegger treats the concept of Being, and more specifically human beings as Dasein in
his classic work Being and Time. A more engaging explanation of that work is far beyond the
scope of the present dissertation. It will suffice for now to say that Heidegger is still interested in
the idea of Being even here in his much later work the Question Concerning Technology. George
Steiner summarizes the goal of Heidegger’s philosophy as it is laid out in Being and Time. “It is
the unique and specific business of philosophy, therein and at all times referential to its Greek
inception, to be incessantly astonished at and focused on the fact that all things are; that there is
a universal and totally determinant attribute to things, which is that of existence.”53 Heidegger
acknowledges that Plato and Socrates were perhaps the first philosophers to truly question and
attempt to think about what being is. However, Heidegger rejects Plato’s forms, and also the idea
of the form of the good, as the ultimate answer to what being is. Heidegger understands Plato’s
forms as constituting a forgetting of being. It is this forgetting which has made possible, “…the
alienated, unhoused, recurrently barbaric estate of modern technological and mass consumptionman.”54 Yet as much as Plato has missed the primordial sense of being, which for Heidegger still
remains mysterious, the enframing does not yet exist in the ancient world. Philosophy is not yet
exact science, though it may be on its way.
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Descartes explains this aptly when he writes that practical philosophy must supplant
speculative philosophy.55 The forms of Plato are still well within merely speculative philosophy,
but the scientific revolution begun by Descartes and others is the realm of the new practical
philosophy, the new natural science (or nova scientia). In terms of the problems that the
enframing presents, one of the greatest is that we are losing sight of Being itself. As we push our
machines, and especially our thinking, we see the world of only disposable resources, and so the
actual being of entities, and indeed Being itself, becomes obscured. “We have compelled nature
to yield knowledge and energy, but we have given to nature, to that which is live and hidden
within it, no patient hearing, no in-dwelling. Thus our technologies mask being instead of
bringing it to light.”56 The work of technology is to reveal the world, and in that sense
technology is concerned with uncovering the being of the world and the being of entities. So it
seems to be our destiny in this current age to know the world through the lens of modern
technology. In that sense we know what the world is, because of the guiding light of the
enframing. Yet that enframing poses a threat to us that is more than just the threat of machines
and the threat of stripping the world of all its resources.
Heidegger accepts that the enframing is our present way of knowing the world, and thus
it reveals what the world is, it reveals the being of the entities of the world. “The essence of
technology lies in Enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. Since destining at any
given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the
brink of the possibility of pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering,
and of deriving all his standards on this basis.”57 The enframing is the attitude and systematic
way of thinking and living which underlies all of our activity in the modern world. Whenever
people engaged in the sciences of phrenology and physiognomy they were comparing and
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measuring bodies to meet a standard of use. The black body was useful for one thing, and the
white was, in a sense which was always meant to be quite different, useful for another.
Whenever I hunt down knowledge, so to speak, I am hunting practical or useful knowledge.
Whenever I construct art, I do so technically and according to the established methods for
making art that will be mass consumed. The forest is revealed to me as a national park which
functions as a site of political power, as an educational tool, or as means to control natural gas
and oil deposits. The forest is also revealed as a site for logging and mining, and as a storehouse
of future goods and consumer products. In all this, it is apt to say that I know the forest, and that
I know what the forest is, at least in a limited way. However, that limitation restricts me as a
human being, and I find myself being ordered by the enframing to see nothing but a world of
useful things. In a very similar fashion the white gaze feels threatened by the black body which
will not fit its expectations. When the black body refuses to be useful in the ways proscribed by
that measuring objectifying gaze of whiteness then that gaze strives to reassert the restrictions on
black usefulness. In fact, the only alternative I can conjure to the useful is the useless, which
seems to be little more than the absence or privation of usefulness. “…man is endangered from
out of destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore
necessarily danger.”58 I am threatened by the enframing, but that danger is not the same danger
which out of control technology threatens. Deforestation, nuclear war, environmental pollution,
and rising mounds of trash are problems of modern technology. Yet the danger of the enframing
is worse and more basic than any of those problems, since indeed those problems only exist
because of the threat which the enframing poses in the first place. For Heidegger, the enframing
is not just the danger, it is the supreme danger.
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The enframing threatens us in two ways: first, it threatens our identity as humans and
second, and, more importantly, it threatens to eradicate truth itself. In the first place, the danger
of the enframing converts us into standing-reserve, while simultaneously giving us the delusion
that we have finally conquered the earth. Heidegger phrases it this way, “…he (humanity) comes
to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to
be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself
to the posture of the lord of the earth.”59 The supreme danger of the enframing, in the first sense,
is that human beings will be conquered and dominated by the very instruments which they
believe give them mastery over the earth. In his book The Abolition of Man, the noted theologian
C.S. Lewis examines this first way in which the enframing threatens humanity. Lewis claims,
“…what we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over
other men with Nature as its instrument.”60 For Lewis, the chief problem of rapid technological
growth, and the scientific attitude which sees the world in terms of its use, is the threat of some
humans against others. Lewis makes this danger concrete by theorizing that advances in
eugenics, education, and machine power technology will eventually create a generation of
humans who have been entirely engineered to meet some ideal. Those humans who have been
driving the process of engineering the perfect human will eventually succeed but of course their
idea of the perfect human will be perverted to the ends of absolute technical efficiency. Of this
supposedly perfect generation Lewis writes, “They are not men at all: they are artefacts. Man’s
final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man.”61 It is worth mentioning that both Lewis
and Heidegger have greatly overestimated the rate at which humanity can resist this urge to turn
technology on itself to its own ruin. For it seems clear in their constant use of the term “man”
that neither Lewis nor Heidegger are aware that this kind of reduction has already been done for
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centuries. Certainly this is the danger that exists in slavery and in racism. Yet it is also clearly the
danger that exists in sexism and the enforced domesticity of gender roles which relegate women
into subordinate positions. Despite their near-sightedness, both Heidegger and Lewis do raise the
valid point that this is precisely one of the great dangers in the attitude of the enframing.
Beyond even Lewis’ concerns lies an even greater danger, and it is a further
manifestation of the danger in the enframing. Heidegger sees that since the enframing is a
destining, since it is the way in which being and beings are revealed in our era of history, then its
true danger is not to us, but to being itself. “As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of
revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other
possibility of revealing…Where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standingreserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear,
namely this revealing as such.”62 The supreme danger of the enframing is that we will lose our
access to truth. To be human means to be involved in knowing, doing, and living in the world
and with the world. The being of humanity, our being human, has to do with how we open
ourselves to all of the possible ways of seeing the world and everything in it. We come from
diverse cultures, with diverse languages, we have different modes of dress, different modes of
art, and different modes of habitation. In every way, human beings encounter a world that is
never the same and always different. We reflect that difference in ourselves, but the enframing
crushes all of that into dust. There now remains one way of seeing the world, and only one way
of thinking about the world. This even seems to lead ultimately to one kind of language, and
indeed the English language is already dominant in much of the world. This gives way to a mode
of dress, art, and habitation that is in every way efficient, technical, and mass produce-able. So it
is not surprising then that race is invented as a means for reducing the vast differences between
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people and groups down to four or five basic categories. The concept of race, in short, follows
the logic of reduction, of efficiency in our perception, and our dealings with “fixed” peoples.
At first it seems that the threat posed by racism is that great domination of all of those
who are “inferior,” by those who deem themselves “superior.” The threat in technology seems to
show up in the way that natural handwork technology is run out by the faster and more efficient
machine-power technology. These are threats, but they are secondary to the more primordial
threat, for once we lose our ability to see a world as colorful, beautiful, old, new, mysterious,
vague, unknown, mystical, and even divine; we see a world that is merely, useful. Yet the useful
is a binary, and to it is always opposed its failure and its opposite, the useless. Heidegger
summarizes it in this way:
The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines
and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.
The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to
enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal
truth.63
What threatens us most in enframing is that we will lose our ability to see a world beyond that
frame. We may become lost, and in so doing the world and the beings of the world also become
lost.
In summation, this chapter has given us an overview of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of
technology in order to prepare the way to see that the attitude of the technological enframing is
strikingly similar to the attitude of whiteness. A genealogy of technology revealed a distinction
between ancient and modern technology. Ancient technology was concerned with the work of
poiesis, of revealing the world in its natural state. Modern technology was concerned with
enacting an enframing on the world and its entities. The enframing is the cultural attitude, and
way of looking at the world, which drives people in contemporary society to challenge and
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reveal a world of resources. These resources are disposable and thus have no lasting significance.
Furthermore the enframing threatens humanity in two ways. It threatens to turn us into resources,
which thanks to slavery and racism has already happened, and it threatens to destroy every other
way of looking at the world. We have the capacity to see the world in many ways. One example
of this is the fact that children often imagine the world to be much more mysterious and magical
than the adults who raise those children. Children can see a world that is not full of resources, but
full of mysteries. This seems especially true when one considers how “inefficient” children are in
their use of the time and resources allotted to them. Yet as they grow older children become
conditioned to see the world of disposable resources and to do the work of storing up those
resources. The supreme danger of the enframing is finally that we will lose our ability to be
human insofar as we lose our ability to see the world in a diverse or artistic way. That we
ourselves and all future generations may only ever see a world of resources is indeed a great
tragedy.
Yet this tragedy is not different from the threat posed by whiteness. Within whiteness, we
are likewise challenged to see a world that is raced with whiteness setting the standard for which
group is “superior.” Whiteness threatens humanity in that everyone is always at risk of becoming
non-white. Even the most fair-skinned, elite, wealthy members of society are constantly
threatened in their affiliation with whiteness. The threat of whiteness is greater still when you
realize that we may be delivered over to a way of looking at the people in the world as
perpetually racialized. Whiteness hides itself and conceals itself behind the mask of class
difference, ethnic difference, and cultural difference. All the while whiteness defines and orders
these differences in a hierarchy which privileges light-skinned, upper class, and western-cultured
individuals. Whiteness is so significant that even those light skinned members of society who
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lack wealth and culture are deemed superior to people of color who are wealthy and cultured.
The lowest member of society who is white is afforded the privileges and protections of
whiteness which are denied to even the most important non-white member of society. So there
are clear parallels between the problem of race as whiteness and the problem of technology as
the enframing.
Whenever human beings are threatened in such a complete and overwhelming sense,
especially by their own actions, that threat to humanity has become a sin. Even though the issue
with race and technology is an ethical one, the term “sin” resides very firmly within the language
of religion. Rather than handing the ethical issues of philosophy over to the methods of theology,
the discussion of sin will instead transplant a theological notion into the realm of philosophical
questioning. This transfer is necessary since there is something special at stake in the supreme
dangers of whiteness and enframing. In most ordinary ethical discussions, the remedies for
unethical behavior require some type of reform. In certain extreme cases reform may not be
preferable or even possible. Whiteness and the enframing cannot be reformed, and there is no
special fix for these problems. There can be no program of gradual change or slow improvement
to remedy these issues. They are a danger, but that danger is a sin.
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Chapter 5 – Sin and Ethics
The idea of sin immediately strikes us as an ethical one. Sin is a term so deeply valueladen as to have unavoidably ethical connotations. Thus far I have showcased the problems of
race and technology as the problems of whiteness and enframing. Now, if I claim that racism is a
violation of ethics, or that the enframing violates ethics, then I must make clear what my ethical
system is. However, this is not something I can do just yet. Hence, the ethical theory on which
my critique is based will remain delayed. The reason for this delay is that the problem of
whiteness and enframing has not yet been fully delineated within this dissertation. There is an
underlying schema beneath the grounding of whiteness and enframing in western history and
culture. This schema is neither reducible to the idea of whiteness nor to the idea of enframing.
There is a deep cultural attitude which allows for the simultaneous historical emergence of
whiteness and the enframing. To be sure, we see the evidence of racism emerging only in the late
seventeenth century, and we see the evidence of modern technology emerge one hundred years
later. Yet prior to the existence of slavery based on racism lies the attitude of whiteness, and
prior to the industrial revolution lies the enframing.
Yet we have not arrived at ethics in our analysis. The words and language of whiteness
and enframing begin to pile up. The problem eludes us because we see the categories, and the
very thinking which we are trying to criticize has framed us into this act of categorization. The
work of philosophy itself becomes a logical analysis and a phenomenological exploration of
concepts, structures, and ideas. The fundamental attitudes behind these ideas are vague and
obscure. Like Rene Descartes we are seeking ideas that are clear and distinct. We suspect that if
we had perfectly clear and distinct notions of the ideas of whiteness and the enframing then we
would see the clear path to the resolution of these ideas. Yet that suspicion is merely the mask of
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an assumption that would reduce this problem to one of epistemology. We are tempted to say
that “There is no real ethical problem here, the problem is one of ideas and proper thinking.” The
methods of analysis, observation, and logical inference make us confident that we need only to
get clear about our words in order to resolve any issues with them. I have fallen into this way of
addressing the issue. I have engaged in linguistic and textual analysis. I have presented
contrasting viewpoints and dismissed counter-arguments. In short, I am so far from being ethical
about these issues precisely because they present themselves to me as mere ideas for analysis and
reflection. This is why the problem must be recast using the language of sin.
In this chapter, I will investigate the nature of whiteness and modern technology by
viewing them through the religious language of sin. An initial analysis of religious language will
reveal the ways that it can uniquely illustrate the problem. The goal of this analysis will be to
show how religious language can explicate technoracism as the source of both whiteness and
modern technology. So to that end I will turn to the ideas of sin as presented in the works of
Augustine. He argues that sin is a matter of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to
do with the object of our desire. He also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against
society. We sin against God when we love the lesser goods of the world more than the great
good of God, and this is a religious sin. We sin against society when we elevate our interests
over and against society’s interests, and this is the sin against society. Both whiteness and
modern technology will be shown to be religious and social sins. In the end I argue that using
religious language to explain these concepts creates a kind of moral aesthetic. This means that
the mode and means through which a thing is described has an ethical unique value since the
way that something is addressed reveals what is of vital importance. In the second place this
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analysis of sin shows even more intensely how similar are the problems of technology and race,
and this prepares the way for the underlying concept of technoracism.
The concepts of sin and guilt are very near to me. Their nearness evokes feelings, biases,
concerns, and anxieties. The word sin, for example, causes me to shift uneasily in my seat. In one
sense that uneasiness may result because I have “polluted” the work of philosophy with religious
language and symbolism. A sudden rush of paranoia pushes me to retract the word. I know that
the use of the word sin is a kind of theoretical transgression as it breaks the rules of “accepted”
philosophical discourse. My use of sin, however, need not break those rules so long as I use it in
that cold and distant manner with which the intellectual process de-stigmatizes language. Yet I
want the concept of sin to have its full meaning; I want the concept of sin to be unsettling. To say
that racism is a sin is not merely to put one thought into a religious category. To say that the
enframing is a sin is not meant solely to evoke the image of some kind of environmental duty.
Sin evokes the language of death and fear. Sin can, and should, galvanize us to action. The
danger that often exists in philosophy is the risk of intellectual complacency. As a thinker I
become accustomed to the game of ideas and the play of categories. I flirt carelessly with
Nietzsche; I drift easily in and out of Aquinas, and I float effortlessly past de Beauvoir. I am no
expert in any of these thinkers or their works and yet even if I were that expertise might avail me
nothing. To engage with Nietzsche is to feel the madness of Zarathustra and to be driven to
excesses of rage. To enter into Aquinas is to find oneself mathematically enfolded into a
geometry of perfection and stability. To read de Beauvoir is to wake up from the dream of
Modernity to the rising sun of oppression. These thinkers never intended to be thought of as
mere idols to be worshipped or admired as mere static categories of thought in the canon of
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ideas. They meant to change the world, and their words sparkle with the intellectual fire which
incites the mind to passions and activities.
So my personal excursion has lead me to invoke the language of sin in order to showcase
what is truly problematic in the deepest possible sense about whiteness and enframing. The
language of religion is not meant to scaffold a tower of abstract theological terms. It is meant to
push, pull, and prod one into action, and especially into a more active mode of thinking. We
must come to see whiteness and enframing as problems that demand active solutions, rather than
as mere ideas for passive reflection. This is not meant to commit us to some system of theology,
or even to religion itself as a more accurate way of seeing the world. The use of sin to discuss
whiteness and enframing will serve as a kind of poetic performance of religious language. Rather
than take up the study of theology, the language of sin opens us up a more active way of
approaching the problems of whiteness and enframing as ethical problems. So despite my
excursion I have no intention of abandoning the methods I have used thus far. This current
project is a work of philosophy and as such I will continue to use the tools of philosophy to
convey the ideas at hand. Yet by casting the ethical problem as one of sin I also engage in this
performance. I perform religion in an attempt to make the problem which unites whiteness and
enframing clearer. While I am attempting to clear up those problems, the language of sin will
help to illuminate the common schema which underlies both. The ultimate goal of this
illumination will be to show that there really is only one problem, the problem of technoracism.
So in order to begin an investigation into sin within the context of religious language, it
will be necessary to start with an understanding of the nature of religious language. The most
pressing obstacle in using religious language to discuss ethical problems is that religion, and by
extension its language, may also have certain ethical problems already loaded into it. Beyond
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that the work of religious language might further obscure our ideas if we are not careful. So we
also need to make sense of the way in which religious language is deployed to convey or capture
meaning.
In the first place religion, and by extension religious language, raises certain ethical
concerns. In one rather obvious sense religion may itself stand as an over-arching allencompassing way of seeing and knowing. In just the same way as racism and the enframing,
one can say that monotheism also threatens human beings by closing off all other ways of seeing
the world. In this light, Rosemary Radford Ruether claims that, “Male monotheism has been so
taken for granted in Judeo-Christian culture that the peculiarity of imaging God solely through
one gender has not been recognized. But such an image indicates a sharp departure from all
previous human consciousness.”1 Ruether’s claim is that religion is reduced to the idea of
monotheism, but even more so to a patriarchal monotheism which is designed to reinforce maledominated power structures. Certainly when we say “Religion” we tend to tacitly assume
Monotheism. That assumption comes from a place of western cultural domination which tends to
shut out non-monotheistic worldviews. Beyond this what remains as monotheism is itself further
subsumed under the hierarchy of Christianity. We find a perfect example of this hierarchy of
religion in the work of Hegel. In the same essay where he discusses race, Hegel distinguishes
between the major monotheistic traditions. As we saw in the introduction to this project, Hegel
divides the Caucasian race into the Western Asiatics, which he identifies by their religion of
Islam, and the Europeans which he identifies by their religion of Christianity. For Hegel, only
Christians understand God as God ought to be truly understood, and Muslims are perhaps better
off than other religious groups, but they are still impoverished monotheists.2 So the danger
inherent in whiteness and the enframing seems to also be present in monotheistic religion. That
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danger is that we will lose a multiplicity of ways of seeing the world and all of our thinking will
be subsumed under one single reductionist mode, the monotheistic mode. It sounds hollow to try
to reassure people that monotheism does not seek to control the world, especially in light of the
aggressive program of conversion which typifies it. Indeed this is a point which Islam and
Christianity have very much in common, that of their mutual desire to convert all peoples to their
particular brand of religion. Now whether this is merely the political way in which religion is
being expressed in our modern era or an essential feature of those religions is at this point
immaterial.
However there is a way of looking at religion which fits very much into the critical
project we have been carrying out thus far. It should be obvious that the expression of racism, the
expression of modern technology, and the expression of monotheism are all deeply similar. This
does not invalidate religious language any more than it invalidates the language of race or the
language of technology. This makes our link all the more crucial. Religion seems to be driven by
the same underlying schema which facilitates the arrival of race and modern technology. Indeed
monotheism seems to predate both race and modern technology and so in that sense it is closer to
this hidden schema. The bias of religion is not something we wish to ignore, but neither does it
invalidate the idea of using religious language. Though my turn may seem sudden, I am
emboldened into using the language of sin all the more in light of the fact that monotheism is
older and seems to bear the notion of power and dominance in a more original fashion.
Now we can look more closely at how religious language functions to convey meaning.
Paul Tillich, an eminent philosopher and theologian from the early twentieth century, writes in
his “The Nature of Religious Language” of a loss of meaning in words. Tillich attempts to get
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clear about some basic concepts which are essential to understanding how religious terms and
phrases carry meaning. He begins by explaining the distinction between symbols and signs.
Symbols are similar to signs in one decisive respect: both symbols and signs point
beyond themselves to something else…The difference, which is a fundamental difference
between them is that signs do not participate in any way in the reality and power of that
to which they point. Symbols, although they are not the same as that which they
symbolize, participate in its meaning and power.3
Tillich’s example is that the letters of an alphabet operate as signs, since they do not actively join
in on the proper pronunciation or speaking of those letters. Instead the letter merely signifies, or
signs, the sound or idea which is conveyed. A stop sign is merely a reminder of where the traffic
laws of a society preside. Yet the sign itself can be readily destroyed and the laws remain
perfectly intact. On the other hand, Tillich explains that a flag is not a sign for a nation but rather
a symbol of its power and authority. Hence when a flag is lowered to half-mast then the flag
actively participates in the grief felt by the citizens of that nation. When a town or city is seized
in warfare then the flag is replaced with the conquerors flag because the flag symbolizes the
occupation of a new political power. When we burn a flag, we are also attacking the political
powers for which that flag stands. Tillich explains further that “The symbol represents something
which is not itself; for which it stands and in the power and meaning of which it participates.”4
Yet Tillich rightly argues that a symbol can never completely represent the thing to which it
points. A flag may symbolize a nation but the flag cannot be tasked with completely representing
a nation, as there is no flag whose loss would destroy a nation. For Tillich this limitation points
to the more essential nature of symbols. “Every symbol opens up a level of reality for which
nonsymbolic speaking is inadequate.”5 Tillich claims that this opening up is unique to the
symbol being used, and that the meaning that is opened up, or revealed, by that symbol cannot be
accessed in any other way.
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Religious language functions in a symbolic way that opens us up to a meaning which
would be in any other way inaccessible.
The same (symbolic meaning) is true also in the relationship of poetry and philosophy.
The temptation may often be to confuse the issue by bringing too many philosophical
concepts into a poem. Now this is really the problem; one cannot do this. If one uses
philosophical language or scientific language, it does not mediate the same thing which is
mediated in the use of really poetic language without the mixture of any other language. 6
The opening up of levels of reality that we find in certain kinds of symbolic language
corresponds also to what Tillich calls the opening of “…levels of the soul, levels of our interior
reality.”7 This opening up of levels of reality is a process in which the thinker participates with
the symbol. The symbol reveals something hidden about nature and the thinker also discovers
something hidden about him or herself. Tillich goes further and claims that religious language
opens up the true nature of reality in a way that is more penetrating than philosophical or
scientific language. However it is not my intent to commit myself, or this current dissertation, to
the “metaphysical superiority” of religious language. As a symbolic way of interacting with the
world, religious language, especially the concept of sin, opens up new possibilities for
understanding the problems which plague us in whiteness and in the enframing.
However, I take religious language to be more limited than Tillich as it appears to lack
clear or unmitigated access to the being of reality. We do well not to forget the unstable nature of
language. Although this instability is something which Tillich decries, nonetheless this instability
of meaning is what is also important about religious language. Because words have symbolic
meanings, we can access a deeper layer of meaning in both the world and ourselves. Yet,
because such meanings are unfixed and changeable, the meanings to which we are opened are
ones that are able to constantly surprise or even overwhelm our thinking. This surprise is not
some pure chaos, but rather it creates, as Heidegger would put it, the way.
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Another way of looking at religious language comes to us through the Tao Te Ching,
attributed to Lao Tsu. The concept of the Tao itself is often translated as the way, and although
that way might appear singular it is open and branching. In the Tao Te Ching, we find that “The
Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth. The named is the mother of ten thousand
things.”8 Although Taoism is not a religion per se, nonetheless the idea of language being unable
to fix on the true nature of reality is still very useful here. So while Tillich points out that
religious language functions as a symbol to open us up to a hidden reality, Lao Tsu explains that
language creates a fixity for our dealings in the world. Yet this fixity is not, and cannot claim to
be, truth in some absolute sense.
The point of this excursion into language can now be summarized, I do not think
religious language has a pure claim to supremacy in terms of its access to truth, especially given
the vague and evolving nature of all language. However religious language does open up a new
way of thinking. That new way is to be found in how this language presents certain ideas as
symbols, and I intend to use one of these potent symbols to reveal some hidden truths about
whiteness and enframing. That most valuable of religious symbols for my current discussion is
the symbol of sin.
To begin a discussion of sin, it seems that I must define precisely what I mean by the
deployment of this word. Suffice to say that sin is an idea which we find most keenly expressed
in the religion of Christianity, though Christianity is not the only religion to lay a claim to this
concept. Here I explore my own indebtedness to the term’s importance. The idea of sin as an
idea which can help to explain the problem of technoracism finds its origins in the works of St.
Augustine of Hippo. More specifically, as it should be noted, my aim here is to discuss sin as it
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pertains to technoracism. Before I can explain how sin relates to the problems of technology and
the problems of race, I demonstrate how I am obliged to the work of Augustine for my own
definition of sin.
For Augustine, sin is a matter of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to do
with the object of our desire. To that end he organizes the things in the world according to a
hierarchy of goods with God at the top, followed by intellectual things, and then with physical
goods at the bottom. He also distinguishes between sins against God and sins against society. To
sin against God would be to commit a sin that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of
the world more than the great good of God. To sin against society is to elevate my own
importance over the importance of maintaining social unity.
In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine defines evil, or sin, as the result of a disordered
love. The text itself is a dialogue between Augustine and Evodius, written in the style of the
Platonic dialogues, with Augustine playing the role of Socrates. Although in this text Augustine
is mostly interested in presenting a theodicy, he also provides a very clear and simple version of
what constitutes moral evil, or sin. In the first chapter of the dialogue Evodius introduces the
concept of sin when he asks “It seems that no one could sin unless he had first learned how to
sin. And if that is the case, I must ask this: From whom did we learn to sin?”9 Augustine explains
that since evil is nothing then when we sin, or do evil, we are involved in the process of turning
away from the good. In the first place, the word sin is used to define the kinds of evil actions
which people intentionally commit. The words evil deeds, evil acts, and sins all mean the same
thing, and Augustine explains that the best understanding of evil is to be found in the notion of
libido.10 Thomas Williams, the translator for this text, informs us that there is no suitable English
word for the Latin term libido, but the best translation he can offer is that sin is inordinate
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desire.11 Augustine further explains that evil is inordinate desire for those things that you can
lose against your will.12 Sin is not dependent on the consequences of my actions, or even the
kinds of actions I take. Rather sin is the result of my psychology; it comes from what I want and
how I let those wants direct my actions. I sin, that is, I do an evil deed, based on the intent or
desire behind my deed rather than the merit of the deed itself. The significance of my will is very
profound here, since Augustine will lay the blame for sin firmly on the person who has such
inordinate desires. This could only be possible if our will was free and if we are thus free to
choose to sin or not to sin. Though in this sense what we are free to choose is not our actions, so
much as the objects of our desires. That is, freedom consists in choosing the object to which I
will intentionally extend my affections, and sin occurs when I have extended my affections
inappropriately.
Augustine writes on how the problem of sin is most keenly felt whenever we direct our
affections towards temporal bodily things, rather than eternal mental things. “Then it is clear that
some human beings love eternal things while others love temporal things; and we have also
found that there are two laws, one eternal and one temporal….”13 Augustine argues that those
who live morally, love the laws, since those laws enable them to live as they do, and what they
love best is the eternal and unchangeable law. In Augustine’s Confessions he shows his platonic
roots when he explains that what is at stake in loving the temporal over the eternal is actually
loving the physical world more than one loves God.
But in our quest of all these things, we must not depart from You, Lord, or deviate from
your Law. This life we live here below has its own attractiveness, grounded in the
measure of beauty it has and its harmony with the beauty of all lesser things…Yet in the
enjoyment of all such things we commit sin if through immoderate inclination to them –
for though they are good, they are of the lowest order of good – things higher and better
are forgotten, even You, O Lord our God, and Your Truth and Your Law.14
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This passage contains all of the key insights from On Free Choice of the Will, and adds a very
vital element in the form of the proper object of our desire. Augustine explains that the things we
encounter in the world are good, after their fashion, but they are of a lower order of goods. There
is nothing evil in wealth, sex, food and drink, or the society of others in and of themselves. Evil,
or sin, enters into the picture when I desire any of these lower order, temporal, goods more than
the higher order, eternal, goods. The eternal law makes an appearance as one of the higher goods,
and yet it is subordinate to the highest good of all, God Himself. The proper object of our love,
and the proper end of all of our desires should be God. God’s eternal law exists primarily as the
most helpful guide to a true and genuine love of God Himself. God is the proper object of our
desire, and all actions we take must be motivated by a love of God as the highest, greatest, and
most important good.
For Augustine, then, morality exists as a system of hierarchies and priorities. The good
Christian need not hate the beautiful lower order temporal goods of the world. After all these
things have a value and a purpose, and they are good insofar as they are God’s creations. The
temporal goods only become harmful and cause us to sin when we love them as though they
were eternal. Our problem then is that we love them with the fear that we will lose them, and
thus our actions are dominated by fear, suspicion, anxiety, and desperation. However, if we love
God and His law, then we will use the things of the world for their right purposes.15 The basic
moral principle is that sin is a matter of intention, and that what is good or bad has everything to
do with the object of our desire. Augustine claims that our actions are motivated by our loves and
desires, rather than any rational principles. Even when we are doing good actions and behaving
rationally, it is only because in a more basic way we are directing our love towards God and His
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perfect eternal law. Now beyond the basic natural morality of properly loving God, there is a
secondary morality based on the customs and traditions of one’s society.
In the Confessions, Augustine draws a further distinction between the natural moral law
and customary moral law. Although the natural law of God always stands as the most significant
law, it is still possible to sin by breaking the laws of society. “In no time or place could it be
wrong for a man to love God with his whole heart…and his neighbor as himself. Therefore those
sins which are against nature…are in all times and places to be detested and punished.”16
Augustine argues that there are sins which are wrong universally because the motivations for
such sins are a violation of the God-designed human nature. Again, that which defines an act as a
sin for Augustine is not so much what I do, but rather the internal psychological motivations I
have in doing it. “Actions which are against the customs of human societies are to be avoided
according to the varieties of such customs; so that which is agreed upon by the custom, or
decreed by the law, of state or people, is not to be violated at the mere pleasure whether of
citizen or alien.”17 In contrast to sinning against God, sinning against society is relative to the
laws and customs of that society. Augustine declares that the laws of a society ought to rule over
everyone within the bounds of that community, whether they are citizens or aliens. The
fundamental principle which justifies these laws of society is the notion of harmony. “For every
part is defective that is not in harmony with the whole.”18 Augustine also says that sins against
society are motivated by, “complete contempt of the existing order of society…”19 To sin against
the customs and laws of society is sin, precisely because in so doing a person asserts their own
significance over the greater significance of a unified and just society. Augustine will also claim
that there is a problem with any social customs which violate the natural law of God. Augustine
clearly places an emphasis on the significance of the proper love and devotion to God, and God’s
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laws and reasons, above any other affiliation. Yet where there is no conflict one should also
follow the laws of society. It is possible that Augustine makes too little of the lack of conflict
between sins against God and sins against society. He claims that God’s laws are always to be
held as more important, and yet the absolute devotion to a love of God may in fact put one at the
greatest odds with society.
Augustine describes the notion of sin as a matter of proper love, but he also distinguishes
between sins against God and sins against society. To sin against God would be to commit a sin
that violates the sacred sphere of God’s direction and is thus religious in nature. This sin occurs
whenever I love those lesser things, though they are good in their way, more than I love God.
The sin against God occurs whenever I allow my inordinate desire to distract me from proper
love of God and into an improper love of lesser goods. Yet when I sin against society I do not
love some lesser goods more than I love society, though it is easy to see how that may be
possible in cases like theft or murder. Sins against society violate the social sphere which
involves my direct interactions with the lives of those humans with whom I have to live. These
social sins disrupt the lives of my neighbors and the ordained structure of society, but because
they are not violations of God’s natural laws then they are not religious sins. Instead the sin
against society is essentially one where I elevate my own importance over and against the
importance of maintaining unity within society.
Given the delineation of Augustine’s concept of sin before us, how does that concept
apply to the issues of whiteness and enframing? To answer this, it is important to determine
whether or not whiteness and enframing vis-à-vis sin has a social or religious dimension.
Certainly, Augustine thinks that the worst dimension is sin against God. However, insofar as a
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society is able to function, where all of its inhabitants do not share the same religion, the second
view of sin as the violation of social unity may, at first, be more applicable.
So, the important questions is: “In what sense can racism be seen as a sin against
society?” This is a rather thorny problem, especially if society depends on certain racial
categories for its cohesion in the first place. The majority of the ruling parties in the societies of
Europe and America don’t see racism as a sin throughout much of their development in the
seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. As a way of avoiding the claim that race brings
with it a form of social sin, one might argue that the concept of race began as a pragmatic
building block of social identity, as a way of making sense of human beings within their diverse
phenotypic appearances. However, the concept of race was never quite free of value-laden
assumptions, assumptions that imperiled and threatened that same society. Recall that the
greatest danger posed by whiteness is how it makes us unable to see a world as anything other
than racialized through its own lens. In politically, economically, and aesthetically structuring a
society where whiteness is the norm, whiteness sins against all of the members of that society,
even those considered to be white. It creates an arbitrary category of white supremacy, against
which everyone is judged and by which everyone is harmed. The Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.
held to this idea and expressed it clearly in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail. “Moreover, I am
cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and
not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of
destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”20 The standard of whiteness is used
by police officers to evaluate the “perceived threat” of non-white bodies. It is used by security
and military forces to evaluate the “perceived threat” of foreign, though essentially still non-
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white, bodies. It is deployed as the social standard for economic success and used to criminalize
poverty and dehumanize the poor as “lazy” and “useless.” Whiteness is a sin against the entire
society which miserably carries it forward. It brings harm in political practice, foreign policies,
and economic policies. Whiteness asserts its own importance over the benefit and well-being of
all of those non-white members of society. Whiteness is far from harmonizing with the whole of
society, and though it seems integral to the history of society it continues to persist in a way that
damages and destroys social cohesion and unity.
Judith Butler brilliantly sums up the devastating impact that Black people experience
within the context of anti-Black racism, or where whiteness is the norm.
When we are taking about racism, and anti-black racism in the United States, we have to
remember that under slavery black lives were considered only a fraction of a human life,
so the prevailing way of valuing lives assumed that some lives mattered more, were more
human, more worthy, more deserving of life and freedom, where freedom meant
minimally the freedom to move and thrive without being subjected to coercive force. But
when and where did black lives ever really get free of coercive force? One reason the
chant “Black Lives Matter” is so important is that it states the obvious but the obvious
has not yet been historically realized. So it is a statement of outrage and a demand for
equality, for the right to live free of constraint, but also a chant that links the history of
slavery, of debt peonage, segregation, and a prison system geared toward the
containment, neutralization and degradation of black lives, but also a police system that
more and more easily and often can take away a black life in a flash all because some
officer perceives a threat.21
According to the United States Census Bureau, as of 2013 twenty-two percent of Americans
were non-white.22 Of that twenty-two percent, over half were classified as African-American.23
Those numbers make up a statistically significant portion of the population. Yet in a nation
dominated by whiteness and anti-black racism, the lives of that group are seen as less valuable
than the lives of the other seventy-eight percent. One could be tempted to assert that there is no
real sin in white racism since the majority of people, at least in the United States, are white, and
thus the majority of that society is not harmed by this. However, even if one could so easily
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dismiss almost a quarter of the population as insignificant, which would be sinful in and of itself,
it is ludicrous to argue that whiteness does not harm those people who are considered to be
white.
It is immensely psychologically damaging to be raised in a world where one is
systematically taught that human lives do not have value if they are of the wrong “race.”
Although the psychological damage of whiteness sustained by white people is not equivalent to
the physical and psychological damage sustained by non-whites, the damage to white people is
still a relevant issue. Whenever a society has evolved to suit an arbitrary power structure like
race, this often goes hand in hand with other damaging power structures. Add to this the hazards
of becoming white through cultural indoctrination, and the risk of discovery for those who can
pass for white, then one comes to realize that many of those seventy-eight percent had to pay a
high price to “become” white. That price was their heritage, history, ancestry, family, religion,
culture, and language. As an example of this price I will once again share a personal story related
to how whiteness affects the use of non-white language.
One aspect of the price of whiteness is the often subtle complicity white people have in
dehumanizing and degrading non-whites. Some years ago, my partner and I had sat down to have
dinner in a restaurant. This particular eatery was situated in a small city in East Texas, and that
particular evening it had a small crowd of patrons. While I was sitting in the dining room, I
happened to glance toward the kitchen. An employee had just walked through the door to the
kitchen so I could see several signs posted on the inside of the kitchen door. These signs faced
the kitchen and they would ordinarily not be seen by the customers except when someone briefly
left the kitchen and entered the dining area. I thought nothing of this arrangement until I noticed
one sign in particular. The largest sign, placed most centrally on the door, written in large capital
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letters simply read: NO SPEAKING SPANISH BEYOND THIS POINT. The situation so
unnerved me that I felt compelled to seek some advice on the matter. In an e-mail explaining
what had occurred, George Yancy wrote,
When I read your message, I thought of Sara Ahmed's works, especially her work around
space and race. I agree with you. It is a very problematic sign. To get a feel for this, just
imagine that you were Latino(a). Imagine how alienating this would feel, how you would
feel unwanted and undesirable. It is a form of dehumanization. It is also a way of policing
space. And it is a way of marking Spanish as that which does not belong in this
(white) space. The sign communicated that while in "this space," you might as well leave
yourself out. To belong, you must negate and an important part of yourself.
Presumably, the sign was written to those who are already passing. It was written for those who
can speak English, and who are going to work in that white space. Thus it was written for those
who have become white, and who must be reminded that the price of becoming white is the loss
of a form of speech. It is the censoring of language in an effort to create a space for those who
are white to be free of all that is non-white. Yet that sign does not merely harm those who are
passing, it also harms all the “white” customers by creating an artificial space which diminishes
and denigrates important members of their society. It creates the illusion of living in a “white”
America, free from the perceived “menace” of Spanish speaking immigrants. My partner and I
left and did not return to that restaurant, though I was haunted by the fact that I had been
complicit. I had participated in the whites-only space of the restaurant by patronizing them. In
that situation, my white, English speaking presence served as the model for the world of the
customer. I exemplified and instantiated that whites-only space even if I did so without any
malice, and even if I attempted to correct the mistake by avoiding that restaurant in the future.
Whiteness is clearly damaging to non-whites, and although the harm is different and lesser it also
damages those who identify as white. If the whole of society is damaged by a basic social
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institution then it should be clear at this point that whiteness constitutes a sin against society, but
it remains to be seen how whiteness can be a sin against God.
Whiteness is also a sin in the religious sense, and the initial problem that this poses
concerns the notion of God. For Augustine, sin is ultimately an offense against God, and a
misdirected love towards lesser entities which are not as deserving as God. However, one need
not establish God’s reality in order to understand the potency of racism as a religious sin.
Without making recourse to any particular set of theological teachings it will suffice to say that
racism presents a sin against the universe itself as unknown or mysterious. Even Carl Sagan, a
notable atheist and astronomer, understood the universe as a great and unknown entity. “The
Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be. Our feeblest contemplations of the Cosmos stir
us — there is a tingling in the spine, a catch in the voice, a faint sensation of a distant memory,
as if we were falling from a great height. We know we are approaching the greatest of
mysteries.”24 What Sagan is describing is the importance of humans gaining knowledge about
the world in which we live. This sentiment is also echoed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, when
Nietzsche proclaims that if God is dead there would still be a mistake to be made by “sinning
against the earth.”25 Nietzsche is arguing against any human attempt to seek out the mysteries of
some unknowable God and Sagan is arguing that the only unknown worth investigating is the
Cosmos, the world as we can know it through science. Yet even the Atheist can see that racism
presents a kind of sin against the cosmos, especially insofar as it makes it impossible to know
what it really means to be human.
Part of the trouble inherent in the racial categories is the need to bring the objects,
entities, and beings in the world under an absolute system of categorization. As has already been
observed, Cornel West directly links the problem of racism to the scientific need to categorize
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and order the natural world.26 Rather than letting the entities in the world stand, or be as they are
as Heidegger might say, this revolution demands that the world submit to certain categories and
methodology. In this context, whiteness take on the character of a religious sin because it
proceeds from a place of arrogant domination over the entirety of the human world. Racism
makes the unreasonable demand that the human should be available to the categories of race as a
transparent object of inquiry. That is the human must always have a racial identity and there is no
possibility of being human without being raced. However, the goal here is not to demonize
science, though as West points out there are serious implications of Euro-centrism within the
scientific method itself. Rather, the point of this inquiry is to shed light on the idea that race is a
sin in the religious sense because it misdirects and reorders the human. It makes a claim to a
power and an idolatrous authority over human beings by forcing each of us to conform to its
arbitrarily created categories. By the creation and maintenance of whiteness as the transcendental
norm, race takes on the character of an offense against the Cosmos. Whether or not there is a
God to be offended by racism, the Cosmos itself is pushed and harmed by being forcibly
remanded into these arbitrary racial categories. These categories cover up and conceal what we
might otherwise be able to learn about our genetic heritage, our ancestral past, or even our
human evolution. Thus the truth of our nature which is contained in the Cosmos is lost, and the
Cosmos is represented in a false and broken fashion. The sin here is not so much the harm that
racism does to humanity, but the very notion that racism sets itself over humanity as an authority
and in so doing greatly limits human freedom, creativity, and our interrelatedness to other
humans.
This religious sin would ordinarily go by the name of idolatry, for it is as an idol and a
poor substitute that race stands in place of genuine knowledge of the human condition.
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Whiteness obfuscates genuine knowledge and involves an epistemology of ignorance where
whiteness qua ignorance actively militates against an accurate understanding of the world. This
sin even goes so far as to drive a wedge between humans and other creatures by creating not only
the idol of whiteness, but also the idol of the “natural human being” as an ideal white male. Race
becomes an idol which denies the revealed mystery of the diversity of human appearances and
experiences. It reduces all such experiences to the categories of white, which stands as the idol of
the human, and non-white, which stands as the idol of the inhuman. Indeed the only real category
left for humans to inhabit, who will not or cannot inhabit the racial type of the “human being as
white”, is to be reduced to the level of the sub-human. Thus the long history of racism also
includes the constant dehumanization of black bodies, and the reduction of that which is human
to that which is bestial. Indeed this is precisely what Herder does when he attempts to make
sense of the “over-sexualization” of the African race.27 According to Herder that race which is
naturally lacking in intellect, the intellect being the mark of true humanity, is more naturally
gifted in sexuality. Herder describes how the increased fertility of the African race makes
Africans into sexually driven subhuman animals. One might say, especially given how Black
women were exploited under American slavery, that they were treated as reproductive machines.
In his attempts to praise the Africans, he reduces them to nature, a kind of natural, primitive, and
exotic landscape against which whiteness stands. The idol of whiteness stands supreme among
all racial categories as it sets the image in which humans are to be re-made. Yet by worshipping
and reinforcing this idol, we sin against the cosmos and lose our ability to truly know the human.
Although humans have a miraculous ability to dwell and thrive in all the corners of the earth,
whiteness twists and distorts this success. It was not accidental that Europeans exported their art,
architecture, language, and economy to all the parts of the world they colonized. Wherever white
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colonizers encountered a non-white space that place became a New Amsterdam, or a New
Jersey, and then the colonizers went about converting the land and resources into something
which resembled their Old world counterparts. Yet these moves destroy and obscure all the
knowledge we might gain about those rare forms of people who were able to more peacefully
coexist with their environment. The knowledge that the cosmos may have offered is now lost and
irretrievable. In its place stands the human world which whiteness has given us instead.
Whiteness attempts everywhere to reconstitute the meaning of the “human,” and, hence, the
meaning of the “subhuman,” through the image of European civilization and technology.
Since the colonization would have been incomplete without the technology to convert
that world into its white ideal, then it seems that we must now consider how technology itself is a
sin. It might make sense to start with the idea of technology as a religious sin, since technology
seems most directly pitted against the natural world. In remembering how handwork technology
approaches the entities in the world, Rojcewicz reminds us that the four causes oblige us to the
natural world.28 Ancient technology does the work of letting that which is already present in
nature come forth on its own into the light of human understanding and everyday life. Heidegger
claims that what ancient technology mimics is simply the natural tendency of the physical world
to reveal itself. The flower blooms, the egg hatches and both cases show how the world of
nature, the world of physis, reveals itself in its own time as it chooses.29 In a way that is reverent
and respectful of the natural order, the work of handcraft technology effects an indirect
revelation through the basic assistance of the human crafter.30 This respect for the order of nature
takes on the character of a religious reverence and, as Rojcewicz claims, a sense of piety.
Yet the work of modern technology, in the strongest sense possible, manifests itself in
opposition to piety; it takes on the character of religious sin. Rather than allowing the natural
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world to stand forth as it is, modern technology performs the act of forcing and challenging
nature to yield energy. 31 Thus, modern technology destroys any semblance of natural order, and
it displays no reverence or respect. In that sense, modern technology also presents itself as a kind
of idolatry. All the world must be made to serve the idols of productivity and “progress,” and all
nature must be subjected to the endless drive for more and more power. Rather than approaching
the world as an entity deserving of respect and consideration, the modern technological attitude
replaces that world with the concept of Bestand. As Rojcewicz has explained, the things in the
world have become not just consumable but ultimately disposable.32 When this happens, the
world itself and all entities within it become disposable. What once inspired reverence now
inspires greed. The sense of religious sin which prevailed in the discussion of race seems to be
just as applicable to the concept of modern technology. We also recall that humanity narrowly
escapes becoming altogether disposable at least insofar as humans are necessary to drive the
work of ordering and revealing the world. Yet this escape is no real victory. It is the illusion of
our freedom which most directly proves that modern technology is not just a religious sin, but
also a social one.
When modern technology begins to make the claim of mastery over and against human
beings, by ordering us to order the world, then we see how it is also a social sin. Though we
believe ourselves to be in charge of technological progress, it is the cultural attitude of the
enframing which drives us to the work of ordering the world as disposable. Now technology
certainly poses a threat to human beings in terms of causing environmental destruction,
producing and using weapons of modern warfare, and the increase of social alienation created by
rampant information technology. Yet, as has been said before, the real danger posed to humanity
is that the enframing will limit us in terms of framing the world as a resource, or as something to
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be exploited. This profound limitation forebodes an end to history and the inevitable capitulation
of human beings into the ordering of technology which they so precariously seek to master.
Heidegger explains that the risk to humanity is that we will become lost to ourselves, and end up
given over entirely to the brute domination of the attitude of enframing.33
Has this project now become a sermon instead of a philosophical inquiry? In an effort to
address the problems of whiteness and enframing have I created fantastic myths where there
were once clear philosophical categories? To be fair, Heidegger uses similarly judgmental
language in his estimation of the dangers posed by technological enframing. Cornel West uses
similarly extreme, and also religiously laden, language in his estimation of the threats posed by
racism and white supremacy. Richard Rojcewicz frames the question and significance of
Heidegger’s critique of technology within the context of language about piety and proper
reverence. Certainly my project is not alone in its use of such language, and indeed this language
serves a dual purpose. First, religious language serves to emphasize the existential and ethical
nature of the problems of whiteness and enframing. Second, a turn to religious language provides
the final connection between whiteness and enframing which will make us ready to see their root
cause through an analysis of technoracism.
First my use of religious language illustrates the need for a decisive ethical treatment of
the problems posed by this philosophical inquiry. There is a great temptation to treat that which
is complex as being beyond the mundane. Thus, one may carelessly discuss the historical
ramifications of civil rights laws, or concerns about race wars in an academic context which can
so easily forget about the impact of those ideas. It can be all too easy to think and write about
how the political philosophy of Manifest Destiny created conflicts between European and Native
Americans, as though the whole topic was merely an answer to a question on a quiz. When we
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do this, and when we slip so casually into this style of abstraction and contemplation we lose the
horrifying simplicity of the topic. We forget that people died. We forget that people were
horribly mutilated by weapons that were designed for maximum technical efficiency in snuffing
out human life. We lose the sense of horror, misery, fear, and anxiety which ought to accompany
these considerations. In that sense then the point of the language of sin is to return us to the
inescapably existential nature of these problems. I do not claim that sin is the only way to
express this problem, nor is it the final way, but it is a way and that way does open up interesting
possibilities for our future. It is intended to shake us out of the comfort of intellectual distance
and bring us head on into the collision that is technoracism. In that sense, my project is an
existential one and my use of religion is intended to create a kind of moral aesthetic.
A very good example of the kind of moral aesthetic I intend here can be seen when one
watches films about the struggles with racism in America. Beautiful and compelling cinematic
feats like Selma or Twelve Years a Slave draw us into to a confrontation with racism. These films
take historical or literary license and they are clearly intended to dramatize rather than to merely
inform. In a sense, these works are intended to inculcate a kind of bias in the viewer, although
that bias exists to counter the danger of polite complicity in social indifference. It is hard to
watch a black woman being whipped, even if you try to tell yourself that these are actors who are
merely pretending. The violence and visceral nature of the scene sticks in your mind in a way
that does not let you easily return to the world where you try to tell yourself that such practices
are historically bygone events, and thus no longer relevant. In the same way my use of religious
language is not meant to compel a person into any specific religious stance, but instead to convey
my own moral aesthetic. So in the first place what I am doing is removing the discussion of
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whiteness and enframing from its comforting intellectual underpinnings in an effort to shake us
into a moral confrontation.
Second, my use of religious language serves to demonstrate how intensely joined the
problems of whiteness and enframing are. In conducting a genealogy, I showed how the problem
of race developed in a historical context. I also demonstrated how race attempts to present itself
as a minor everyday problem about identity, but how this hides the deeper problem of whiteness
as racism. Ultimately, my goal was to demonstrate that the greatest danger posed by whiteness as
racism was the reduction of all human identity into a racially stratified one where whiteness
serves as the invisible standard. In bridging the gap between a discussion of whiteness and
enframing, I investigated how Sheth argues that race is produced as a tool of political power.
Then in discussing Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, I investigated how Heidegger
performs his own genealogy which differentiates handwork, or ancient, technology and machinepowered, or modern, technology. In the analysis of Heidegger, we once again saw the same
layered structure as we encountered with the problem of race. Technology presents itself as an
everyday problem of proper use, but the deeper problem of technology is the attitude of
enframing which orders the entire world as mere resource. This leads to the realization that the
greatest danger of the enframing is that human beings will be forced to only ever see and
produce a world of mere resources. With both whiteness and enframing, the supreme danger is
our blindness to the cultural attitude which is actually dominating, controlling, and even creating
our lives. We are somehow unable to see or understand how race is a concept which whiteness
both creates and denies just as we are unable to see that technology really means the enframing.
Both problems have the same three fold structure, and the idea that race can be produced as a
kind of tool begins to open us up to the possibility of understanding something more. When we
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finally add the realization that whiteness and enframing operate as religious sins of idolatry and
social sins which harm even those who think they benefit, then we are finally ready to
understand why these problems are so connected.
As a sin of idolatry both of these forces assert themselves as supreme, in a sense they
assert their divinity. Yet whether there is a divine or not these concepts claim more than is their
due and they attempt to shove out every other mode of knowing the world. As a sin against
society, whiteness and enframing damage the unity of society by creating internal strife where
groups of people are arbitrarily pitted against each other in a bid for control and domination.
Although these concepts do favor certain groups over others, they nonetheless damage everyone
by destroying any potential peace and harmony. By looking at whiteness and enframing through
the lens of sin we see that they operate in the same fashion. The problems of the enframing and
whiteness are manifestations of an underlying cultural attitude, the attitude of technoracism. This
attitude is the fundamental cultural attitude which holds sway in our contemporary society.
Whether or not it is a necessary and objective feature of the universe, though, remains to be
demonstrated. We now turn to an understanding of the definition, limitations, and ideas to which
this attitude gives rise.

128

Chapter 6 – Technoracism
“We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the selfrevealing as standing reserve,” technoracism.1 This modification of Heidegger’s introduction to
the notion of the enframing opens us up to the possibility of thinking through the cultural attitude
which underlies both whiteness and enframing. Up till now this dissertation has focused on the
ways in which racism as whiteness poses a problem and the ways in which modern technology as
the enframing presents a problem. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that there exists a cultural
attitude, which I name technoracism, which exists prior to whiteness and enframing.2
Technoracism allows for, and facilitates, the emergence of both whiteness and the enframing as
cooperative mechanisms for creating and enforcing a political power structure. That power
structure is a European cultural dominance which eventually gives rise to a broader Western
cultural dominance.
It is important to understand that this attitude in one sense exists prior to the structures, of
whiteness and enframing, and calls them into being as the consequence of the effects of
technoracism. For example, Francois Bernier did not invent the notion of race, and indeed the
word itself was already in use prior to his writing. According to the Oxford English dictionary,
the English word for race likely comes from the French word rasse, which is first used around
1480 to designate a “group of people connected by common descent.” It may have also
originated from the Italian word razza which was in use even earlier, around 1388, to designate a
species or kind.3 Prior to an intellectual or philosophical understanding that the world could be
raced, the idea of race already existed in the late medieval French and Italian cultures. Indeed,
prior to the industrial revolution there already existed the scientific revolution which had made
such technology possible. Heidegger explains that even though machine power technology
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comes about nearly two hundred years after the advent of modern physics, it is the essence of
technology, as enframing, which makes the science possible in the first place.4 This chapter will
explore the definition, origin, and limitations of the cultural attitude of technoracism as a way
toward the possibility of an ethical solution to that same attitude.
In this chapter, I argue that technoracism is a cultural attitude which is prior to whiteness
and enframing. I begin by defining the idea of a cultural attitude via Heidegger’s notion of
Geschick. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both
rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I also
investigate the idea of the cultural attitude by looking at how Cornel West and Fred Evans
discuss the notions of white supremacy and oracular voices respectively. I then argue that
technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural attitude which
underlies both whiteness and enframing. In order to clearly demonstrate this, I will turn to an
investigation of the historical and cultural forces which are found at the origins of technoracism.
Such a cultural attitude comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of
the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Technoracism is ultimately defined by the
three main characteristics of violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute subjectivism.
These characteristics are historically instantiated through a shared Christian European cultural
identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the supreme
value of the individual. In my analysis of the elements of technoracism, I show that an ethical
resolution must involve discourse and direct action and this in turn leads to a virtue ethics.
I begin by defining the notion of a cultural attitude itself in Heidegger’s notion of
Geschick, or destining. Heidegger explains that the enframing, as the essence of modern
technology, is just such a destining. “The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way
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of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing
reserve. ‘To start upon a way’ means ‘to send’ in our ordinary language. We shall call that
sending that gathers…which first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining [Geschick].”5
According to Heidegger, it is a destining which determines the possible ways that history may be
enacted. This destining is what sets up the possibility for historical events by setting out the
conditions which allow ideas and modes of existence to rise and fall in prominence and
significance. Rojcewicz adds that this notion of destiny is a fundamental aspect of our identity as
humans. “What we are destined to do, most fundamentally, is to look upon beings as a whole in a
certain way. This – the way we understand what it means to be in general – is the foundation for
any further vocation we may have.”6 The way that we are given to look upon these beings is our
destining, it is what I am calling our cultural attitude, and this cultural attitude is technoracism.
The most definitive aspect of what it means to be human is how we understand the things in the
world, and ourselves, through a kind of overarching concept or set of concepts. This field of
ideas is our destiny as humans since it is this way of thinking and knowing which determines the
possible ways that we understand ourselves and everything in the world. Thus we are, in some
sense, meant to live in the world in a way that is given to us by our destiny. The realm of any
particular human society is fixed by how that society understands the objects in the world. Thus
when we understand objects in the world as standing reserve then our destiny, and that which
most particularly characterizes the historical moment in which we find ourselves, is the
enframing. Thus far we have been focusing on the destining that leads to enframing, and to be
sure non-European cultures and societies experienced other destinings. Yet it is also clear that
the European destiny was not always the enframing.
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This also opens us up to the possibility that there have been other destinies in human
history, and that there may be other destinies in our future. While our technological age is
dominated by the destiny of the enframing, at one point we were dominated by the destiny of
monotheism. Certainly we can extend this concept over the European period of history known as
the Middle Ages. We can then see that the most transformative and powerful ideas that
dominated in that period were the doctrines of the monotheistic religions. We are free to see this
even without an in-depth study of that period of history. Almost all of the major historical events
in the Middle Ages, or medieval period, in Europe were dominated by the conflicts between, and
supremacy of, the newly emergent monotheistic religions. Catholic Christianity initially emerges
out of the diminishing Roman Empire as the force which unites Europe and gives it a shared
cultural identity.7 The rise of the Islamic Empire and the Muslim conquest of North Africa and
Spain brought the established Christian world into conflict with the newly emergent Muslim
world. The Crusades were driven by Christian ideologies and countered by a unified Muslim
ideology.8 Even the Black Death was understood as punishment from God, and the disease
prompted religiously motivated violence against non-Christians in many parts of Europe.9 Of
course it can be argued that the historical events of the Middle Ages were driven by many other
factors besides religion. However as an example of an idea which lends itself to a complete
cultural understanding of the world and the events within it, the Monotheism of the Middle Ages
is a stellar choice.
Then it seems that the cultural attitude of technoracism first emerges into European
society in a subtle but powerful fashion, and then becomes manifested through the dangers of
whiteness and enframing. To demonstrate this we can for now look at how whiteness progresses.
The danger of whiteness first becomes visible in the early use of the idea of race, and as
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Europeans grow accustomed to the use of this idea it becomes formalized by thinkers like
Bernier, Blumenbach, and Kant. Yet while race is becoming discursively formalized in one part
of Europe it is already being actively put to use in other parts to enact and drive colonialism and
the slave trade. As European society develops so also does race in terms of how it is thought and
how it is enacted, and while race develops so also does the deeper problem of race, whiteness.
Race is always the visible face of whiteness, and whiteness remains elusive and concealed. Yet
when whiteness is brought to light and society threatens to undo it altogether, whiteness survives
by redefining itself and evading sight behind a new discourse on race. So it is even in our own
society that we are quite aware of how race enacts a rationale which is public and
understandable, but at the same time is simply a concealment of the true nature of race as
whiteness.
However, the notion of a cultural attitude conveys more than can be defined by rational
or systematic thought. Rather, there is something that is exchanged and communicated through
the structure of technoracism which is more of a passive kind of feeling than an active, or
directed, thought. That feeling might be better explained when we understand that a system like
technoracism, or monotheism, has both discursive and non-discursive elements.
It is in the writings of Cornel West that we encounter this dichotomy of the discursive
and the non-discursive. In looking at the emergence of white supremacist racism as a dominating
system of our modern age, West offers the idea of modern discourse as a way to understand that
emergence. He found the attitude which will give rise to racism already present even before the
white supremacist practices brought the categories of race into being. Whiteness in some way
precedes the notion of race because“…in the very structure of modern discourse at its inception
produced forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity as well as aesthetic and cultural ideals
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which require the constitution of the idea of white supremacy.”10 Just like the enframing, West’s
concept of white supremacy operates as a destiny for how Europeans come to see themselves and
everyone else in the world. West furthers this by demonstrating how the idea of white supremacy
is so dominating that it excludes any sort of alternative discourse about “black equality in beauty,
culture, and intellectual capacity.”11 Whiteness so dominates the entire mode of thinking that it
comes to be synonymous with thinking itself; while relegating Blackness or Brownness
exclusively to the domain of body. It sets the limits and boundaries for what is knowable and
known.
This is not the same thing as saying that an individual person is automatically beautiful or
ugly, since the cleverness of such discourse also allows for individuals who are exceptional
members of their groups. It allows for the African who may be brilliant, according to the white
standard of brilliance, and it also allows for the European who may be ugly, but he will be ugly
according to the black standard for ugliness. Though it must also be added that the brilliance of
the brilliant African can be downplayed, diminished, or eliminated altogether by reaffirming that
this brilliance must be evidence of some bizarre anomaly at best or at worst some hint of
miscegenation. “The concrete effects of this exclusion and the intellectual traces of this silence
continue to haunt the modern West: on the non-discursive level, in ghetto streets, and on the
discursive level, in methodological assumptions in the disciplines of the humanities.”12 West
here opens us to the realization that certain modes of discourse operate to create these structured
ways of living and thinking, but this also involves that which is not discursive. Also the modern
discourse which clarifies the various races must in some way precede the formalization of those
races, since it makes them possible. This modern discourse itself proceeds from the essence of
race as whiteness, but since whiteness is not the beginning of all things then it too must proceed
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from an earlier movement. Yet if whiteness arises from the discursive and non-discursive, then
perhaps there is a more fundamental way of thinking about it. Thus far we have looked at three
different kinds of destinings and discourses which have shaped the history of humanity, the
enframing, monotheism, and whiteness. We will now turn to how each of these may be
considered a cultural attitude by investigating the influence of the non-discursive.
Although Heidegger and West are right that a cultural attitude is most often instantiated
through the practices of rational and systematic social institutions, there is an irrational side to
cultural attitudes. West hints at this irrational, or non-discursive side of modern discourse,
though if it is non-discursive then perhaps it makes more sense to talk about it in terms of that
which motivates discourse. In that sense, a cultural attitude is the source for the kinds of
discursive activities which we run into in society. It is more basic than the discursive forms of
domination, as it involves those aspects which are spoken as well as the unspoken.
A brilliant example of the way that the attitude involves both the spoken and the
unspoken side of these forms of cultural domination can be found in the concept of the oracular
voice in Fred Evans’ The Multivoiced Body.
...society is an interplay among voices, each of which resounds within the rest....Because
these voices are always 'in motion', that is exist as responses to one another, their
interrelationship is more aptly characterized as 'interplay'...This interplay among the
voices simultaneously keeps them separate and holds them together, that is, constitutes
them as a social body. It is for this reason that I refer to society as a multivoiced body and
contrast it with society as a univocal subject or a collection of individual subjects.13
According to Evans what constitutes a society is an ongoing and ever changing dialogue between
all of the constituent parts, individuals, and aspects of that society. Now this interplay of voices
occasionally creates a rising sense of anxiety and a fear that one may become overwhelmed by
the voices. This anxiety can move a society to repress its identity as multivoiced and raise one of
its voices to the level of the oracle. "Those supporting an oracle tend to accept other social
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discourses only insofar as they function in some technocratic or other way that helps reproduce
the society and its dominant discourse. The adherents of the oracle also designate certain other
voices as evil 'enemies'...(this) increases the acceptability of the oracles dominance of society."14
The oracular voice defines the same cultural force of domination as destining or modern
discourse. This includes the unspoken or non-discursive, precisely because the dogmatic
adherence to the oracular voice is irrational and often exists as an unquestioned norm. The
oracular voice is discursive, setting the terms for what discourse and visible exchange is possible
in society. Yet it is also non-discursive since it informs and guides the irrational, the active, and
the unspoken aspects of society. Evans even claims that one version of an oracular voice is
Heidegger’s notion of the enframing. The technological enframing reduces everything to the
order of standing reserve, and ultimately Heidegger sees the enframing as a kind of "omnipresent
framework within which we are destined to operate".15
In the very same section of his book, Evans also discusses the notion of whiteness as an
oracular voice. "Whiteness consists in the usually subconscious attitude that 'being white' is the
standard against which all other groups are to be measured."16 Yet the blaring voice of whiteness
finds that it has competition in the form of resistance to white norms. Not everyone in a society
dominated by whiteness will identify as white. We celebrate black history month during
February, we identify non-white elements of pop culture, and we readily identify very powerful
people, who are nonetheless not white. Even those who traditionally might identify as white in
many cases resist whiteness in both their everyday and political lives. "These observations
indicate that whiteness is not an omnipresent enclosure, but rather an oracle that furtively carries
within itself the increasingly strident voices of opposition to it."17 The resistance which
whiteness encounters serves to illustrate that whiteness does not exist as a completely discursive,
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nor completely overarching, power. Instead this oracular voice involves an aspect that is nondiscursively, or irrationally explicable given the nature of the voice itself. While whiteness as an
oracular voice operates through and as discourse, this discourse arises as a reaction to the nondiscursive. The non-discursive side includes the bodies of the people and the objects which
inform and make up society. Thus whiteness is as much a response to those bodies which fail to
fit its standards as it is the force which defines the standards of bodies in the first place. This
informs how we can come to understand the idea of the attitude as both discursive and nondiscursive.
If the rational side of a cultural attitude may be called the discursive, then the irrational
side may be called the non-discursive. The source for the non-discursive may be human
psychology, historical causality, or even the mysterious and the divine. The cultural attitude must
employ both the rational discursive and the irrational non-discursive as a means of establishing
itself. This irrationality is not merely a failure to be rational, such as one might find in the person
who willfully adopts new technologies without thinking. Nor is this to be found simply in an
attempt to be anti-rational, such as the person who clings to their racist bigotry despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In fact, the irrational side of the cultural attitude is best
understood as involving a kind of historical motion which precedes and defines even the
conditions for rationality. The non-discursive side of the cultural attitude exists at a formative
level of thinking which determines what ideas, methods, systems, experiences, appearances, and
entities will even count in the first place as sites of understanding. One way to unpack this is to
try to make sense of the extent that emotions, feelings, and psychology play in establishing the
conditions for the rational. Another way to understand this is to explain that each stage of human
history is conditioned to be what it is by the prior stage through a chain of causality. In reference
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to the schema that was introduced earlier one could argue that the non-discursive side of the
cultural attitude was formed by the discourse of a previous cultural attitude. Alternatively one
may seek for an explanation which goes beyond humans to the divine or the mysterious. Then
one might claim that the non-discursive side of the cultural attitude stems from God, or as
Heidegger seems to indicate, from Being itself. Rojcewicz explains this last possibility when he
writes, “What is primarily responsible for technology as an understanding of what it means to be
in general is the self-showing of the gods, the self-offering of Being…That is to say, humans, in
their disclosive looking, are the followers, and Being is the leader.”18 (To be sure, for Rojcewicz
this following and leading must be understood in a very nuanced sense.) To whatever extent we
think that the non-discursive comes from human psychology, historical causality, or the
mysterious and the divine, it remains clear enough that there is a non-discursive element to a
cultural attitude. This element sets the conditions for the rational side of discourse and allows for
the meaningful to be realized out of this unknown source. In laying out the definitions and
limitations of a cultural attitude we will always have some understanding of the discursive
methods which instantiate that attitude. Yet there will also remain, more or less hidden from
view, the non-discursive side which only reveals itself after a prolonged philosophical
investigation.
Now that we have defined the notion of a cultural attitude in general, it is important to
turn to an investigation of the discursive side of technoracism as the cultural attitude which
underlies both the enframing and whiteness. It might at first seem that we ought to continue to
treat these attitudes as separate, following the course of study we have laid out thus far.
However, what this project has so far revealed is that these two attitudes have an almost identical
structure. We have found their historical origins in the scientific categorizing of the seventeenth

138

and eighteenth centuries primarily in the works of European men. The enframing and whiteness
both present a kind of bland and innocuous everyday face which appears to do little more than
apply “neutral” categorizations to natural phenomena. Yet in both cases this everyday face serves
to do the work of concealing the totalizing truth of their nature as social and cultural forces for
absolute domination of the world and all of its entities. These structures are threatening to
humanity due to the violence which they both perpetuate, but even more so by annihilating all
competing ideas and structures. This destruction removes all other ways of seeing the world and
subordinates our understanding to these systems as ultimate and primary modes. Finally, both
whiteness and the enframing exist as sins in the social sense, where they cause harm against all
members of the population which fall under their hegemony. They are also sins in the religious
sense, since both seek to establish a domination over the mystery of the cosmos. These systems
set themselves up as superior, and the rationale of their processes will not tolerate any entity to
fall outside of their mastery. To sum up, both whiteness and enframing have this idea of mastery
in common, and both hide their mastery in the form of things proceeding as usual. They both
function as universal sites of domination, and both of them define the world in such a way that
we come to think that the world must be defined in that way as opposed to there being alternative
ways that the world can be defined
Now we have come to the crux of the matter, and the idea of technoracism hinges on the
following argument. The enframing and whiteness make absolute and totalizing claims which
seek to subordinate all human understanding unto themselves. Either there is a conflict between
these two attitudes, and one of them is supreme over the other, or there is only one attitude
present, of which both the enframing and whiteness are expressions or manifestations.
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Technological enframing is clearly not the proper name for this attitude, for if it were
then Heidegger would have understood that there is not some unknown future danger that
humans may become disposables. Rather he would have realized that European slavery had
already enacted this, and that the Nazi holocaust had been another clear example of it.
Heidegger’s bias and his own racism may have blinded him to this realization. Beyond this it is
clear enough that the enframing which reduces the world to resource already stems from a more
basic approach that reduces the world to the scientific category of the knowable and the not yet
known. That earlier reduction is predicated on the importance assigned to knowledge as a means
of gaining power over the world. Recall that long before the historical era of machine power
technology, Francis Bacon has already said that the aim of philosophy and science is “to give
humankind mastery over nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions.”19 Thus the
enframing cannot be the more basic of the two attitudes.
Yet whiteness is also insufficient to stand as the true cultural attitude which dominates all
in our age. Though it may be easy enough to see whiteness as dominating human affairs, yet
when it comes to the human attitude towards plants or non-human animals a different kind of
thinking appears to be employed. Although whiteness seems to proceed by dehumanizing the
non-white through the categorization of blackness, in fact it must proceed by this
dehumanization. That is, whiteness establishes the identity of human beings, white men, over
and against other beings which are deemed subhuman, non-white non-men. Yet this
accomplishment would have no meaning, fixity, or significance if the creation of white identity
was in opposition to the identity of a carrot. The notion of white identity as significant is caught
up in the notion of whiteness as supreme. The white is supposedly better than the black because
she exceeds her in all relevant activities such as speech, culture, and intellect. There would be no
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victory inherent in whiteness, and thus no certainty in the establishment of the white, without the
threat of competition. The black competes with the white for intellectual superiority, the Black
competes for athletic prowess, and the Black competes for political prominence. Of course, each
of these competitions has been defined by and for the white body. For proof of this, recall Robert
Fullinwider’s analogy of the land of giants.20 Thus the game is rigged, which means that even if
a non-white individual is to win, he must win by approximating and achieving the white
standard. However, even this sense of competition is part of the logic of whiteness, since it is
whiteness which creates the conditions that draw nonwhites into competition. If one places
oneself in the position of being supreme, then the other is always a potential threat to that
supremacy. Ultimately, the standard of whiteness retains little meaning beyond the sphere of
direct human interaction and comparison, and so it is not even as far reaching or as expansive as
the idea of the enframing.
This dilemma could be made even more problematic if we also considered that there are
other systems like sexism, Christian supremacy, or classism which vie for absolute control. To
even construct this dilemma we must restrict our investigation to the two notions which have so
far made this project what it is. The temptation is to say that there are innumerable competing
attitudes, all of which vie for supremacy. Yet that very notion of competition and supremacy
points to the realization that there exists some basic cultural attitude which underpins even our
ability to understand the various systems as battling for domination. More basic than sexism,
whiteness, or classism is the attitude which is comprised of supremacy, conflict, violence,
domination, silencing of the other, the advocating of self-importance, and the ability to objectify
and simultaneously create the self as subject. This attitude is what properly deserves the label of
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actually being our cultural attitude, technoracism, and all the other systems thus far investigated
should be understood as expressions, or manifestations, of that thinking.
This true cultural attitude I have defined by stipulating the term technoracism. This term
is not absolute, and in an obvious sense this term exists as a placeholder and a first attempt to
define something which is basic and essential to all the visible manifestations of this attitude.
The term itself, technoracism, has been crafted from a union of “technology” and “racism”, and
it illustrates the way in which the moral problem of racism proceeds from a more fundamental
and technical way of seeing the world. The prefix techno evokes a mode, and a way of seeing a
subject, and that subject is racism as whiteness. But this term also seeks to turn the analysis of
the problem of racism as whiteness, back against the structure which puts it into play, back
against that technical cultural attitude. Yet this attitude exists historically, and so to understand it
we must first investigate its origins. Technoracism is the cultural attitude which comes to
predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, roughly the late
sixteenth century. It is instantiated discursively by a shared Christian European cultural identity,
an emphasis on reason and universal categorization, and the assertion of the value of the subject
as individual. It is characterized by the non-discursive aspects of violent exclusivity, precise
particularity, and absolute subjectivism.
Since technoracism is ontologically prior to whiteness and the enframing then it should
be unsurprising that it shares a similar structure. The notion of the Christian European cultural
identity presents itself as the everyday aspect and the visible surface of technoracism. In its nondiscursive aspect Christian European Cultural identity is a force of violent exclusivity. Modern
Atheists and Marxists alike are quick to point out that the failings of modern society may all be
traced back to the dominance of the Christian religion over the development of western society.
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This accusation is not far off, even if it is too simplistic, for the appearance of technoracism first
shows up as the face of Christian Supremacy. Yet the deeper problem of technoracism is exposed
when one sees the disconnect that exists between medieval and modern Christianity. At the
advent of the modern age, and the dawn of technoracism, there is a different sort of character
operating through European Christian culture. The deeper problem of technoracism, and the
structure which lies below the face of Christian supremacy, is the emphasis on the universality of
categorization. In its non-discursive aspect this universality can be understood as a kind of overemphasis on precise particularity. The deeper problem is that the world, and everything in it,
should become always available to the gaze which seeks to define, categorize, and reduce all
things into terms and concepts which lend themselves to a sense of mastery. An insidious form
of absolute rationality dominates technoracism, but of a sort which seeks to convert the world
into concepts which can be mastered. However, the supreme danger of technoracism is not
simply that the world is everywhere forced to bend and be rationalized into a system of power.
Rather the supreme danger of technoracism is that in so categorizing the entities of the world
such that one may master them, we ultimately lose the world altogether and are left with only
ourselves. In discursive terms this is the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. In its
non-discursive form this proceeds from a place of paranoia which can only be resolved by an
absolute subjectivism. Much has been made of the subjectivist turn in philosophy, but in the
cultural attitude of technoracism the subjectivist turn is a turn towards an absolute subjectivity.
In the European quest to know the world and everything in it as it really is, and thus bring
everything under the power of European society, the Europeans lose the world entirely and are
left only with a hollow image of their own projected ego. By seeking to bring all truth under that
power they are ultimately left with a picture of the world which only ever sees the human.
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The non-discursive condition, that is the condition which exists outside of language and
reason, which most definitively stands at the basis of technoracism is that of violent exclusivity.
Violence has perhaps always been a part of human history, and violence has often been greatly
influential on human events. Though of course violence can be discursive, the condition of
violent exclusivity particularly denotes events and activities of a non-discursive nature. Warfare
is perhaps the clearest example of the effective nature of violence in forging culture, since
through the violence of warfare the other is annihilated and the identity of the self comes to the
fore. Yet it will not do to trace the entire history of violence in order to locate technoracism.
Instead, we must establish that a kind of violence was instrumental in creating a shared cultural
identity. Certainly, Europe was not always Europe, in the sense that the various nations, cultures,
languages, and peoples of Europe did not always understand themselves to be European, to be
white. George Fredrickson explains this in his book Racism: A Short History. “The notion that
there was a single pan-European or “white” race was slow to develop and did not crystallize until
the eighteenth century. Direct encounters with Africans had of course made Europeans aware of
their own light pigmentation, but in other contexts whiteness, as opposed to national and
religious affiliations, was not a conscious identity or seen as a source of specific inherited
traits.”21 To return to those religious affiliations then we can see that prior to the modern age, and
at the foundation of technoracism, lies Christian Supremacy.
Now Christianity did not immediately conquer Europe, nor was it always actively
engaged in warfare to conquer Europe. To be sure even the designation of “Christianity” is
riddled with doubt and uncertainty insofar as the key identifiers of the movement do not seem to
be clearly defined or always present. By the time of the rise of modernity, the time of the
enlightenment, it must be an undeniable fact that European cultural identity was completely
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intertwined with Christianity. In his work Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the
Middle Ages, Brett Whalen explains this complex picture of Christian supremacy.
In reality, regional diversity and political fragmentation characterized the Christian
territories of medieval Europe. The self-declared members of Christendom nevertheless
viewed themselves as a people unified through their shared faith, their use of Latin as a
sacred language, their mutual observance of religious rites, and their obedience to the
Roman papacy. Simply put, Christendom formed the “whole society of Latin Christians
and the lands they occupied.”22
What initially unifies Europe is a linguistic fact. In his book The First Thousand Years: A Global
History of Christianity, Robert Louis Wilken writes that it was Latin which created the cultural
foundations of Christianity. “What the syriac language was to Christians east of Jerusalem, Latin
was to Christians in the West. Its geographical reach…would bind the peoples living in
Germany, France, the Low Countries, Poland, Scandinavia, the British Isles, Spain, and Italy into
a distinctive Christian civilization that we know as Europe.”23 Wilken explains that the Latin
language came to dominate all intellectual, political, and religious life by the sixth century in
Southern Europe. He then details how the Latin missionaries carried their religion, and their
language, to Northern Europe. “A case can even be made that the great period of Christian
expansion in Europe did not come to an end until the fourteenth century, when Jogaila, the grand
duke of Lithuania, adopted the faith.”24 Certainly most of what we now know as Europe had
become Christianized by the eleventh century. Through the decline of Christianity in the East
and the rise of the Islamic Empire, the identity of Europe emerged as distinctly and inescapably
Christian. Germany was the site of the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation, and from there
Protestantism came to England, and eventually the United States of America. In one form or
another the teachings and religion of Christianity eventually came to dominate all of Europe
throughout the Middle Ages. Now, due to the vast diversity of theological viewpoints, even
within Catholic Christendom, a full investigation of the Christianization of Europe is beyond the
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scope of this current project. Yet this project can and must establish that European cultural
identity comes about in the first place because of Christianity. There is no unified Europe
without Christendom, and Christianity.
The force of European Christian cultural identity is made possible in the first place by the
non-discursive aspect of violent exclusivity. It is violent exclusivity which is the first
characteristic of technoracism.
It is widely recognized that the High Middle Ages formed an era of territorial growth and
broadening horizons for Christian Europeans through their acts of conquest, crusading,
settlement, and missionary activity across all of Europe’s frontiers. Leaving aside, for the
moment, the Jewish communities that lived squarely within the territories of the Western
Church, the borders of Christendom seem easiest to trace when set against the boundaries
of lands where the inhabitants did not believe in Christianity (such as the Muslims) or did
not practice their Christian faith in the same way as the followers of Rome (such as the
Greek Christians of Byzantium).25
During the Middle Ages, Christianity defined itself through conquering and converting all who
did not share its theology. In his book, Europe: the Emergence of an Idea, Denys Hay describes
the slow conversion of Europe as the old Roman Empire collapsed.
Admittedly the Christianization we have outlined was accomplished painfully slowly and
formed for long a mere official covering over habits of mind which were essentially
pagan. Admittedly there were differences between one sort of Christianity and
another…Yet by the thirteenth century the cross was a universal symbol from the Black
Sea to the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Circle.26
In a rather interesting turn, Hay also locates the creation of European identity in the Jewish and
Christian theological understanding of the world as divided up between the sons of Noah. The
myth of Noah’s ark and the survival of humanity through the descendants of Noah’s three sons,
Shem, Ham, and Japheth is present in both the Hebrew and Christian Sacred texts. According to
Hay, the first explicit link between the sons of Noah and the three continents of the world is
found in the writings of the Jewish historian Josephus in the first century.27 The sons of Shem
were given the Continent of Asia, and what we now think of as the Middle East, the sons of Ham
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were given the continent of Africa, and the continent of Europe went to the sons of Japheth.
Hays explains that this marks the first historical emergence of the global concept of Europe, and
it very importantly emerges within the context of theology. Furthermore, this allocation of the
continents sets the foundation for the emergence of white supremacy. “…a further step was taken
in the establishment of that fearful tradition which was sometimes to justify in later ages an
attitude to the African Negroes which precluded them from a full enjoyment of the Christian
Tradition.”28 The theological interpretation of this myth inevitably determined that the
descendants of Ham were cursed to be “a servant of servants”, for the sin of Ham, the mocking
of Noah’s naked drunken state.29 In this context, then, European Christianity is not just one
possible identity, but rather it is the supreme identity.
The paradigm case of the spread of Christian Supremacy certainly was the Crusades.30
Indeed even the term itself, Crusade, continues to symbolize an act of absolute faith in one’s
unassailable superiority. Indeed the Oxford English Dictionary notes that the word Crusade
began as a verb, and it originally meant “…a crossing or marking with the cross…“31 Hay
explains that the idea of being a Christian was synonymous with being a person, and that this
was used to justify the Crusader’s attitude.
Yet the very existence of a vernacular noun ‘Christian’, meaning no more (and no less)
than ‘person’ gives a vivid indication that religion rather than race or government or
geography formed the common basis of all groups in western society…Above all this is
the terminology of the Crusades, when the Latin West forcibly took cognizance of the
outside world.32
The term Christian was used, during the era of the crusades, to define the active crusaders and
the violent military strategists whose aim was to conquer Jerusalem. It was occasionally used to
talk about the Greek or orthodox Christians, but more and more the term “Christian” itself came
to mean those in Europe alone.33 Bret Whalen also adds that Christendom was just as keen to
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convert as it was to destroy. “…both Christian and non-Christian peoples had roles to play in the
realization of history. The expectation of Christian world order relied— somewhat
paradoxically— on mutually reinforcing languages of exclusion and inclusion, on the
identification of God’s enemies and the promise of their ultimate redemption, or at least their
opportunity to be redeemed.”34 Yet it must be emphasized that the need to convert others, the
need to overturn the beliefs and systems of other people through rational rather than military
means, remains a form of discursive violence. The tactics of conversion often involved
discursive force, the force of argument, coercion, manipulation, or intimidation to overturn the
beliefs of others. In a subtler sense, because the theological notions of Christendom are geared
towards conversion as their end goal, then there is no satisfaction to be gained in mere
agreement. It will not suffice for a person to assent to the teachings of Christianity, they must
submit to its authority. This conversion and full transformation requires an abandonment of any
previously held beliefs which conflict with that authority. One must go so far as to reject
altogether whatever one’s former, Non-Christian, identity was. The exclusionary nature of the
Christian cultural mindset demands that the Christian only ever encounters the world of
Christianity itself. Thus all Non-Christian peoples, cultures, and societies must be brought under
the dominion of Christian ideology. “Christendom was thought by contemporaries to be limitless
in its potential. It would, they believed, reach everywhere and everyone before the end of
time.”35 From such a perspective regarding the world, we already see the need for domination
and the accompanying demand that all entities submit to a unified vision of the world.
However, the violent exclusivity in Christian supremacy would not have been enough to
bring about technoracism by itself, quite simply because it existed without technoracism for
hundreds of years. Although Christendom demanded submission, it ultimately demanded that
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submission indirectly on behalf of another, that other being God. Thus the dominating claim of
technoracism remained dormant while the middle ages were ruled by the claim of monotheism.
Nonetheless, without the creation of a European Cultural identity through the work of
Christianity, technoracism would not have been possible and so Christian supremacy stands as
one of the major foundational forces for the emergence of technoracism as a cultural attitude.
From out of the first characteristic of technoracism, violent exclusivity, emerges a search
for precise particularity as the Middle Ages gave way to the rise of modernity. While Christianity
demanded indirect submission, modern science allows for the dominating claim to be issued
more directly. We have already noted that racism would be impossible without the rise of science
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Cornel West explained that the advent of exact
science preceded the advent of racism, since we see race emerge in the late seventeenth century
but exact science seems to go back as far as the late sixteenth century.36 This also coincides with
the rise of machine powered technology, and so it is here also that we must locate the emergence
of technoracism. I am arguing that the cultural attitude of technoracism is what causes the
emergence of both whiteness and enframing as particular manifestations of it. Yet it is not
surprising to find that the origins of technoracism itself coincide with the same time period as the
emergence of whiteness and enframing. A cultural attitude remains dormant unless it can become
instantiated through a manifestation, and that manifestation is simultaneously the testament to its
existence and its starting point in recorded history. The attitude always comes before the event,
but as Heidegger pointed out, this precedence is often logical rather than simply chronological.
So the second defining characteristic of technoracism is the precise particularity that
characterized the rise of modern science in the enlightenment. In that sense technoracism is also
the cause of the enlightenment, though it is the spiritual ancestor of that movement. West

149

explains that it is the age of enlightenment (1688-1789) which is responsible for the emergence
of European modernity. Further, West explains that this modernity rose up within a prosperous
system of European capitalism which depended on slavery for its profits.37 He sums up the
mindset of this Enlightenment modernity as dependent on three key features, the authority of
science, pagan neoclassicism, and the subjectivist turn in philosophy.38 Yet what is more basic
about technoracism, is how its emphasis on precision created the universality of categorization.
The authority of science, neoclassicism and the subjectivist turn in philosophy depend on
the simpler form of the universality of categorization. This is the idea that there exists a set of
categories for all things in the world and that this set of categories is absolute and definitive. Yet
the existence of such a set of categories in the first place cannot take on the character of
universality without the confidence which stems from the violent exclusivity of Christian
supremacy. This is accomplished by a conflation of the Christian moral laws and the notion of a
Natural law which exists as God’s perfect ordering design on creation. Ernst Troelstch explains
this in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, when he writes, “The church proves the
rationality and universal validity of her moral law by deriving it from the moral law of Nature, as
it existed in its perfection at the dawn of the creation of humanity…”39 The natural law is a
concept that goes back to the ancient philosophers, and found a great representative in Aristotle.
Yet in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as other important European theologians and
philosophers, the natural law takes on a new form. When the natural law becomes equated with
the order and systematicity with which God has created the world, then the world begins to
emerge as something which can be known with certainty. Since God is good and consistent then
He will neither alter His ideas nor change His mind. In his Meditations, Rene Descartes
famously argues that since God is not deceptive then all knowledge which depends on God may
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be seen as absolutely trustworthy, static, and determinate.40 Troeltsch explains that through the
teachings of Aquinas, the natural law “presents itself as the law of Reason imparted to nature;
which also as freedom is the effect of the Divine Law in man; thus the Aristotelian doctrine of
virtue and of the end, as the Stoic doctrine of the Law of Nature and of Reason, are united and
fused into one.”41 The natural law may be accessed by reason, and by reason alone it can be
known. What is more important is that knowing how the world truly is also sets a precedent for
determining our proper behavior in response to it. The idea that the world is knowable in a fixed
and determined way is a necessarily moral one, since if the world is fixed then our knowledge of
it will move us into the proper attitude and behavior towards it. So in the first place the
emergence of the universality of categorization derives from a Christian ethos.
The emergence of the universal categorization occurs when the knowledge of the world
as fixed renders human beings the masters of nature. If the world is fixed then it can be known,
but if it can be known then in an even more important way it can be mastered. Recall that
Descartes claimed that the goal of a practical philosophy, a knowledge of all things of which the
mind is capable, is to master and possess the natural world.42 However, this desire to dominate
the world cannot go forward if the Christian medieval notion of God as supreme remains intact.
Thus the precise particularity which characterizes the rationalistic and scientific aspect of
technoracism is also necessarily an atheist one. In his book The Enlightenment, An
Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism, Peter Gay defined the enlightenment thinkers as
modern pagans. “…they, unlike the others, used their classical learning to free themselves from
their Christian heritage, and then having done with the ancients, turned their face toward a
modern world view. The enlightenment was a volatile mixture of classicism, impiety, and
science; the philosophes, in a phrase, were modern pagans.”43 By distancing themselves from the
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restraints imposed by Christian theology, and by embracing the return to pre-Christian texts and
thinkers, the key thinkers of the enlightenment were able to take up a new tradition. This effected
a shift from the medieval dependence on God, to an independence of the rational thinker.
The world remained a world of fixed knowledge and inquiry, and yet there no longer
remained an automatic Christian ethos imposed by this knowledge. Thinkers like Descartes,
Bacon, Voltaire, Hume, and Kant encountered the world as brimming with the kinds of
knowledge which a rational mind could uncover. Yet at the same time this knowledge was now
no longer burdened with some filial sense of duty and piety to God. To be sure this was a tension
for many of these thinkers, as thinkers like Descartes and Kant still considered themselves to be
Christian. Yet Descartes is perhaps one of the most telling cases since, as has already been
discussed, he had a very clear notion of a scientific ethos. This ethos was guided by nothing less
than the desire to possess all knowledge in order to conquer and subdue the earth, not through a
non-discursive force of arms (though that does not mean the enlightenment Europeans were
altogether peaceful) but by a discursive force of intellect. A system of universal categorization, a
system of science, was now possible and this system was remarkably self-justifying in its ethical
approach to the world. Under such a system any approach to the world which created more
knowledge was to be praised, and any approach which imposed restraints upon thinking was to
be condemned. The precise particularity which characterizes the emergence of a system for
universal categorization ultimately lends itself to a view of the world which sees humans as
autonomous subjects of power. “The men of the enlightenment united on a vastly ambitious
program, a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom
in its many forms…freedom, in a word, of moral man to make his own way in the world.”44 This
emphasis on freedom is really an emphasis on autonomy. Yet it is not a democratic autonomy
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which is being sought, rather it is autonomy for the self-determination of those who are already
socially determined as selves. This will give rise to our final characteristic of technoracism, the
assertion of absolute subjectivism.
The supreme danger and true essential nature of technoracism is found in the assertion of
absolute subjectivism. As has already been noted in the writings of West and Descartes, there is a
strong subjectivist turn in the work of philosophy at the onset of the enlightenment. “This quest,
initiated by Descartes, gave first place to concepts of the subject, ego, or the self, and
preeminence to the notion of representative knowledge. The subject, ego, or self supplied the
principal means for subjects to make contact with objects, ideas to copy things, or concepts to
correspond to the external world.”45 West argues that this places philosophy in the position of
being the strongest and most important of the newly emerging sciences. Philosophy stands as an
overarching unifying system which brings the various sciences together so that knowledge may
be collected. Yet this collection of knowledge does not serve merely to enhance our thinking, or
even to bring humans into a relationship with the world where absolutely everything can be
known. To be sure, the subjectivist turn seeks true, universal, and reliable knowledge. However,
this knowledge is in service to something that is as noble as it is desperate. In his book, The
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Ernst Cassirer explains the enlightenment quest for knowledge
by drawing our attention to the ultimate object of this quest.
Yet its thirst for knowledge and intellectual curiosity are directed not only toward the
external world; the thought of this age is even more passionately impelled by that other
question of the nature and potentiality of thought itself. Time and again thought returns to
its point of departure from its various journeys of exploration intended to broaden the
horizon of objective reality. Pope gave brief and pregnant expression to this deep-seated
feeling of the age in the line: ‘The proper study of mankind is man.46
This subjective turn is more than mere over-confidence in the face of the success of science and
the return to classical art and literature. The turn to self is also no mere revolt against Catholic
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dominance, in some novel effort to establish the superiority of Protestant Christianity in its stead.
Peter Gay characterizes the enlightenment thinkers as modern pagans, a title which is meant to
imply their interest in classical, or at least non-Christian, thought.47 To be sure, the emergence of
Protestant Christianity also seems to precede the rise of technoracism, but insofar as that
movement remained Christian, it continues to serve as the unifying cultural identity. Some blame
might indeed be laid against the Protestant theological emphasis on the importance of individual
faith or conversion. Yet in the end, the subjectivist turn also incites a turn away from Christian
theology, even though Christian culture remains a defining aspect of technoracism. This turn
becomes necessary since it is not possible to have an absolute subjectivism while a god or any
supernatural entity retains dominion over a world which it has created. The absolute subjectivism
which is the supreme danger of technoracism is also necessarily an atheistic subjectivism. This is
not to say that atheism is somehow inherently problematic, but rather that technoracism emerged
out of the decline of Christian Supremacy and the rise of Enlightenment Atheism.
It now becomes imperative to investigate the extent to which the subjective turn is made
possible by subjectivism as absolute, as law. It is easy enough to see that many famous
enlightenment thinkers still held themselves to be subject to greater powers, be they political,
philosophical, or theological. So the notion of subjectivism as an absolute law and moral
standard needs to be explained. Cornel West illustrates how Immanuel Kant took the
subjectivism initiated by Descartes further. “Immanuel Kant deepened Descartes’s subjectivism
by erecting new formal foundations upon a transcendental subject which builds an objective
world by means of a universal conceptual scheme.”48 Kant’s system derives from the only
trustworthy source of knowledge, one’s own capacity for reason. Descartes’ entire skeptical
project is based on his experience of the untrustworthy and incomplete nature of the formalized
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systems of education and knowledge in his society.49 Hume claims that knowledge of matters of
fact depends on sensation, and he holds an intractable suspicion on anything which is
unobservable. This famously leads him to claim that physical causality is something
unknowable.50 The underlying reason for why subjectivity becomes not merely an option, but an
inescapable law is that knowledge becomes certain or knowable only insofar as I myself am the
one who knows it. The enlightenment thinkers reject the idea of knowledge derived from
systems of authority, quite simply because those systems become suspect and uncertain. Thus the
subjective turn takes on the nature of an absolute subjectivism out of a crisis of faith. For one
reason or another, the enlightenment thinkers were united in the fact that the sources of
information they trusted most of all were their own intellects. Even the empiricists of the
movement trusted not so much in the senses in general, but in their own senses and in their own
ability to comprehend the senses.
The result of this turn to autonomy is the construction of systems of knowledge which are
inherently aggressive and appear to be ultimately driven by fear. The attitude of technoracism is
founded on a deeply held sense of suspicion and anxiety. The impetus for this essentially rational
movement in history is itself nothing rational, it is a mood and a feeling. The systems of
whiteness and enframing are strong examples of the paranoid agenda inherent in technoracism.
Whiteness racializes the humans in the world and it reiterates and protects these racial categories,
since it functions from the well-founded fear that these categories are fragile. Whiteness must
time and again be defended and purified against miscegenation, non-white ideas, and black
bodies. It exists as a system which is under constant threat even though it also exists as a system
of violent supremacy. The enframing is pressed everywhere to turn the world into functional and
practical resources to serve the progress of modern society. Yet even while great advances are
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made in raising the standard of living thanks to new technologies, that same standard is
threatened by atmospheric pollution and destructive drive for resources. The very machines
which are supposed to create the trouble free life which Descartes envisioned become the
machines which create a world of new and pervasive troubles. The pain of technoracism comes
from the sense that my identity is defined by how well I use my reason to gain mastery over the
world and others. This threatens me in my own identity, so that I must always and everywhere
make the world rational, knowable, and thus available to be mastered. The ultimate danger is that
I will be so effective in converting the entities of the world into the tools and categories of my
own reason that I will cease to encounter the world altogether. Instead I will only ever encounter
the copies of my own intellect, and the entities of the world will present themselves to me as the
constructs of my own imagination. This is especially threatening when that imagination is driven
by a fear that it will never know the world and in not knowing the world will be helplessly
delivered over to it.
An investigation into the origins of the fear which drive the quest for absolute
subjectivism may yield strange and varied results. In Descartes the fear is driven by a desire to
never be deceived but also by a fear of disease, the seemingly endless wars in Europe, and the
dangers posed by a natural world out of our control. Perhaps this fear comes from the breakdown
of medieval Christian society, or from the panic which was created by the black-death or the
various diseases which plagued Europe. If it can be said that the mood of fear is the driving
force behind technoracism then surely the origins of that fear are just as important. It is perhaps
inevitable that any investigation into the non-discursive should encounter it as obscure in its
origins. Although the rational elements of technoracism are easy enough to trace, the irrational
elements only become apparent after thorough investigations into the rational. Perhaps the
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origins of the fear which drives absolute subjectivism are difficult to locate because that fear is
complex. It seems born from the medieval fear of God, the fear of devastating disease, the
European fear of invasion, or any number of different sources. A full investigation into the
feeling of paranoia in technoracism is beyond the scope of this current project, as it requires a
longer look at the history of how human society has dealt with its various fears. Instead this
dissertation now turns to our own present age and how we might respond to it.
I began this chapter by defining the idea of a cultural attitude via Heidegger’s notion of
Geschick. A cultural attitude contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both
rational and also pre-rational insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality.
Technoracism is just such a cultural attitude and it is the true cultural attitude which underlies
both whiteness and enframing. To prove this investigated the historical and cultural forces which
are found at the origins of technoracism and which give rise to it. Technoracism comes to
predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of the modern age, around the late
sixteenth century. It is defined by the three conditions of violent exclusivity, precise particularity,
and absolute subjectivism. Violent exclusivity is the characteristic which emerges in a shared
Christian European cultural identity. Europe slowly is made to convert to Christianity as
competing beliefs are destroyed or altered. When this violent exclusivity is combined with the
second characteristic, precise particularity, technoracism begins to take its full form. This precise
particularity places an emphasis on the reason and universal categorization which characterize
the rise of modernity and the sciences. Finally, this precise particularity, which characterizes the
emergence of a system of universal categorization forms a worldview which sees humans as
autonomous subjects of power. Thus the final characteristic of technoracism emerges in the form
of absolute subjectivism, and the assertion of the supreme value of the individual.
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Technoracism presents itself as an intellectual problem, insofar as it must be understood
to be confronted, but it also exists as a profoundly ethical problem which must be dealt with in
order to move forward with society. The need to confront and resolve technoracism is itself a
desire born out of technoracism since it is a need to gain some kind of power over that which has
power over us. Thus there are profound difficulties and limitations in attempting an ethical
resolution to technoracism. Yet unless we make an effort to change the ways in which
technoracism is a lived reality then we must stay firmly locked within its sway. While it remains
the attitude which informs everything we know about the world then we remain helplessly
delivered over to whiteness, enframing, and even other forms of oppressive categorization in
terms of our sex and sexuality. So the next step, and the last chapter of this project, will involve
an ethical approach to resolving the cultural attitude of technoracism by finding a way to live
through a virtue ethics based on multiplicity.
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Chapter 7 – The Virtue Ethics of Multiplicity
This chapter explores the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by means of
a virtue ethics of multiplicity. The language of discourse is now rephrased as education, and the
language of non-discourse is now the habitual. Previously discourse had been used to refer to
social movements and events which were rational and linguistic. Non-discourse had been used to
refer to events that were non-rational and physical. I will begin with a brief analysis of virtue
ethics from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Ultimately, Aristotle claims that a life of virtue
achieves happiness since it is a life of virtue which would best fulfill the ideal of being human.
The human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even though our human
identity has been largely constructed by technoracism, nonetheless there is an aspect of that
identity which eludes that construction and which informs it. Based on the ideal of multiplicity I
will define three virtues which oppose the three main constituent elements of technoracism.
Within the sphere of religious belief, the virtue of religious diversity is raised up as the mean
between the vices of Christian supremacy and religious indifference. In the sphere of
understanding, the virtue of aesthetic mystery lies in the mean between the vices of universal
categorization and total skepticism. The sphere of inter-subjectivity gives us our final virtue with
community lying in the mean between absolute subjectivism and cultural appropriation. Since
virtue is acquired through practice, I will also describe four different practices for bringing about
the virtues of multiplicity. The practices of detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue begin to
set us on the path towards our ultimate freedom from technoracism.
The way must now be prepared to approach technoracism as a matter of ethics. So far, I
have evaluated the problems of race and technology from a critical philosophical standpoint.
This approach has served mainly to elucidate the unique challenges involved in understanding
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technoracism. If technoracism exists as a cultural attitude then some might think that it only ever
remains an intellectual problem. Thus any sort of approach that seeks a resolution might take the
path of argument, explanation, and education as it seeks to change only our thinking. Yet this
purely abstract approach clearly misses out on the ways in which technoracism exists prior to
rationality, and in fact frames the limits and grounds of our rationality. It is precisely because
technoracism is a cultural attitude, which sets the conditions over and against which members of
the culture may exercise their reason, that no intellectualist approach can be successful in
completely dismantling it. Instead, the approach must involve getting at technoracism in its prerational form, through its practices. Every cultural attitude survives based on the ways in which it
manifests itself through different cultural practices which are constantly reinforced in a given
society. So the first step towards an ethical approach to technoracism requires us to find the
cultural practices which instantiate and institutionalize it as a cultural attitude.
The practices which instantiate a cultural attitude first show up on the discursive side of
that attitude, but the non-discursive also remains at work. The discourse which affects the
cultural attitude of technoracism has taken on many forms over the years. However, this
discourse does not grow out of isolated incidents. One of the more pervasive myths about all
forms of discrimination is the narrative of the anomalous isolated event. An example of how
technoracism underlies these events, both discursively and non-discursively, can be seen in the
shooting death of Tamir Rice. In November of 2014, Cleveland Police Officers Tim Loehmann
and Frank Garmback responded to a 911 call which described the twelve-year old Rice as “a guy
with a pistol.”1 Within seconds of seeing Rice, Loehmann fired his weapon, hitting Rice. Tamir
Rice would later die of his wounds at the hospital. One of the officers radioed in the shooting
saying, “Shots fired, male down, um, black male, maybe 20… Black hand gun.”2 The effort to
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identify the race and age of their victim is a moment of discursive technoracism. There must be a
logical justification for their actions, and the identification of the “black hand gun” is thrown in
after the victim is identified to show that the victim was armed. It was later discerned that the
weapon in question was a toy replica which closely resembled a handgun. Initially, the story
made headlines because Loehmann was white and Rice was black, and a minor. Here we see
technoracism operating on the discursive level which through the news media seeks to explain
tragedy in categorical and individualistically based terms. However, once it was revealed that
Loehmann had been deemed unfit for service by his previous police department then a new
narrative took over within the public arena.3 Loehmann was painted as mentally unstable, and his
shooting was explained away as the isolated actions of a “troubled” individual. The incident
began to be increasingly isolated from any larger discussions about racially motivated police
violence, and the Cleveland Police Department was seen as negligent in their hiring of
Loehmann. Here the non-discursive begins to bleed into the public discussion.
The attitude of technoracism is active in the minds of the public, moving them to accept
the new story of the unfit cop over the old story of the racist cop. Although unfitness and racism
are not mutually exclusive, nonetheless the narrative of a strange anomalous event starts to build.
Now the public starts to become convinced that Loehmann did not shoot Tamir Rice because of a
cultural and institutional bias against the image of violent and dangerous black bodies. They start
to believe that Loehmann can’t be a racist and neither is the Cleveland Police Department who
are at worst negligent in their hiring practices. The department would never advise their officers
to shoot children just because they were black. Indeed, according to the Cleveland PD the
officers involved told Rice to throw down his weapon and surrender, and that the officers were
forced to shoot since Rice reached into the waistband of his pants.4

161

However, this new narrative has problems. The department’s claim that the officers told
Rice to surrender is flatly contradicted by surveillance video footage of the incident, which
shows them opening fire immediately. There is also the fact that when they called in the
shooting, one of the officers described Rice, who at this point was still alive, as an armed twentyyear-old black male.5 Of course there is a way of interpreting these events which sees the
Cleveland PD as acting unprofessionally and Tim Loehmann as simply mentally unstable. Yet
that narrative isolates the incident from the broader cultural arc of racially motivated incidents of
police violence. Besides this event, the language of the “isolated incident” continues to be
deployed to cover over many events of police violence against black bodies. And yet, the
incidents pile up almost as fast as the bodies and they begin to reveal what was concealed there
all along. Rather than believe that there is a rash of anomalous and inexplicable incidents of
racially motivated state sanctioned violence over the past fifty years of American history, one
must come to see these incidents as connected. Yet this connection is not due to some complex
rational conspiracy. Rather, the shooting of Tamir Rice grows out of the cultural attitude which
defines certain bodies as ready-made sites of violence. What’s more, this attitude is not simply
racist, since racism is one manifestation of the deeper cultural attitude of technoracism. Through
broad rational categorization, police practices reflect and reinforce the assumptions about which
bodies are dangerous and which bodies are not, and these assumptions are not only based on
race. These categorizations are the most important ones since the mood of technoracism is one of
paranoia. The need to categorize and control the world is driven by a fear of the danger and
threat that the world poses. Tim Loehmann is not merely “unfit for duty”, he is in fact culturally
conditioned to be afraid of the black body. He is so culturally attuned to his fear that a boy with a
toy gun transforms into a fully grown, violent adult, who is wielding a deadly weapon.
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Loehmann has no time to demand that the “monster” he is confronting act in a civilized manner,
he already knows that if he tells it to drop its weapon it is merely going to shoot him instead.
Loehmann is doing what he has been trained to do; he is eliminating the threat. In fact
Loehmann’s actions proceed very strongly from the non-discursive instinctual side of
technoracism. His actions are non-discursive insofar as they are immediate, improvised, and
proceed from an unconscious reaction to the situation. Whereas the actions of the Cleveland
Police Department are much more calculated and discursive.
This analysis of technoracism as being driven by the discursive and the non-discursive
can now be resituated in terms of the educational and the habitual. Indeed, all of the language of
discourse can be rephrased in terms of education in order to show that the intentional public
discourse around certain events is designed to inform and teach us. I am not born with the
technoracist attitude, instead it must be deliberately instilled in me by a rigorous program of
instruction and teaching. Also, this education is not enough by itself to reinforce and reinstitute
technoracism unless it instills within me certain non-discursive habits. The majority of my active
life is driven by habits and practices which have been culturally conditioned.
Tim Loehmann was taught how to use a gun and he was taught how to be a police officer.
This must have included practical advice on which kinds of people are dangerous and which
kinds are not. Whether or not his formal training including directly racist ideas, the techniques of
identifying threat and danger would have become mixed with Loehmann’s own ideas about who
in his society was already dangerous. The formal education he received in the police academy
was merely layered over the less formal education he received growing up in a society that
remains deeply segregated along racial lines. Yet it was not the discursive and rational side of
racism which drives Loehmann to think “Today, I will shoot a dark skinned person because
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he/she is evil”. Instead, Loehmann shoots Rice from a non-discursive habitual, and reactionary
mood. He has been trained to deal with hostile threats through violence. So when he is
confronted by a dark skinned figure, who is wearing a hoodie and holding a gun shaped object,
Loehmann reacts predictably. He is not firing at the assailant with the gun, so much as he is
firing at the body which in his habitual mood is always-already a site of violence and danger.
Another way to describe this would be to say that Loehmann is in the habit of shooting armed
black men who “threaten” him, or at least persons who appear, in virtue of being Black, to be
“threatening” to him. Even though he has never done this before, the habit is fully formed and
operational. It is a habit born out of policing practices which continue to reveal the black body as
a site of criminality. Loehmann shot Rice because he had been educated and habituated into
having the vice of racism, a vice which is all-too common in Western American society. Yet this
language of education and habit will be the doorway into an ethics which confronts this cultural
attitude. The language of education and habit is the language of virtue ethics. To investigate
technoracism through virtue ethics, it is important to begin with an overview of virtue ethics and
its articulation in the works of Aristotle.
An ethics based on virtue finds its origins in the works of Aristotle, and so we should
begin with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Rather than giving a thorough analysis of the text we
need only define a few key concepts from Aristotle’s work. Our brief survey of virtue ethics in
Aristotle will explain how happiness is the highest good, how virtue is the only way to secure
happiness, the proper definition of virtue, and finally some examples of classic virtues.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins by claiming that all activities in life aim at
some good, though of course, not all activities achieve that good. The idea of the good here is
initially that of a kind of natural goal, a purpose and motivation towards which certain actions
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tend. “But the ends [that are sought] appear to differ; some are activities, and others are products
apart from the activities. Wherever there are ends apart from the actions, the products are by
nature better than the activities.”6 Some ends are sought because they are final ends, products,
and some ends are sought because they are means to other ends, activities. Since the final ends
are preferred, Aristotle claims that there should be some highest end of all the activities in life.
This highest end, the best good, is sought for itself and all other activities ultimately tend towards
it, and it is never sought to advance anything else.7 The name for this highest good is happiness,
and after eliminating the activities in life which will not produce it Aristotle comes up with a
definition: “Then why not say that the happy person is the one whose activities accord with
complete virtue, with an adequate supply of external goods, not just for any time but for a
complete life?”8 The goal of living is to become happy, and this happiness is a kind of lifelong
achievement, rather than a temporary emotional state. Aristotle also implies that happiness is
difficult without the external goods of wealth, power, or privilege. A truly happy person,
however, needs only to be virtuous in order to attain happiness. This is true at least in part
because happiness is a lifelong goal. Momentary misfortunes are not significant when compared
to a life spent pursuing happiness by living virtuously. “Since happiness is a certain sort of
activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue, we must examine virtue; for that will perhaps
also be a way to study happiness better.”9
So having defined the goal of life as happiness, Aristotle now gives a thorough definition
of the concept of virtue. “Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean
relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to
which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one
deficiency.”10 First, virtue is a “state that decides”. Virtue is a character trait; a defining feature
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of a person’s identity which remains constant throughout the various circumstances of life. This
state is further defined by Aristotle as the “state that makes a human being good and makes him
perform his function well.”11 Our function is to live well and to achieve our natural goal of
happiness, so virtue is a state of our character which enables us to achieve happiness by
remaining consistent. Yet this consistency is active since it is arrived at only through deliberate
choice. This state of character which decides, or rather enables us to decide, is a habitual way of
choosing. Although our state of character is consistent, it lies within our control and always
remains our responsibility. Second, virtue is a mean. It is a moderate position between the two
extremes of excess or deficiency. Rather than being perfect, following rules, or seeking the good
for others, morality is about self-control. This is not to say that the path of virtue is always found
in choosing the middle ground between two options, as Aristotle readily admits that some
activities are just wrong. For example, he argues that there can be no moral mean in actions like
adultery, since the problem with adultery is not moderating our degree of involvement but rather,
the problem is that we engage in the activity in the first place.12 Nonetheless, virtue is the path of
moderation and all of the virtues consist in choosing the middle ground between two extremes.
Finally, this mean which is a state of character born out of making consistent choices must be
understood as subordinate to reason. The guiding principles which move us to make choices that
will create a state of character which is moderate and conducive to our lifelong happiness are
rational principles. This is the most important part for Aristotle’s virtue ethics since it defines
virtue in terms that are ultimately philosophical. To be a good person means being a wise or
rational person, and one’s own reason is all the guide one needs to gain the virtues and live a life
of happiness. This is not to say that clever and smart people are automatically good, as Aristotle
readily admits that the vicious are quite intelligent, but rather that it is impossible to be good
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without living a life guided by reason. Furthermore, the vicious person may be intelligent but
they are ultimately not as rational as they could be, since the truly rational person sees that the
life of virtue is superior to the life of vice.
Some of Aristotle’s classic virtues include courage, temperance, and generosity. Courage,
for example, is the mean between the extremes of rashness, where a person has too much
confidence and too little fear, and cowardice, where a person has too much fear and too little
confidence. The courageous person is one who behaves rationally in the face of fear and danger.
Thus they know better than to be afraid when there is no good reason to be, and they know better
than to be confident when there is no good reason for that either.
One final element of Aristotle’s virtue ethics needs to be explained, namely the human
ideal. Aristotle is quite clear that happiness is the goal of all of our human activities, it is our
final good towards which we dedicate all of our actions. Happiness is our reason to exist, and it
is the meaning of our lives. Yet this meaning is based on the notion that we as human beings
have a function. “Perhaps, then, we shall find this if we first grasp the function of a human being.
For just as the good i.e., [doing] well…for whatever has a function and [characteristic] action,
seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human being if a human being
has some function.”13 The idea here is that being human means the same thing for everyone
because there is one ideal way to be human. That ideal way of being human is fulfilled whenever
we accomplish our function, and accomplishing that function is the thing that makes us happy.
Aristotle is quite clear that this kind of purposeful activity exists for all the crafts as well as for
human life in general.14 Just as the whole purpose of shoemaking is to make perfect shoes, the
whole purpose of being human is to be the perfect, or ideal, human. Yet it is only possible to
know how to make perfect shoes if one knows what makes shoes perfect, and this kind of
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knowledge we possess when we understand the nature of shoes. So also we must understand the
human nature in order to become the ideal and best humans we possibly can be. Now we might
consider the problem that comes up when a person dedicates themselves to a violent craft like
war, assassination, or bomb-making. Yet Aristotle would counter this by arguing that although
the craft of bomb-making is indeed aimed at making perfect bombs, that nonetheless the goal of
being human is not to be the best bomb maker but to be the best human. Thus a good human
might make bombs which are perfectly good for controlled explosions in demolishing old
buildings, but refuse to make bombs for an unjust war.
Aristotle argues that we do want happiness for its own sake, but this drive to be happy is
simply the natural expression of our human nature. If we were squirrels we would seek our
perfect ideal by being the best squirrels and having the most perfected squirrel lives. Yet since
we are human we seek our ideal through perfecting our humanity. Aristotle explains it like this:
“We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or
requiring reason.”15 Our function as humans is to live, but to live rationally. That we are rational
is the defining feature of our nature and thus the ideal human is one who is in every way
reasonable. Ultimately, Aristotle argues that our complete happiness is only possible by focusing
on our highest and most important virtue, the virtue which is the most perfect expression of our
nature. “If Happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord with the
supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing. The best is understanding…and to
understand what is fine and divine…this activity is the activity of study.”16 The ultimate
expression of our human nature is found in being as rational as we possibly can be. Thus we are
only ever happy when we are thinking, and when we are being philosophical.
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Yet Aristotle’s ethics raises a few problematic issues, issues which should be addressed
before proceeding with a virtue ethics approach to technoracism. Virtue ethics could be
construed as the moral institution of social norms. That is to say, what a society considers
virtuous might be little more than its own selected biases, and a particularly violent society might
consider wars of conquest to be quite virtuous activities. In that case then we would say that
technoracism has its own set of virtue ethics, and thus virtue ethics is ultimately a morally
relativistic approach. Virtue ethics also seems to have a naïve confidence in human reason, and
this is especially troubling when you consider that technoracism has been largely driven by socalled “rational” human enterprises. One might also argue that virtue ethics is only possible if we
make the move of essentialism and reduce humanity to its nature, to the exclusion of all else.
Despite these problems virtue ethics is the best approach to resolving the danger of the cultural
attitude of technoracism. Technoracism is not something which can be removed by sheer
willpower, force of argument, or by following some set of rules. It is deeply imbedded in every
aspect of our society and it can only be undone by a meticulous process. Virtue ethics presents
such a process since it works to inculcate a new approach to life by careful practice which
involves the social as well as the rational.
So we should begin by responding to the potential criticism that virtue ethics merely
reinforces problematic social norms. This is a legitimate concern since, as Alasdair Macintyre
notes, different societies seem to have different sets of virtues: “Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the
New Testament, and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us
different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different rank order of importance to
different virtues; and they have different and incompatible theories of the virtues.”17 There is
ample historical proof that European and American societies did not merely tolerate race based
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slavery but also defended and lauded it. The various sets of virtues we encounter all seem to exist
in order to define the ideal human for a particular society. Even Aristotle’s insistence on the
human ideal as rational is limited in its scope, since it must compete with the heroic ideal
presented in Homer. So virtue ethics seems equipped to tell us how to be the best members of
our society, but it simultaneously seems to reinforce the systemic injustices of our society.
Macintyre is concerned about this, and he attempts to resolve it by finding a universal criteria by
which he can define virtue for all societies.18 He explains that the important parts of social life
involve engaging in certain practices. A practice is a cooperative human activity with special
internal goods that are only achievable by working at a standard of excellence within that
practice. Macintyre gives examples of architecture and farming as practices since they are such
complex human activities.19 He then defines the virtues as those traits which enable us to achieve
the unique internal goods of practices.20 Ultimately, the practices which are valued by a society
are valued because they help to build a society which is ideal and which allows for the
emergence of the human ideal as defined by that society. As we have seen with technoracism the
human ideal is a disinterested rational resource gatherer and manipulator. Thus our other
problems now come into the light of our inquiry. The problematic thing about virtue ethics is the
ideal which defines that ethics. If the ideal is corrupt, as it is in a society driven by technoracism,
then that society will likewise be corrupt. Yet how can I claim that the human ideal in our society
is corrupt without begging the question? I respond simply by saying this, our ideal is corrupt
because it is incomplete and insufficient to actually be a human ideal.
The common theme for systems of virtue ethics, whether they be from Aristotle or
Macintyre, is the goal of achieving a virtuous ideal. The practice of the virtues is meant to
achieve, in the practitioner, a state of being that is the most desired state which a human can
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achieve. In the work of Aristotle this is especially tied to the idea of the purpose, the telos, of a
thing. For example, if we can say that non-human animals have virtues then the virtues of the red
squirrel exist so that red squirrels can achieve their ideal. Their practices involve fleeing from
predators, eating nuts, and burying food for the winter. In all that it does the squirrel is striving to
become the best possible squirrel it can be. In other words, its goal is the perfection of its form.
A squirrel behaving like a housecat would be a vicious and evil squirrel, since the true nature of
any squirrel is a squirrel nature rather than a housecat nature. It is not that the cat is evil, rather it
is evil for the squirrel to behave in a way that denies its squirrel-ness. In the most basic sense
then, achieving the perfection of one’s form is precisely where Aristotle derives his ideal of the
rational human being. Aristotle takes it as a given that to be human is ultimately to be rational.
He is also quite clear on the limitations and scope of this rationality. The rational human has both
practical and philosophical wisdom. Practical wisdom, or prudence, is the kind of thinking which
enables a person to deliberate and choose the best things, those which will lead to happiness,
based on experience.21 Philosophical wisdom is the kind of thinking which combines scientific
knowledge, of the kind gained through formal education, with intuitive reasoning, the ability to
think well about the most important things.22 Thus to be the best and most perfect human I can
possibly be I need to make supremely rational decisions. In order to be human I must make
deliberate and intentional choices, since being human means to be purposeful and proactive.
However, Aristotle’s ideal of the human is problematic and flawed, as it fails to take into account
all of the various possibilities of being human. What is needed is an ideal which most completely
takes into account something more of the diverse nature of being human.
The ideal of the virtue ethics I am proposing is called multiplicity. The ideal way of being
human is one that affords, as closely as possible, the form or nature of the human. This is of
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course complicated by all the various kinds of social constructions around human identity.
Besides if biology is our goal, i.e. we want to have the healthiest and strongest human bodies,
then we must come to grips with the impossibility of deriving moral rules from observations of
our biological human nature. The picture becomes even more complicated if we consider the
possibility that there is no essential human nature, and that to be human is to always be a social
construct. The philosophical problems begin to pile up. So, we must deal with them in some kind
of order. First in order to define the human ideal of multiplicity I must define the concept of
human nature. Then I will demonstrate how the ideal of multiplicity most perfectly harmonizes
with that human nature.
Let’s begin with the problem of human nature. To begin, the idea of the human being is
itself a kind of historical and social construction which owes most of its being to the scientific
and philosophical traditions of Enlightenment Europe. Chapters one, two, and six have already
dealt with the problems of how the human being has been traditionally defined and the cultural
attitude, technoracism, which is responsible for this definition. Therefore, any attempt to define
the human in terms of exact science or in terms of normative behavior has already been
determined by technoracism. Now we cannot sidestep past this problem by reaching back into
the past or casting about outside of our culture. The human being, and therefore the human
nature which is to form the foundation of our new virtuous ideal, must be found within the
constructed reality created by technoracism. This is necessary since our entire mode of thinking,
reasoning, and knowing are set up and delimited by that cultural attitude. This is precisely the
moment when Heidegger’s quoting of Hölderlin begins to make the most sense. “If the essence
of technology, Enframing, is the extreme danger, and if there is truth in Hölderlin’s words, then
the rule of Enframing cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all lighting-up of every revealing,
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all appearing of truth. Rather, precisely the essence of technology must harbor in itself, the
growth of the saving power.”23 The human nature and identity may very well be a social
construct, but it is a social construct which has defined the history of our language and society
for centuries. Such an idea cannot be abandoned; it must be cultivated. The history of being
human has always involved a limiting and a reduction. Human nature has been reduced to
reason, biology, behavior, instinct, emotion, relations, productivity, and many other forms in the
various writings of the thinkers who have pondered it. Within the deeper social context of
technoracism, human identity has been determined to be religious, rational, and independent.
However, ultimately that independence swallows up the others when it takes up the form of
absolute subjectivism. Yet if we follow Heidegger, and his reading of Hölderlin, then it is within
the depths of technoracism that we can find that which saves.24 In this case, that which saves is
not one, two, or three things, it is a vast multiplicity.
If one were to conduct a phenomenology of the human nature in order to get at the core
meaning of what it is to be human, one would find that the core is irrevocably complex. Even
Aristotle deals with the problem of why human beings are not perfectly happy when they simply
pursue reason alone. “After that, the next topic is friendship; for it is a virtue, or involves virtue.
Further it is most necessary for our life. For no one would choose to live without friends even if
he had all other goods.”25 Aristotle makes it clear that even if one had all other goods, including
the goods of the highest form of philosophical wisdom, the human would be unhappy without
friendship. We are not only rational creatures, we are also creatures which need friendship. In
fact Aristotle devotes a rather large portion of his ethics to defining the best kinds of friendship,
taking care to explain that the friendship of equals is not the same as the relationship of love
which exists between family members.26 So besides being rational and friendly, we are also
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essentially communal and need both family and society. Beyond what Aristotle has given us we
can also add that to be human means being emotional, aesthetic, spiritual, irrational, solitary,
playful, careful, biological, instinctual, and productive. There are many more traits besides this
which define human nature and those traits are indefinitely many. In our everyday experience of
ourselves and other people we never encounter only one thing. We always encounter multiple
aspects, multiple traits, multiple appearances, and this points to human nature as a multiplicity.
Multiplicity is the antidote to technoracism since technoracism is constantly seeking to
reduce the other to a singular thing. The enframing reduces the entire forest to a raw statistic
about the fuel efficiency of burning a set amount of wood. Racism reduces the person walking
towards me to a set of predestined behaviors which I am free to ignore or which I am driven to
pre-empt. Yet in contrast, when I take the human nature as a multiplicity then I encounter it as
constantly opening up to new possibilities. The violence of this reduction in technoracism is
based on the assumption that things exist for a singular purpose, for one practical use. The ideal
of multiplicity is a stay against that violence since I am always confronted with a person, thing,
or place which cannot be destroyed without some great loss. I cannot simply annihilate the thing
in front of me to harvest the one valuable resource it has, such annihilation removes too many
other things of value. The ideal of multiplicity is a way towards more than mere toleration of
difference. Indeed, tolerance is the standard moral position in a technoracist society which has
not yet determined the most efficient use of a thing. Instead of this, multiplicity is a way towards
being in a world that is more peaceful, more understanding, and desirous of all things different
and diverse. Now the goal of a virtue ethics is not the accumulation of a series of rules nor is it
some kind of enhanced utilitarian pleasure. The virtue ethics of multiplicity seeks the perfection
of the human form, and that perfection is the drive towards multiplicity.
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Now in order for multiplicity to be an adequate form of virtue ethics, it must have
realizable human virtues which seek to bring about that ideal. Just as the human is never one
thing but always multiple, so also there is not one core virtue but many. However, we will focus
on the three virtues which stand out in clear contrast to the three defining features of
technoracism. Since technoracism is defined by Christian Supremacy, the universality of
categorization, and absolute subjectivity then within virtue ethical thinking it is easy to see that
these three features are vices. In true Aristotelian form we oppose these vices by a mean which
lies between them and other less common vices. The practice of this mean is the virtue which
allows for the realization of the ideal of multiplicity. It will also be helpful to recall that vices are
either excessive or defective, they involve either going too far or not far enough within a certain
sphere of activity. Thus the three spheres of human activity which I will investigate are the
sphere of religious belief, the sphere of understanding, and the sphere of intersubjectivity.
The sphere of religious belief is a good place to start, since here the cultural attitude of
technoracism has already created the vice of Christian Supremacy. Within the purview of virtue
ethics Christian Supremacy is clearly a vice of defect, as opposed to excess. What’s more, it is
not the only possible vice of defect here. Though Christian Supremacy is the deficient vice in the
sphere of religious belief, within contemporary society that particular vice seems to be primarily
constrained to the United States. There is certainly a case to be made for the idea that
Christianity is no longer the supreme dominant religion in Europe, and it does not appear to be
the most globally dominant religion either. However, the vice of defect that is Christian
Supremacy is more appropriately described as the vice of solipsistic belief. This vice can be
potentially be found in the practices of those who identify as atheists, Muslims, Jews, Hindus,
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Buddhists, Christians, or any of the variations of these systems. This is the vice of having a belief
system which is narrow, overly deterministic, and dismissive of all other belief systems.
Now the concept of religious belief need not be restrained only to formally recognized
religions, as atheism also fits within this sphere, rather it has to do with the kind of faith which
we place in systems. Life is short, the world is complicated, and figuring everything out for
ourselves is simply impractical. Thus one of the most basic human intellectual practices is the
practice of faith. This faith may be informed or ignorant, haphazard or structured, but it is
necessary to our experience of life and the world. In simple terms, religious belief denotes that
set of thoughts, attitudes, and actions which involve trust in a system, especially a system which
we are unable to completely or thoroughly prove. Thus even the most skeptical of atheists,
insofar as they claim to rely on the scientific method, must have at least some faith in the
findings of scientists whose area of expertise exceeds the atheist’s own. Indeed, this faith may be
quite rational and logical, but it still requires a relinquishing of one’s rational sovereignty to the
expertise of another. Yet this relinquishing takes place within a community of other human
beings, and so the move of faith is also a social one. If there is an individual who refuses to trust
in the social systems in which all of those around her trust, then that individual quickly becomes
a social pariah. Although not explored in Aristotle, the virtue of having the right religious belief,
of the right amount, at the right time, and in the right things, is an essential feature of our
contemporary society.
The vice of excess here is religious indifference, such as one might find in certain forms
of agnosticism. Strictly speaking there certainly may exist forms of agnosticism which go
towards the defect of solipsistic belief. There may also be forms of agnosticism which tend more
towards the mean between the two vices. One of the things which Aristotle mentions is that some
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vices are quite rare, though he argues that this is due to our biological nature.27 Whether or not
biology is destiny there do seem to be some vices which are rarer than others. Such a vice is the
vice of religious indifference. The vice of religious indifference is the vice of not privileging any
particular system of belief in any way. Rather than being extremely closed off to systems of
belief outside of one’s favorite system, the excessive person in this sphere accepts all systems of
belief as equally meaningless. The indifferent person is not skeptical, per se, rather they cannot
be bothered to actually commit to a belief. The opposite of exclusionary paranoid trust is this
utter indifference and disinterest. Such individuals may paint themselves as pragmatic, though
they commit to no beliefs about pragmatism. Ultimately their problem is that they alienate
themselves from their society by trusting in none of its systems. This vice is quite rare, as the
cultural attitude of technoracism conditions one to accept solipsistic beliefs and thus indifferent
individuals are few in number. This is especially true when you consider that indifferent
individuals will neither support, create, nor reinvent social systems of belief.
The virtue of this sphere then is religious diversity, and this is the virtue which best
moves the practitioner toward the ideal of multiplicity. This virtue involves having the right
beliefs, at the right times, about the right things, and of the right amount. Since multiplicity is the
ideal then the person who practices the virtue of religious diversity must constantly choose to
believe in a variety of systems. The harmonizing of a diverse group of systems is certainly a
lifelong practice which must be engaged in a deliberate and focused manner. Yet in one sense
this is merely the process of being a mature member of society. As pluralistic, diverse, and
complex beings within a complicated world one must remain open to a wide range of belief
systems. Yet this openness is also accompanied by being closed off to certain kinds of belief
systems. Systems which are violently exclusionary, that actively promote harm or cruelty, or
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continue to perpetuate exclusionary social constructs as though they were natural types are the
kinds of systems to which one should remain closed. To be closed does not mean to be ignorant,
as certainly one must know what one is rejecting. Rather, to be closed means to not support, not
commit to, and not participate in these systems. One should understand these systems, and yet
not engage in some kind of active assistance in them. Our nature is multiform and complex, and
our happiness relies upon realizing the best possible version of our nature. Therefore, one must
eschew systems of belief which contradict that nature. This virtue even includes skepticism as a
kind of tool which is used to weed out destructive belief systems. This kind of skepticism is not
the radical version that we see in Descartes, but rather it involves a measuring and weighing the
relative values of the differences between the various belief systems. The virtue of religious
belief is a diversity of beliefs, and this is the virtue which is opposed to the vices of Christian
Supremacy, or solipsistic belief, and religious indifference.
The second sphere we will investigate is the sphere of understanding, and here the vice of
technoracism is the universality of categorization, a vice of excess. The desire to possess
knowledge and exert control over the world is a desire which is excessive in technoracism. The
push to make all things in the world fit within the categories of exact science is a move that
involves both thinking and doing. Let me be clear that the problem is not the work of carrying
out the scientific method. Many thinkers are honest about the limitations of science and the
things that it cannot or does not prove. The problem steps in when anything which falls outside
of the sphere of exact, precise, universal categorization becomes immediately relegated to the
unknowable and irrelevant. In one sense this is the vice of intellectual arrogance, and the activity
of total classification exists to mark the sites where that arrogance has imposed its dominion. An
example of this universal categorization shows up when society demands an explanation for why
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persons of color, who are athletes, seem to be superior to athletes who are not persons of color.
The question of difference is not the problem, but rather the demand is for an answer that is
totalizing and reduces the accomplishments of individuals to their genetic or biological affects. It
is the demand for universal categories which determines that certain diseases are racialized. So
long as disease remains racialized then the racial categories, and all else that they contain, remain
medically relevant to determine other things far outside the scope of those disease studies. Thus
the medical justification for race also justifies differential treatment for patients of different
races, enhanced psychological scrutiny for patients of different races, and a lack of confidence in
certain patients whom the doctors “know” will be trouble. The problem is that the universal
categories are presumed to be complete and all-encompassing. Even if these categories were
rational or evidence based, we would still be facing the reality that these categories were set up
based on troubling racist assumptions.
The sphere of understanding is best demonstrated by investigating Aristotle’s notion of
philosophical wisdom. Aristotle determined that it was the most important of all the virtues, and
the one which was most essential for happiness.28 The sphere itself contains all things which are
known and unknown, though there is an obvious paradox inherent in knowing that there are
unknown things. Of course that paradox may be easily resolved by claiming that most of what is
known is known partially and through a process of knowing. The most important thing about this
sphere for the virtuous ideal of multiplicity is to realize that understanding is a process rather
than an achievement. In one’s own personal experience, the ideas and notions which you have
had to know over the course of your life have only ever been partial. Knowledge is not a series of
boxes to be checked off, it is a complex net which links up to other points in the universe, but of
which you will only ever hold a piece. Even the holding of that piece, the knowledge you
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possess, is temporary and changing. Some of the things you now know are receding into your
memory and can be accessed again with effort, but some things you might be forgetting and you
will never remember that they have been lost. A full and rich realization of what it means to
understand must take into account our indebtedness to others who have known or do know things
upon which we depend. It must also take into account the fact that our knowledge will change,
evolve, get revised, be lost, be supplemented, be recorded, but ultimately be forgotten in the
passing of time.
The vice of defect here is also rare, as it is only ever held out by a few philosophers, and
that is the vice of total skepticism. The refusal to assent to anything as an object of the
understanding appears to be a vice. It is the other extreme version of intellectual arrogance.
Although the challenge of this vice renders it almost impossible to actually attain, there are
definitely academic attitudes and habits which sometimes tend in this direction. There were
classic skeptics who claimed to withhold their assent from any propositions, and without doing
them a disservice we may still say that this position is an extreme one. Besides which we may
wonder whether any philosopher ever successfully achieved a pure skepticism, as it seems that
any skeptic who bothered to write their ideas down or debate them with others at least thought
that they knew their skeptical position to be correct. In any case, to actually withhold your assent
from propositions, which purport to describe true or real situations, is a difficult thing to practice.
Though of course it is easier than refusing to assent to any or all propositions.
The virtue of the sphere of understanding is something I am calling aesthetic mystery.
Occasionally, Aristotle remarks that some vices are unnamed, and in the case of small honors
even the virtue is unnamed.29 Yet it will not do for our present inquiry to leave this virtue
unnamed, though rightly perhaps it has no adequate name. This is the virtue which requires us to

180

be knowledgeable but also to accept and seek out the unknown in order to preserve it in its
mystery. This is the province of art and creation so it encompasses all of the arts whether they
are low or high, fine or broad. A work of art requires knowledge, and the skills of the artist
require training and practice. Even an artist who lacks training, but possesses some innate talent,
will need to practice and perfect their work over time and thus their work evolves and develops.
The experience of art also requires knowledge and understanding of how a work has been
influenced, what it has influenced, and where it fits into the cultural and historic traditions which
gave it life. Art exists within very particular historical contexts, and even the art of an era which
is meant to imitate another era is still deeply tied to the age which originated it. Yet through all
of this, the source of art remains mysterious as it attempts to convey and also preserve that
mystery and uncertainty. This is the heart of Heidegger’s discussion of how the work of the artist
is a work of poiesis, and how it brings forth what is hidden into the world.30
The final sphere we will consider is the sphere of inter-subjectivity, and its corresponding
vice in technoracism is the vice of absolute subjectivism. This is the deficient vice in this sphere.
A person who insists on their own abilities, rights, and privileges at the expense of others in their
society shows that they lack either the care or understanding of how they are dependent on the
others they exploit. The elevation of your own absolute self-importance can only be achieved by
a denial of your reliance on and continuing relation to others. The genius at the top of their field
would still be quite foolish if they refused to acknowledge the role that their family, society, and
predecessors played in getting them to that place. They would be quite arrogant to suppose that
their position of privilege, power, authority, or notoriety was ever sustainable without the
constant care and support of other people. There are of course some geniuses who do admit their
dependency, but then there are those who are taken up by the vice of absolute subjectivism. It is
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this vice which elevates the individual as supreme over the welfare of their society. This is an
example of the kind of social sin which Augustine claims causes a person to have complete
contempt for social order.31 Yet the motivation here is not arrogance so much as it is fear and
suspicion.
A very interesting case study of a person affected with this vice would be the study of the
American institution of the Conspiracy Theorist. In brief, the conspiracy theorist tends to believe
and profess certain extremely complex systems and theories which draw connections between
historically verified events and impossible to verify facts which are supposed to undergird those
events. Yet whether or not their beliefs are true, the psychological research of the conspiracy
theorists themselves overwhelmingly presents the same picture. According to Tim Melley,
author of Empire of Conspiracy, these thinkers all hold strong individualist values but are also
experiencing a loss of control in their lives.32 The culturally imposed individualistic alienation
from other members of society creates a situation of ongoing mistrust. In its tamer incarnations
absolute subjectivism leads to conspiracy theorists, and in its most extreme cases, it leads to a
complete psychological break with society.
The sphere of intersubjectivity is most important since the heart of multiplicity requires
our primary focus in life to be on our relationships with others. All of the complex diversity of
our lives and identities is only possible through lived and shared experiences with other people.
It is people who shape us, mentor us, influence us, love us, support us, and advise us in all of the
ways that make us who we are. Even the brilliant and solitary genius cannot get far in life if
society thinks that she is mad and that her work is dangerous. The most self-sufficient of
individuals in a developed society depends on other people in innumerably complex ways. The
myth of the rugged individual is just that, a myth. Even if one is quite capable of surviving alone
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and unaided in a hostile environment like a desert or a rainforest, it was not always the case. A
survivalist needs training and a support structure that enables them to practice their skills before
they take the huge, though well calculated risk, of surviving on their own. All of that relies on
the historic and ongoing social contributions made by other people. Besides, even if one is selfmade, self-taught, and self-trained it cannot possibly be denied that for at least the first few years
of your life you were completely dependent on other people. Even the feral child must depend on
the assistance and mercies of animals stronger than itself. This dependence we have on others is
also more than a mere resource for our own advancement. Our dependence is mutual since the
investment of people in our lives declares our value to them and their ongoing involvement
declares our ongoing value.
Yet if other people have value then technoracism might try to extract that value and
separate it from the person themselves. This leads us to the vice of excess, the vice of cultural
appropriation. This vice involves the all-too common imperial activity of mining the art,
language, culture, science, and religion of persons of color in order to derive desirable practices
and valuable productions. Whenever the culturally defining dishes of a non-white society
become repackaged, often in a significantly altered form, as the food which defines all of the
people from a certain part of the world, then you have cultural appropriation. This practice has
given rise to the existence of such institutions as Indian food, Chinese food, Sushi, and Lebanese
food. Of course any global traveler understands that people from these nations eat more than
their culturally appropriated cuisine. However, the kinds of foods that are served in American
restaurant chains come to define entire people/groups in a way that is consumable, entertaining,
but ultimately trivial. Rather than undergoing the arduous task of traveling, one may consume
other parts of the world, and consume them largely for entertainment. There is also the quite
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famous appropriation of Jazz and Black Music in order to invent the American cultural
phenomenon of White Pop Music. These appropriations remain ongoing and they stem from a
kind of excessive involvement in the culture of the other. There is an intrusion and an invasion of
the spaces of non-white bodies. All the while the technoracist gaze is merely looking for artifacts
and treasures to return to its world of absolute subjectivism.
Finally, the last virtue is the virtue of community. This is the virtue of defining yourself
as a member of a society and knowing yourself within that society. It involves relating to others
in a way that is neither overreaching nor antisocial, but constrained within the bounds of a fair
politeness and a flexible propriety. Furthermore this politeness is not weak subservience but
rather it is born out of having a care for how your actions impact the well-being of those who
share your world. This means respecting the space, bodies, stories, and traditions of those you
encounter. The person who exercises the virtue of community understands and appreciates their
own identity, but they could make no sense of that identity without the broader social and
cultural context in which it falls. At the same time the virtue of community also involves
resistance against those entities which try to set themselves up as supreme. There is a risk, of
course, that community can become insular and even hostile, but it is important to bear a
distinction in mind. The virtue of community is not found in spaces protected by high fences,
redlining, or armed security, since such a space is always suspicious and projects a constant state
of threat. The people living in such a space do not trust each other, let alone anyone outside of
their group. Thus such a space is no community at all, and so the virtue of community is not
found there. The virtue of community is only found in spaces where welcome and hospitality are
lived realities.
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However, before we can bring about a virtue ethics of multiplicity in an attempt to
counter the cultural attitude of technoracism, we need to accept the limitations of this approach.
The work of cultivating the virtues is the work of a lifetime and it is a work of methodical and
deliberate change. The problems of race and modern technology have been around for hundreds
of years and it is unlikely that they will be swept away in a sudden movement of intellectual
furor or an attempt at cultivating new habits and dispositions (Hexis). The very nature of cultural
attitudes is that they tend to evolve and adapt to changing cultural pressures and situations. I am
not presenting a complete and fixed virtue ethics that might involve a permanent list of rules.
Instead, I am presenting a virtue ethics that begins with three virtues but that also needs some
practical guidance along its way. This way lies along the path of engaging in specific cultural
practices and activities, since it is through practice that a virtue is taught and reinforced. So it is
towards a virtue ethics of multiplicity that one must act, all the while anticipating and realizing
that this ethics is on its way, still arriving. Thus the practices and habits which will guide us
along the path of virtue are detachment, tarrying, vigilance, and dialogue.
The first practice we need to engage in comes to us from the work of Heidegger, and it is
the practice of detachment. “What Heidegger advocates we do is think…In the first place he does
not even mean thinking in the sense of a special mental activity. He is referring to an attitude
towards things as a whole, a general way of being in the world. Heidegger names this therapeutic
attitude “detachment”, die Gelassenheit.”33 This is a practice which is open to all people, and
which is not limited by a person’s intellectual prowess or their education. This kind of thinking is
less about a specific thought process, and more about a general adoption of a new attitude.
Rojcewicz explains the full implications of this letting and how it relates to technology.
Detachment (Ge-lassen-heit, from lassen, ‘to let’) means letting things go, letting the
things of technology go. But it is absolutely essential that this ‘letting go’ be understood
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in a double sense; it means both to let go of technological things and also to let them go
on. For Heidegger, detachment is an attitude that both says ‘no’ to technology (lets go of
it) and also says ‘yes’ to it (lets technology go on.)34
By detaching ourselves from technology, the enframing, we do more than simply try to ignore or
forget it. We accept it for what it is, and we do not attribute more to it than that. We let go of our
investment in it, and in letting go we find that the enframing cannot sustain itself without our
investment, and so it goes on to its end. Applied to technoracism in general, the letting go we
find in detachment means the adoption of a new way of approaching people and things of the
world. It means that I become aware of how technoracism attempts to determine my thinking and
also of the ways in which it succeeds. It also means that in becoming aware of this I no longer
blindly submit myself to it. The mood of technoracism is one of fear, panic, and an immediate
surrender to a mode of thinking which attacks the world before technoracism can be attacked.
Technoracism is pre-emptive and it is always engaged in an aggressive assault on the senses,
feelings, and thoughts so that we encounter the world in a heightened state of paranoia. Yet if I
practice detachment then I engage in a practice that is almost meditative. I acknowledge the fear
and the suspicion to which the calculations of that attitude deliver me. I acknowledge them, but I
do not engage with them. In so acknowledging that technoracism is a spirit of fear and selfdestruction it becomes less appealing to me. If I begin to let go of my active involvement in
reinforcing it then it no longer delivers on its promise of power and supremacy. So, by practicing
detachment I shift my personal attitude towards a calm and meditative stance which is no longer
obsessed with universal calculations, religious supremacy, and absolute subjectivism.
This shift leads quite naturally to the second practice, the practice of tarrying. In
detachment I make the effort to let go of my own investment in technoracism, but in tarrying I
make the effort to re-engage technoracism from the perspective of those who are directly hurt by
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it. The idea of tarrying comes from the work of George Yancy in Look a White! Near the end of
that book Yancy describes how he encounters white resistance to the discussion of whiteness,
race, and its implications for persons of color. He remarked that there is a reactive tendency to be
dismissive of the ways in which racism continues to have a profound, and negative, impact on
those who must endure it. “This refusal to tarry with the reality of racism and black pain and
suffering is not new…I have noticed that many whites, after I present the elevator effect,
immediately ask questions that challenge my epistemic status as a black person (and by
extension other black people) and my capacity to know when an act is racist.”35 The tendency to
assert one’s absolute subjectivism is the factor which most often overrides the experiences of
others. In an effort to control the fear which drives the effort of universal categorization, one
must assert one’s own significance as supreme. Yet it is that same anxiety which opens up the
possibility of undermining technoracism. “I encourage whites to dwell in spaces that make them
deeply uncomfortable, to stay with the multiple forms of agony that black people endure from
them… I want them to delay the hypothetical questions, to postpone their reach beyond the
present. Reaching too quickly for hope can elide the importance of exposure.”36 That very
moment of anxiety which urges one to retreat into the confidence provided by the illusion of
technoracist supremacy is a moment which can be prolonged.
If one is already practicing detachment then this is precisely the point at which you
should begin to detach. The feeling of anxiety should be the inspiration for letting go of the
comfort of technoracism, however briefly. “The unfinished present is where I want whites to
tarry (though not to permanently remain), to listen, to recognize the complexity and weight of the
current existence of white racism, to attempt to understand the ways in which they perpetuate
racism, and to begin to think about the incredible difficulty involved in undoing it.”37 The
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significance of the practice of detachment is that it is the most basic step towards the ethics of
multiplicity, precisely because it involves a shift in attitude. That shift is subtle and slight but
necessary in order to free us from the dominance of technoracism. Yet the practice of tarrying
returns us to technoracism and moves us to confront it, and especially to confront our complicity
in it. This confrontation still requires detachment though, since what I must now become
detached from even further is my affection for technoracism, or at least my affection for the
comfort brought on by its familiarity. Technoracism survives in almost all of its many
manifestations by attaching itself to our traditions and customs. Thus it reinforces itself as a
natural part of our social world, even while it continues to redefine that world in terms of
discord, inferiority, and domination. If technoracism is so persistent, then we must be equally
persistent in our efforts to undo it.
This leads us to our next practice, the practice of vigilance. Despite our best efforts to
detach ourselves, and despite the invitation which this creates for us to tarry in the space of
anxiety, technoracism continues to reinsert itself into the foundations of society. Invariably this
will mean that technoracism also reasserts itself in terms of the privileges which it conveys to
some at the expense of others. Technoracism is a cultural attitude by which those who are
society’s intellectuals, rulers, Christians, whites, males, straights, able-bodied, cisgendered, rich
etc., continue to be raised up as “normal” even when a person who perfectly fits into all of those
groups is extremely rare. That is, there are certainly members of these groups in power in
society, but it is rare to find a person who perfectly fits into every single one of these groups. So
the normal person exists as a kind of ideal which is never realized even though people in power
try to present themselves as the paragon of that ideal. As much as technoracism does damage to
those it fits into its normative groups, it does incalculably more damage to those who fit into its
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non-normative groups. This very clearly shows up with race since, as Yancy so powerfully
illustrates: “As antiracist whites continue to make mistakes and continue to falter in the face of
institutional interpellation and habituated racist reflexes, tomorrow, a Black body will be
murdered as it innocently reaches for its wallet.”38 Technoracism is a pressing matter and while
it exists in the realm of philosophy, it should also exist in the realm of activism. It is not enough
to be detached and tarrying, one should also take up the call to vigilance. Those who benefit
from technoracism by being members of its normative categories have a great responsibility and
an immediate urgency in attacking and undoing technoracism. Yet, at the same time, they must
admit and accept their continued benefit from and complicity in the very systems they seek to
undo.
Dismantling whiteness is a continuous project…This however is the ambiguous reality of
white racism. Antiracist whites must not flee this ambiguity, but continue to undo white
racism even as it repositions them as privileged…In other words, while ‘undoing’
whiteness is clearly a performative metaphor, it does not presuppose an ontology of the
self that is capable, through a single act of will and intention, of rising above the white
discursive streams within which that self is embedded.39
Whiteness and all of the manifestations of technoracism are things which must be continuously
and intentionally undermined. The practice of vigilance is not one of keeping watch over the socalled enemy, but of keeping watch over ourselves and the cultural attitude which we nurture,
even while we try to overcome it. Since it is really we, who are our own enemy in the
maintaining and sustaining of technoracism. Vigilance, then, involves an active giving up of
those privileges and powers, a relinquishing which is also deeply tied to detachment. “There
must be the call, the continuous effort, to disarticulate whiteness from those juridico-political,
economic, institutional, aesthetic, and other locations that will resist disarticulation to ensure the
maintenance of white power…the white body is tied to the operations of the state as a powerful
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site of white hegemony.”40 Yet this most active and directed of all the practices would ultimately
be doomed to failure if not for the final practice.
The final practice which is necessary for cultivating a virtue ethics of multiplicity is the
practice of dialogue. It is clear enough from the particular manifestations of technoracism that
cultural attitudes play favorites. To be classed as white, within a system of white racial
supremacy, means that one has the benefit of being in the “normal” state. To be an apt user of
advanced technology means that one will be advantaged in a system of modern technology.
When it comes to technological expansion, it is necessary to remain cultured in new
technological advances in order to remain relevant in society. Now if one wants to work towards
a virtue ethics of multiplicity, but one is the recipient of the benefits of technoracism, then that
work becomes impossible to do on one’s own. Aside from the fact that it seems completely
counterintuitive to seek to dismantle a system from which you greatly benefit, there is the added
problem of how that system remains hidden. To those who actively suffer from racism, race is
much more apparent than it is to those who actively benefit from white privilege.
This is why it is important that the dynamics of white racism not solely be left in hands of
whites to theorize. Whites’ insights must be challenged and corrected by those bodies of
color that stand to suffer from the subtle blinkers that inhibit the efforts of antiracist
whites. People of color must keep whites cognizant of the limits of their visions, their
‘certainty’ regarding how to tackle whiteness.41
To be in the position of privilege means that one is uniquely qualified to undermine that system.
Yet it also means that one is uniquely inhibited in addressing the shortcomings of any approach
towards dismantling those systems of privilege. On the other hand those who suffer from such
systems are well qualified to point out and illuminate the failures of those systems. Yet, owing to
their lack of social status and privilege, those who suffer from these systems do not always find
themselves in positions of power where they are able to effect change. There is no person, or
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even persons, who is going to lead us out of technoracism. Rather, this is why it is crucial for
people to work together. In any system of virtue ethics, virtue is not something which a person
has by nature or which they are capable of acquiring on their own. Aristotle posits that some
virtues are taught directly, while other virtues can only be attained through repeated habitual
practice.42 Yet even those virtues we acquire through practice must be directed by good teachers
and good guidance. “Further the sources and means that develop each virtue also ruin it, just as
they do in a craft…Otherwise no teacher would be needed, but everyone would be born a good
or bad craftsman.”43 To effect the virtues of multiplicity we must cooperate with whatever
teachers, persons, events, or otherwise can best guide our practices to a proper cultivation of the
virtues. This cooperation can never become a mere acquiescence, however, and must always
remain an engaged and active dialogue.
Thus far we have demonstrated that technoracism is a cultural attitude which when
morally theorized takes on the character of a moral vice. This allowed us to approach a
resolution against technoracism in the form of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. By using the virtue
ethical structure of Aristotle’s Ethics we were able to demonstrate the definition of virtue ethics
and also investigate the limitations of such a viewpoint. We then found that there were at least
three virtues which could counter the particular vices of technoracism. Within the sphere of
religious belief the technoracist vice of Christian supremacy can be moderated by the virtue of
religious diversity, so long as we do not veer off into the vice of religious indifference. Within
the sphere of understanding the technoracist vice of the universality of categorization can be
moderated by the virtue of aesthetic mystery, so long as we do not veer off into the vice of
complete skepticism. Within the sphere of inter-subjectivity the technoracist vice of absolute
subjectivism can be moderated by the virtue of community, so long as we do not veer off into the
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vice of cultural appropriation. Finally, we considered the various practices which would be
necessary to bring about this virtue ethics. By practicing detached thinking, tarrying, vigilance,
and dialogue we get into the right habits to fully cultivate a true virtue of multiplicity.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have moved from a critique of whiteness and technology, through
the introduction of technoracism, and finally ending in a virtue ethics of multiplicity. Before I
conclude this project, it is important to review, though briefly, what this project has
accomplished.
In chapter one, I presented a genealogy of race in order to trace the origins of the concept
of race back to a fixed historical point. This tracing also uncovered the structures and attitude
which informed that genealogy and allowed race to appear as a globally dominant concept. I
introduced the three layered structure of the problem of race by investigating how the genealogy
of race reveals the everyday problem as the problem of correct classification. It was the
problematic structure of race which led to chapter two and the investigation of whiteness. There I
investigated the notion of whiteness as the deeper problem of race, and all of the various ways
the racial categories are understood as offshoots of an original white standard. The normative
gaze of whiteness was revealed through a discussion of white privilege and the process of how
whiteness creates other races. This also led to the supreme danger of whiteness insofar as it
retains the ability to disappear and go unknown as the supreme normative category while
simultaneously still enforcing its structures. The idea that whiteness could somehow even
precede the idea of race opened the way towards a discussion of the difference between
whiteness as an idea within race, and whiteness as tool for constructing race.
In chapter three, I analyzed that very notion of whiteness as a tool by uncovering the
technology of race. This analysis began with the work of Falguni Sheth and her idea that race is a
political tool. This became the initial point of contact between the genealogy of race and a
phenomenology of technology. Sheth argued that the technology of race is a tool of political
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discourse, that it is able to conceal its political nature behind some more official purpose, and
that it conceals our actual relationship with government behind a supposedly objective morality.
In order to construct a rich phenomenological approach to the subject, I also explored Sheth’s
analysis by looking at how it was reflected in the arts. I investigated the technology of race
through the mediums of literature and poetry, as well as looking directly at some political
discourse on the issue of race. Furthermore, by investigating how Heidegger contributes to
Sheth’s theory I was able to begin an analysis of the ways in which issues like race resist rational
discourse as functions of a basic cultural attitude. In order to initially explain the idea of the
cultural attitude, I looked to the work of Immanuel Kant to establish that the aim of this project
was to uncover the conditions which make race possible in the first place. Since race is
technological then a full understanding of it is only possible by investigating the idea of
technology, and to that end I turned my project to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.
In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I engaged in a thorough analysis of Martin
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology in his essay The Question Concerning Technology. I
began with the distinction between handwork and modern technology. This provided a
preliminary definition of technology as an instrument and a tool for human work. In ancient, or
handwork, technology the work of the crafter reveals something hidden and natural in the object.
This revelation is called poiesis and this was the true essence of ancient technology. Yet modern
technology does not gently reveal, it challenges and forces the natural world to yield up its
resources. When the human workers of modern technology are driven to yield up the resources
of the world, then we see that there is a different revelation happening in modern technology.
That revelation, of the world as merely full of useful materials and resources, is driven by a
cultural attitude called the enframing. It is in the enframing that we found the great danger posed
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by modern technology. The greatest threat of technology is that it will conceal its true nature as a
normative gaze under the mask of mere instrument. That supreme danger is the notion that we
are set up and forced into one way of seeing the world. While we are the agents who cause the
enframing to reveal the world as mere resource, we are at the same time losing our very agency.
The threat is that we will only ever encounter technology as a means to our ends, and will never
understand that technology is in many ways out of our hands, operating under its own autonomic
forces. Even more than this we will forget that technology is merely one way of seeing the
world, as our options become absorbed by the normative gaze. The entire world and ourselves as
well are threatened and endangered by the normative gaze of technology. This threat has become
so overarching that it will now be characterized as a sin.
The fifth chapter brought this project under a stark ethical heading by illuminating the
way that the problems we face in race and technology can ultimately be understood as sins. In
order to cast these problems in an ethical light which galvanizes us into action it is necessary to
view them through the religious language of sin. To that end I engaged in an analysis of religious
language. I first illuminated the historical ways in which the development of religion has
mirrored the development of race and technology and so also seems to be caught up in the same
structures. Since the goal was to see how religious language could explicate technoracism I then
turned to the ideas of sin as presented in the works of Augustine. For Augustine, sin is a matter
of intention, and what is good or bad has everything to do with the object of our desire. To that
end he organizes the things in the world according to a hierarchy of goods with God at the top,
followed by intellectual things, and then with physical goods at the bottom. He also distinguishes
between sins against God and sins against society. To sin against God would be to commit a sin
that is religious in nature by loving the lesser goods of the world more than the great good of
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God. To sin against society is to elevate one’s own importance over the importance of
maintaining social unity. Having established Augustine’s idea of sin, I then turned to see how
well this could be applied to the notions of race and technology. Racism as whiteness can be
understood as a sin against society, as a sin against the people it seeks to define. It harms those
members of society who are not white, but it also causes psychological harm even to those white
members of society. Racism is also a religious sin, as the sin of idolatry. It asserts itself as the
supreme category by which all people are to be judged, and in so doing causes a disordered state
of values in our intentions. Modern technology can also be understood as a religious sin. Since
handwork technology approaches the world with a spirit of respect and reverence and thereby
has the character of piety. Yet, for modern technology there is no ethical care for the world and
no respect for it, and so it too operates as a kind of idolatry in asserting its supremacy over every
other consideration. Modern technology was also understood as a social sin, especially since the
supreme danger in it consists in how it closes humans off to every other kind of knowing, thus
doing great harm to human society. In the end of this discussion I offer an explanation for the
validity of this approach. In the first place I argued that using religious language to explain these
concepts creates a kind of moral aesthetic where the value of how something is described is just
as important as what is described. Secondly, I claimed that this showed even more intensely how
similar were the problems of technology and race, and this prepared the way for the underlying
concept of technoracism.
In chapter six, I argued that there exists a cultural attitude, technoracism, which is prior to
whiteness and modern technology. I began by defining the idea of a cultural attitude through
Heidegger’s notion of Geschick, of which the enframing is an example. A cultural attitude
contains both discursive and non-discursive elements, so it is both rational and also pre-rational
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insofar as it defines its own conditions for rationality. I also investigated the idea of the cultural
attitude by looking at how Cornel West and Fred Evans discuss the notions of white supremacy
and oracular voices respectively. West emphasizes the rational side of the cultural attitude while
hinting at the pre-rational. Evans explained that the pre-rational, non-discursive, aspect of the
cultural attitude could be found in how certain emotions or psychological states influence
discourse. Yet the cultural attitude exists as both discursive and non-discursive with both aspects
reinforcing and undermining each other in turn. Having defined the idea of a cultural attitude I
then argued that technoracism is such a cultural attitude and that it is in fact the true cultural
attitude which underlies both racism as whiteness and modern technology as the enframing. In
order to clearly explore the arguments for this I turned to an investigation of the historical and
cultural forces which are found at the origins of technoracism. I argued that technoracism is the
cultural attitude which comes to predominate in most aspects of European society at the start of
the modern age, roughly the late sixteenth century. Yet the origins of technoracism can be seen
best in how its non-discursive aspects justify their discursive counterparts. It is the cultural
attitude which is defined by the non-discursive conditions of violent exclusivity, precise
particularity, and absolute subjectivism. These in turn gave rise historically to the discourse of a
shared Christian European cultural identity, an emphasis on reason and universal categorization,
and the assertion of the value of the subject as individual. In my final estimation it seemed that
technoracism derived from the emotional condition of fear and paranoia as an attempt to resolve
those feelings. In my analysis of the discursive and non-discursive elements of technoracism, I
determined that an ethical resolution to this attitude must also involve discourse and nondiscourse. This in turn led to a virtue ethics.
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The final chapter explored the possibility of an ethical resolution to technoracism by
means of a virtue ethics of multiplicity. I rephrased the language of discourse as education, and I
rephrased the language of non-discourse as habit. This allowed me to situate all discursive
aspects of technoracism in terms of intentional plans to communicate and teach ideas. This also
allowed me to resituate the non-discursive aspects of technoracism in terms of habits born out of
repeated practices. Thus having transitioned into the language of virtue ethics I gave a brief
analysis of virtue ethics from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle defined virtue as a state
of character determined by habits that arise from deliberate choices for moderate goods between
the extremes of defect and excess. He also defined happiness as the goal of human life and
explained that only virtue could achieve happiness. Ultimately, he was convinced that a life of
virtue achieved happiness since it was a life of virtue which would best fulfill the ideal of being
human. Although there were some problems with Aristotle’s approach, I determined that the
human ideal should be best understood as the ideal of multiplicity. Even though our human
identity has been largely constructed by technoracism, nonetheless there is an aspect of that
identity which eludes that construction and which informs it. Even in the most rigorously
constructed of human identities we find there is a tendency for humans to define themselves in
terms of a vast diversity of concepts, entities, beliefs, practices, desires, and relationships. If
there is a human ideal to be aspired to then that ideal is multiplicity. Based on the ideal of
multiplicity I was able to define three virtues which oppose the three main constituent elements
of technoracism. Within the sphere of religious belief, the virtue of religious diversity is raised
up as the mean between the vices of religious supremacy and religious indifference. In the sphere
of understanding the virtue of aesthetic mystery lies in the mean between the vices of universal
categorization and total skepticism. The sphere of inter-subjectivity gives us our final virtue with
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community lying in the mean between absolute subjectivism and cultural appropriation. Since
virtue is acquired through practice then I also set out and described four different practices which
were apt for bringing about the virtues of multiplicity. Through the practice of detachment, we
engage in letting things in the world be what they are and we adopt an attitude of cooperation
rather than domination. The practice of tarrying moves one to re-engage technoracism by having
a care and respect for those who are directly hurt by it. The practice of vigilance is a call to
activism which extends beyond mere thinking, but only insofar as this activism is able to realize
the ways in which it continues to benefit from the very systems it seeks to undo. The final
practice is the work of dialogue and it is only through discussion with others that we can
maintain our vigilance and appropriately engage in tarrying and detachment.
Technoracism is a term which is meant to capture the essence of a cultural attitude which
is by its nature difficult to articulate. In the obvious sense this term points to some of the more
visible manifestations of this attitude by combining the terms technology and racism. To be sure,
there are numerous systemic apparitions that are driven by this attitude and no single work could
begin to unravel them all. So in closing I want to prepare the way towards future projects. The
essence of technoracism is found in its violent exclusivity, precise particularity, and absolute
subjectivism. These common themes can also be applied to an investigation of how sexism exists
in a different way under the system of technoracism. Although sexism is a very old form of
discrimination and oppression, there does seem to be a kind of cultural shift around the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries into a new kind of sexism. This shift is most notable for its move away
from a religious model of understanding sex into a scientific one. It is the biological and
scientific approach to sex and sexuality which brings ancient notions of gender under new
universal headings. For a full investigation into this project, I would need to demonstrate what
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makes sexism different in the modern era and what kind of ethical approaches might be raised
against it. The same investigation might also be applied to a study of social class. Here things are
a bit more nebulous as the class shift which takes place around the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries initially seems to create more freedom for people in society. The rise of the middle
class and the weakening of the Aristocracy at first seem to move towards a more egalitarian
society. Yet in the rise of capitalism, the rule of the nobility transitions into a rule by the new
wealthy class. Marx has already done the major work here in pointing out the dangers of
capitalism. However, there may yet be something to discover here if we think of the rise of
capitalism proceeding from that same attitude which spawned racism and modern technology.
Then it may be possible to understand capitalism proceeding from an absolute subjectivism
driven by a reactionary fear of political powers. This may in turn assist us in an ethics of class
and economy which is able to step into and beyond the notion of wealth defining power. The
goal here would be to rediscover ways in which power could be shared between classes on a way
to a complete restructuring of class itself.
In the end, the various manifestations of technoracism are too numerous to count since
they are all the institutions and systems of the world in which we grew up and now live. The
desire to overcome technoracism is even, in its own strange way, driven by that same attitude,
since it is a desire for power and domination over what threatens us. The approach here is
philosophical, and there are other approaches that are religious or political, and perhaps also
more active. Though philosophy seems to be the slow way, that caution is needed. In seeking to
undo the cultural attitude which informs everything about myself and the world I must be careful
not to rush ahead and simply take up one manifestation of technoracism to fight another. The
work must remain a process and the change must be careful. The virtues of multiplicity must
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begin with the practice of detachment, and as we let things be, the way that things are shows up
in a brilliant and colorful display.

201

Notes
Introduction
1. Crispin Sartwell, "Wigger," in White on White/Black on Black, ed. George Yancy
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 35.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Don Williams, Lord Have Mercy on a Country Boy, by Bob Mcdill, © 1991 by RCA,
Compact Disc.
5. Chamilllionaire, Ridin, by Juan Salinas, Oscar Salinas, Anthony Henderson, Hakeem
Seriki with Krayzei Bone, © 2006 by Play-N-Skillz, Compact Disc.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. G.W.F. Hegel, "Anthropology: from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences"
in The Idea of Race, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc. 2000), 42.
9. Ibid, 43.
10. George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race.
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), xvi.
11. Ibid, 34.
12. Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege.
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 4-5.
13. Isa Hopkins, “Is George Zimmerman white or Hispanic? That depends” Salon, July
16, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2013/07/16/is_george_zimmerman_white_or_hispanic/
(accessed July 31, 2015).
14. “Alfred Nobel: The Founder of the Nobel Prize”, Nobel Media AB 2014, accessed
February 20, 2014, http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/index.html.
15. "Alfred Nobel's Dynamite Companies," Nobel Media AB 2014, accessed February
20, 2014, http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/lundstrom/
16. "Alfred Nobel - Life and Philosophy," Nobel Media AB 2014, accessed February 20,
2014, http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/frangsmyr/
17. Throughout this dissertation I will make use of William Lovitt’s translations of many
of the key terms from Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. This includes such famous terms as
“enframing”, “standing reserve”, and “unconcealment”. I use Lovitt’s translation because it is the
most widespread and because much of the secondary literature on Heidegger’s philosophy of
technology, at least in English, makes use of Lovitt’s terms. However these terms present certain
limitations to a full and rich understanding of Heidegger and it should be understood that these
terms are perhaps useful, but by no means perfect
18. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," In Basic Writings: from
Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964), ed. by David Farrell Krell, trans. by
William Lovitt (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc., 1993), 318.
19. Ibid, 320-321.
20. Ibid, 322.
21. Ibid, 324.
22. Ibid, 332.
23. Ibid, 332-333.

202

24. Ibid, 320.
Chapter 1 – Genealogy of Race
1. It is important to point out that the inspiration for this chapter, as well as the working
out of the method of genealogy owes much to the writings of Cornel West, who articulated his
conception of a genealogy of race in his book Prophesy Deliverance. My take on a genealogy of
race will draw heavily from his work.
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Genealogy of Morals," in On the Genealogy of Morals
and Ecce Homo, ed. by Walter Kaufmann, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale
(New York: Random House, Inc., 1967), 27.
3. Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity.
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1982), 48.
4. Ibid.
5. OED Online. "barbarian, n. and adj." accessed June 10, 2014. Oxford University Press.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15380?redirectedFrom=barbarian
6. Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, "Introduction" in The Idea of Race, ed. Robert
Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000), viii.
7. Francois Bernier, "A new Division of the Earth" in The Idea of Race, ed. Robert
Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000), 1-2.
8. Ibid, 2.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid, 3.
11. Bernasconi and Lott, "Introduction", viii.
12. Ibid, viii-ix.
13. Bernier, "A New Division”, 3.
14. Immanuel Kant, "Of the Different Human Races" in The Idea of Race, ed. Robert
Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000), 8-9.
15. Ibid, 10.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid, 11.
20. Ibid, 12.
21. Ibid, 13.
22. Ibid, 14.
23. Ibid, 17.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid, 18.
26. Ibid, 19.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid, 20.
29. Ibid.
30. We must remember that for Kant and Bernier the skin color is the defining feature of
each race, as it is supposed to be the strongest indicator of the natural kind.
31. Ibid, 10.
32. Ibid.
203

33. Bernier, "A New Division”, 3.
34. Ibid.
35. Kant, "Of the Different Human Races," 17.
36. Bernasconi and Lott, "Introduction," ix.
37. Ibid.
38. Johan Gottfried von Herder, "Organization of the Peoples of Africa" in Race and the
Enlightenment: A Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
1997), 72-73.
39. Ibid, 75.
40. Ibid, 77.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid, 71.
43. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 50.
44. Bernier, "A New Division,” 1.
45. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 51.
46. Ibid.
47. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Third Edition, trans. by Donald A.
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), 20.
48. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 51.
49. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Third Edition, trans. and edited by Donald A.
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, Publishing Company, Inc., 1998), 35.
50. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 53.
51. Ibid. 55.
52. Ibid, 51.
53. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 35.
54. Ibid.
55. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 55.
56. Ibid, 56.
57. Ibid, 57.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid, 63.
Chapter 2 – Whiteness
1. Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race (London
and New York: Routledge, 2000), 20.
2. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 34.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, xxii.
5. Ibid, 34.
6. Ibid, 46.
7. Ibid.
8. George Yancy and John D. Caputo, “Looking ‘White’ In the Face,” The New York
Times, July 2, 2015, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/looking-white-in-the-face/
(accessed August 16, 2016).
9. Ibid, 50.
10. Ibid.
204

11. Ibid, 46.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, 46-47.
14. Nate Sloan, “Stanford historian re-examines practice of racial 'passing',” Stanford
Report, December 18, 2013, http://news.stanford.edu/news/2013/december/passing-as-white121713.html (accessed August 19, 2015)
15. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 48.
16. Ibid, 48-51
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 49.
19. Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 4-5.
20. Ibid, 5.
21. Ibid, 5-6.
22. Ibid. 6.
23. Peggy McIntosh, “White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies,” Working Paper No. 189,
(Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, 1988)
http://www.iub.edu/~tchsotl/part2/McIntosh%20White%20Privilege.pdf (accessed August 27,
2014).
24. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 56.
25. McIntosh, “White Privilege.”
26. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 56-57.
27. McIntosh, “White Privilege.”
28. Caputo, “Looking ‘White’ In the Face.”
29. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 59.
30. Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness, 23-24.
31. Ibid, 25.
32. Falguni Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 2009), 111.
33. George Yancy and Joe Feagin, “American Racism in the ‘White Frame’,” The New
York Times, July 27, 2015, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/american-racism-inthe-white-frame/ (accessed August 16, 2016).
34. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 111.
Chapter 3 – The Technology of Race
1. Throughout this dissertation I will make use of William Lovitt’s translations of many
of the key terms from Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. This includes such famous terms as
“enframing”, and “standing reserve.” I use Lovitt’s translation because it is the most widespread
and because much of the secondary literature on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, at least
in English, makes use of Lovitt’s terms. However these terms present certain limitations to a full
and rich understanding of Heidegger and it should be understood that these terms are perhaps
useful, but by no means perfect.
2. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.
3. Ibid, 4.
4. Ibid, 111.
5. Ibid, 111-112.
205

6. Perry Bacon Jr, “Foes Use Obama's Muslim Ties to Fuel Rumors about Him,” The
Washington Post, November 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/28/AR2007112802757.html (accessed September 10, 2014).
7. Kim Barker, “Obama madrassa myth debunked,” The Chicago Tribune, March 25,
2007, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-070325obama-islam-storyarchive-story.html (accessed September 10, 2014)
8. Ibid.
9. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.
10. Here I am myself merely deploying the racist rhetoric, not condoning it. However this
raises the problem of how far I am able to discuss racism without falling victim to its
categorization. In even reiterating the terms of racism in a scholarly work, I nonetheless
reconstitute them, and to a limited degree I reinstate cultural stereotypes and categories of
oppression and violence. It is clearly not my intent in this dissertation to reinforce racism, but it
is also necessary to remind our academic selves of the danger involved in the mere mention
rather than the use of words. There are terms, which owing to a history of violence and fear,
whose mention are practically inextricable from their use. So while I may attempt to hide my
discussion of racist language behind the veneer of academic objectivity, I nonetheless run the
risk of reinstating the very language I mean to deconstruct. I do not raise this here as a problem
to be avoided, but rather as a bias to be admitted.
11. In conducting a phenomenology I mean to invoke the idea of a looking at from all
available sides. I take my cues from the work of Edmund Husserl on this, even though I admit
that a complete phenomenology is impossible. Nonetheless, when I bring in considerations of art
and literature I gain a different vantage point on how race manifests in other aspects of Western
and European culture. This in turn sheds more light on the notion of race itself. So the more
diverse are my perspectives the more readily the idea of race comes to light at their center.
12. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Chapter I (1899; Project Gutenberg, 2006), par.
13, http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/526/pg526.html
13. Ibid, par. 28.
14. Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden: The United States & The Philippine
Islands, 1899.” Rudyard Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1929). 334.
15. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22-23.
16. Ibid, 23.
17. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, Chapter I, par. 29.
18. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 23.
19. Robert K. Fullinwider, “Affirmative Action and Fairness,” in Ethics: Theory and
Contemporary Issues, ed. Barbara Mackinnon (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2012),
271.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, 272.
22. Ibid, 273.
23. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race, 22.
24. Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W.
Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 132.
25. Ibid, 196.

206

26. The question may also be asked as to whether or not I should confront the racism of
Immanuel Kant. Since Kant is rather valuable to the tradition of philosophy then the practice of
overlooking Kant’s racism, or at least arguing that it has no bearing on his critical project, is
quite common in the philosophical tradition. Yet rather than falling victim to this kind of
thinking it should be noted that Kant is being included in this chapter in order to illustrate that
the kind of thinking employed by Sheth and Heidegger is situated within a history and a
tradition. We are indebted to Kant, and as such cannot ignore his contribution. This does not
mean that his contribution to racism is excused, but rather that this current dissertation would
suffer from important lacuna without Kant’s negative and positive work in the critical tradition
as well as the racist tradition in philosophy.
27. Van Davis, Jeffrey (director). Only a God Can Save Us, DVD (Salem, Germany:
Terrance Edward Davis Production, 2009).
28. Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
Chapter 4 – Heidegger and the Danger of Technology
1. Martin Heidegger. “The Question Concerning Technology” in The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1977). 3.
2. Ibid, 4.
3. Ibid, 5.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, 15.
7. Ibid, 16.
8. Ibid, 22.
9. David Farrell Krell. “Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology” in Martin
Heidegger, Basic Writings Revised and Expanded Edition: Ten Key Essays, plus the Introduction
to Being and Time, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993).
308.
10. Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2006), 15.
11. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 6.
12. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 16.
13. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 7.
14. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 18.
15. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 9.
16. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 31.
17. Ibid, 32.
18. Ibid.
19. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 10.
20. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 37.
21. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 10-11.
22. Ibid, 14.
23. Ibid, 12.
24. Ibid, 13.
207

25. George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
137.
26. Ibid, 5-16.
27. Ibid, 5, 14-15, 17.
28. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, 138.
29. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 14.
30. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 68.
31. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 15.
32. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 78.
33. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, 138.
34. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 16.
35. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 84.
36. Ibid, 85.
37. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 18.
38. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 78.
39. Daniel C. Littlefield, “The Varieties of Slave Labor,” Freedom’s Story,
TeacherServe©, National Humanities Center.
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/1609-1865/essays/slavelabor.htm (accessed
August 26, 2015).
40. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 19.
41. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, 139.
42. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 103-104.
43. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 21.
44. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, Third Edition, trans. and edited by Donald A.
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, Publishing Company, Inc., 1998), 35.
45. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 51.
46. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 22.
47. Ibid, 23.
48. Ibid, 25.
49. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 129.
50. Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc. 1992) 180.
51. Ibid, 178.
52. Ibid, 182.
53. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, 27.
54. Ibid, 28.
55. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 35
56. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, 139.
57. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 26.
58. Ibid.
59. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 27.
60. C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001),
55.
61. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 64.
62. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 27.
63. Ibid, 28.
208

Chapter 5 – Sin and Ethics
1. Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Sexism and God-Talk” in Philosophy of Religion:
Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David
Basinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 385-386.
2. Hegel, "Anthropology," 42 - 43.
3. Paul Tillich, “Religious Language as Symbolic” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected
Readings, ed. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 379.
4. Ibid, 380.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, 381.
7. Ibid.
8. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English, trans, The Tao Te Ching, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1972.
9. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1993). 1.
10. Ibid, 5.
11. Ibid, 5.
12. Ibid, 8.
13. Ibid, 24.
14. Augustine, Confessions: Second Edition, trans. F.J. Sheed, ed. Michael P. Foley
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006). 29-30.
15. Augustine, Free Choice, 26,
16. Augustine, Confessions, 46.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid, 47.
20. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” African Studies Center,
University of Pennsylvania,
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (accessed August 30,
2015).
21. George Yancy and Judith Butler, “What’s Wrong With ‘All Lives Matter’?” The New
York Times, January 12, 2015, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrongwith-all-lives-matter (accessed January 14, 2015).
22. U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Census Bureau, State and County
Quickfacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (accessed January 14, 2015).
23. Ibid.
24. Carl Sagan, Cosmos, (New York: Random House, 1980), 4.
25. Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” in The Portable Nietzsche Trans.
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1982) 125.
26. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 55.
27. Herder, "Organization of the Peoples of Africa," 77.
28. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 18
29. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 10.
30. Ibid, 10-11.
209

31. Ibid, 14.
32. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 84.
33. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 28.
Chapter 6 – Technoracism
1. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 19.
2. During the defense a question was raised as to which was ontologically prior,
whiteness or enframing. Although whiteness seems to be chronologically prior to the advent of
modern machine technology in the industrial revolution, neither manifestation is ontologically
prior to the other. They are simultaneous arisings of that which is truly ontologically prior, the
cultural attitude of technoracism.
3. "Race, n.6," OED Online, December 2014, Oxford University Press.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/157031?result=6&rskey=UhNcKV& (accessed February 09,
2015).
4. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 21-22.
5. Ibid, 24.
6. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 130.
7. Robert Louis Wilken, The First Thousand Years: A Global History of Christianity
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 257.
8. Brett Edward Whalen, Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle
Ages (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 6.
9. Ibid, 226.
10. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 47.
11. Ibid, 48.
12. Ibid.
13. Fred Evans, The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of
Diversity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 74-75.
14. Ibid, 207.
15. Ibid, 209.
16. Ibid, 210.
17. Ibid.
18. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 129.
19. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 51.
20. Fullinwider, “Affirmative Action and Fairness,” 273.
21. George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002), 53-54.
22. Whalen, Dominion of God, 2.
23. Wilken, The First Thousand Years, 257.
24. Ibid, 269.
25. Whalen, Dominion of God, 5.
26. Denys Hay. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh
University Press, 1957) 20.
27. Ibid, 9.
28. Ibid, 12.
29. Ibid, 14-15.
30. Whalen, Dominion of God, 6.
210

31. "crusade, n.," OED Online, September 2016, Oxford University Press.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45256?rskey=STssMj&result=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed
September 06, 2016).
32. Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, 56.
33. Ibid, 56-57.
34. Whalen, Dominion of God, 6.
35. Ibid, 2.
36. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 50
37. Ibid, 27.
38. Ibid.
39. Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, trans. By Olive
Wyon (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1956) 343.
40. Descartes, Meditations, 35.
41. Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, 261.
42. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 35.
43. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism
(New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1966) 8.
44. Ibid, 3.
45. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 28.
46. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. by Fritz C.A. Koelln and
James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 4-5.
47. Gay, The Enlightenment, An Interpretation, 8-9.
48. West, Prophesy Deliverance, 28.
49. Descartes, Discourse on Method, 1-10.
50. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (Auckland: The Floating Press, 2009),
Pro Quest Ebrary edition, 114.
Chapter 7 – The Virtue Ethics of Multiplicity
1. Elahe Izadi, and Peter Holley, “Video shows Cleveland officer shooting 12-year-old
Tamir Rice within seconds,” The Washington Post, November 26, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-namesin-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/ (accessed May 26, 2015).
2. Ibid.
3. Tom McCarthy, “Cleveland officer who fatally shot Tamir Rice judged unfit for duty
in 2012,” The Guardian, December 4, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2014/dec/03/officer-who-fatally-shot-tamir-rice-had-been-judged-unfit (accessed May 26,
2015).
4. Izadi and Holley “Video shows shooting within seconds”.
5. Ibid.
6. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc. 1999). 1.
7. Ibid, 1-2.
8. Ibid, 14.
9. Ibid, 16.
10. Ibid, 25.
211

11. Ibid, 24.
12. Ibid. 25.
13. Ibid. 8.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, 9.
16. Ibid, 163.
17. Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second edition (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 181.
18. Ibid, 186.
19. Ibid, 187.
20. Ibid, 191.
21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 89-90.
22. Ibid, 91.
23. Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 28.
24. Rojcewicz notes that Hölderlin does not actually use the word “power.” He speaks
only of “that which saves.” Thus a better translation for saving power would be “that which
saves”, in - Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology.
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 119.
26. Ibid, 132-134.
27. Ibid, 28-29.
28. Ibid, 163.
29. Ibid, 26.
30. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” 10.
31. Augustine, Confessions, 47.
32. Ilan Shrira and Joshua D. Foster, “Paranoia and the Roots of Conspiracy Theories,”
Psychology Today, September, 11 2008, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-narcissusin-all-us/200809/paranoia-and-the-roots-conspiracy-theories (accessed June 18, 2015).
33. Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology, 214.
34. Ibid.
35. George Yancy, Look, a White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 2012), 154-155.
36. Ibid, 157.
37. Ibid, 158.
38. Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes, 229.
39. Ibid, 232-233.
40. Ibid, 238.
41. Ibid, 240.
42. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 18-19.
43. Ibid, 19.

212

Bibliography
Aristotle. 1999. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc.
Augustine. 2006. Confessions. Second Edition. Translated by F.J. Sheed. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company Inc.
—. 1993. On Free Choice of the Will. Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company.
Bacon Jr, Perry. 2007. "Foes Use Obama's Muslim Ties to Fuel Rumors about Him." The
Washington Post. Washington D.C., November 29. Accessed September 10, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/11/28/AR2007112802757.html.
Barker, Kim. 2007. "Obama madrassa myth debunked." The Chicago Tribune. Chicago, March
25. Accessed September 10, 2014.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-070325obama-islamstory-archive-story.html.
Bernasconi, Robert and Tommy L. Lott. 2000. "Introduction." In The Idea of Race, edited by
Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, vii-xviii. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc.
Bernier, Francois. 2000. "A New Division of the Earth." In The Idea of Race, edited by Robert
and Tommy L. Lott Bernasconi, 1-5. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Butler, Judith, interview by George Yancy. 2015. “What’s Wrong With ‘All Lives Matter’?” The
New York Times. New York, January 12. Accessed January 14, 2015.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-matter.
Caputo, John D., interview by George Yancy. 2015. “Looking ‘White’ In the Face.” The New
York Times. New York, July 2. Accessed August 16, 2016.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/looking-white-in-the-face/.
Cassirer, Ernst. 2009. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Fritz C.A. and James
P. Pettegrove Koelln. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chamilllionaire and Krayzie Bone. 2006. "Ridin." The Sound of Revenge. Comp. Juan Salinas,
Oscar Salinas, Anthony Henderson Hakeem Seriki.
Conrad, Joseph. 2006. Heart of Darkness. Project Gutenberg. January 9. Accessed September
10, 2014. http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/526/pg526.html.
Descartes, Rene. 1998. Discourse on Method. Third Edition. Edited by Donald A. Cress.
Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett, Publishing Company, Inc.
—. 1993. Meditations on First Philosophy. Third Edition. Translated by Donald A. Cress.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Evans, Fred. 2008. The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Feagin, Joe, interview by George Yancy. 2015. “American Racism in the ‘White Frame.'” The
New York Times. New York, July 27. Accessed August 16, 2016.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/27/american-racism-in-the-white-frame/.
Feng, Gia-Fu and Jane English, trans. 1972. The Tao Te Ching. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Fredrickson, George M. 2002. Racism: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fullinwider, Robert K. 2012. "Affirmative Action and Fairness." In Ethics: Theory and
Contemporary Issues, 7th ed., by Barbara Mackinnon, edited by Barbara Mackinnon,
270-274. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

213

Gay, Peter. 1966. The Enlightenment, An Interpretation: The Rise of Modern Paganism. New
York: Alfed A. Knopf.
Hay, Denys. 1957. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea. Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University
Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 2000. "Anthropology: from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences." In
The Idea of Race, edited by Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, 38-45. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Heidegger, Martin. 1993. "The Question Concerning Technology." In Basic Writings: from
Being and Time (1927) to the Task of Thinking (1964), edited by David Farrell Krell,
translated by William Lovitt, 307-341. New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc.
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. "The Question Concerning Technology." In The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, by Martin Heidegger, translated by William Lovitt, 3-35.
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Herder, Johan Gottfried von. 1997. "Organization of the Peoples of Africa." In Race and the
Enlightenment: A Reader, edited by Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, 71-79. Cambridge:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Hopkins, Isa. 2013. "Is George Zimmerman white or Hispanic? That depends." Salon. Oakland,
July 16. Accessed July 31, 2015.
http://www.salon.com/2013/07/16/is_george_zimmerman_white_or_hispanic/.
Hume, David. 2009. Treatise of Human Nature : Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental
Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Pro Quest Ebrary edition. Auckland: The
Floating Press.
Izadi, Elahe and Peter Holley. 2014. "Video shows Cleveland officer shooting 12-year-old Tamir
Rice within seconds." The Washington Post. Washington D.C., November 26. Accessed
May 26, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-yearold-cleveland-boy/.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul and Allen W. Wood Guyer.
Translated by Paul and Allen W. Wood Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2000. "Of the Different Human Races." In The Idea of Race, edited by Robert
and Tommy L. Lott Bernasconi, 8-23. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
King Jr, Martin Luther. 2015. "Letter from a Birmingham Jail." African Studies Center,
University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, January 1. Accessed August 30, 2015.
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.
Kipling, Rudyard. 1929. "The White Man’s Burden: The United States & The Philippine Islands,
1899." In Rudyard Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition, by Rudyard Kipling, 334-336.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday.
Krell, David Farrell. 1993. "Introduction to The Question Concerning Technology." In Martin
Heidegger, Basic Writings Revised and Expanded Edition: Ten Key Essays, plus the
Introduction to Being and Time, by Martin Heidegger, 308-310. San Francisco: Harper
Collins Publishers.
Lewis, C.S. 2001. The Abolition of Man. San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers.
Littlefield, Daniel C. 2010. "The Varieties of Slave Labor." Freedom’s Story, TeacherServe©.
National Humanities Center. January 1. Accessed August 26, 2015.
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/freedom/1609-1865/essays/slavelabor.htm.

214

Macintyre, Alasdair. 1984. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Second Edition. Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
McCarthy, Tom. 2014. "Cleveland officer who fatally shot Tamir Rice judged unfit for duty in
2012." The Guardian. New York, December 4. Accessed May 26, 2015.
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/03/officer-who-fatally-shot-tamir-ricehad-been-judged-unfit.
McIntosh, Peggy. 1988. "White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to
See Correspondences through Work in Women’s Studies." Wellesley College Center for
Research on Women. Accessed August 27, 2014.
http://www.iub.edu/~tchsotl/part2/McIntosh%20White%20Privilege.pdf.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1967. "On the Genealogy of Morals." In On the Genealogy of Morals and
Ecce Homo, by Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Walter Kaufmann, translated by Walter
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, 1-200. New York: Random House, Inc.
—. 1982. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra." In The Portable Nietzsche, by Friedrich Nietzsche,
translated by Walter Kaufmann, 103-439. New York: Penguin Books.
Nobel Media AB 2014. 2014. Alfred Nobel - Life and Philosophy. January 1. Accessed February
20, 2014. http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/frangsmyr/.
—. 2014. Alfred Nobel: The Founder of the Nobel Prize. January 1. Accessed February 20, 2014.
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/index.html.
—. 2014. Alfred Nobel's Dynamite Companies. January 1. Accessed February 20, 2014.
http://www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/biographical/articles/lundstrom/.
Oxford University Press. 2014. barbarian, n. and adj. January 1. Accessed June 10, 2014.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15380?redirectedFrom=barbarian.
—. 2016. crusade, n. September 1. Accessed September 6, 2016.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/45256?rskey=STssMj&result=1&isAdvanced=false.
—. 2014. Race, n.6. December 1. Accessed February 9, 2015.
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/157031?result=6&rskey=UhNcKV&.
Plato. 1992. Republic. Edited by C.D.C. Reeve. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company.
Rockmore, Tom. 1992. On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Rojcewicz, Richard. 2006. The Gods and Technology: A Rreading of Heidegger. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. 2001. "Sexism and God-Talk." In Philosophy of Religion: Selected
Readings, edited by William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger Michael
Peterson, 385-390. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sagan, Carl. 1980. Cosmos. New York: Random House.
Sartwell, Crispin. 2005. "Wigger." In White on White/Black on Black, edited by George Yancy.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Seshadri-Crooks, Kalpana. 2000. Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian Analysis of Race. London and
New York: Routledge.
Sheth, Falguni. 2009. Toward a Political Philosophy of Race. Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Shrira, Ilan and Joshua D. Foster. 2008. "Paranoia and the Roots of Conspiracy Theories."
Psychology Today. Illinois, September 11. Accessed June 18, 2015.

215

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-narcissus-in-all-us/200809/paranoia-and-theroots-conspiracy-theories.
Sloan, Nate. 2013. "Stanford historian re-examines practice of racial 'passing'." Stanford Report.
Stanford, December 18. Accessed August 19, 2015.
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2013/december/passing-as-white-121713.html.
Steiner, George. 1991. Martin Heidegger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sullivan, Shannon. 2006. Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of Racial Privilege.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Tillich, Paul. 2001. "Religious Language as Symbolic." In Philosophy of Religion: Selected
Readings, edited by William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger Michael
Peterson, 379-384. New York: Oxford University Press.
Troeltsch, Ernst. 1956. The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. Translated by Olive
Wyon. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
U.S. Department of Commerce. 2015. United States Census Bureau, State and County
Quickfacts. January 1. Accessed January 14, 2015.
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
Van Davis, Jeffrey (director). 2009. Only a God Can Save Us. Produced by Terrance Edward
Davis Production.
West, Cornel. 1982. Prophesy Deliverance: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity.
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Whalen, Brett Edward. 2009. Dominion of God: Christendom and Apocalypse in the Middle
Ages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wilken, Robert Louis. 2012. The First Thousand Years: A Global History of Christianity. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Williams, Don. 1991. "Lord Have Mercy on a Country Boy." True Love. Comp. Bob McDill.
Compact Disc.
Yancy, George. 2008. Black Bodies, White Gazes: The Continuing Significance of Race.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC.
—. 2012. Look, A White!: Philosophical Essays on Whiteness. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.

216

